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ABSTRACT

THE DECOMPOSING BODY:
POSTHUMANIST MODERNISM AND THE ECOLOGY OF DECAY
Cory Austin Knudson
Jean-Michel Rabaté

This project takes its motivation from the need to theorize a subversion or decentering of the human
subject that has been widely articulated across the contemporary environmental humanities. The
critique of anthropocentrism, I have found, can be enriched by engaging with a strain of modernist
writing about bodily breakdown and postmortem decay that mobilizes innovative techniques for
confronting nonhuman entities and ecological forces that refuse neat containment within the purview
of the human symbolic economy. Bodying forth death and decay in language that performatively
disfigures itself and thus articulates its own impotence in the face of what resists or refuses
representation, modernist writers generated an aesthetic of enmeshment amid more-than-human
assemblages that exceed strictly anthropic determinations. Ultimately, I argue that Charles Baudelaire,
Djuna Barnes, and Georges Bataille constitute an acutely undertheorized form of posthumanist
modernism. Collectively, this tradition advances the writing of dead and decomposing bodies as a
means for reorienting the ontology of the human in relation to the beings and forces that precede,
traverse, and exceed the strictly anthropic.
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INTRODUCTION

Modernity, Modernism, and the Postmortem

General Overview
Over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Anglo- and Francophone literature attests to a
renewed interest in the dead body and its postmortem transformations. Corpses are made to move
and speak in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Facts in the Case of M.
Valdemar.” They are laid bare in all their material vulnerability in the war poetry of Wilfred Owen
and Louis-Ferdinand Céline’s Voyage au bout de la nuit. They are lusted after in Charles Baudelaire’s Les
Fleurs du mal and Jean Genet’s Pompes funèbres. They are the subject of still more lugubrious
degradations, like those of the necrophages that haunt the thoughts of Stephen Dedalus throughout
Ulysses or those of the necrophiliac narrator of Georges Bataille’s Bleu du ciel. Like the decomposing
body of Addie Bundren in As I Lay Dying, literary cadavers seem to have become ever more present
in all their paradoxically lively materiality over the past two centuries. And for all that, it is precisely
over this period that such historians as Philipe Ariès, Manuel Castells, and Michel de Certeau have
asserted that death and the dead have become more hidden and unspeakable, more obscene, than
ever before.
I will demonstrate in the historical overview below how these two seemingly opposing
developments actually feed into one another. It suffices to say at this point that the dead body
underwent a rapid and radical revaluation over the past two hundred years, which entailed
interweaving evolutions in ways of dealing with, thinking about, and writing about the dead.
Modernizing deathways1 particularly influenced the themes and techniques of literary modernism, as
my cursory list above hints. Many scholarly works on the centrality of the corpse in modernist
writing have been published over the past decade. These include Lisa K. Perdigao’s From Modernist
I borrow this useful term for general, hegemonic mortuary attitudes, beliefs, and practices from David Sherman, In a
Strange Room: Modernism’s Corpses and Mortal Obligation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 4 and in passim.
1

1

Entombment to Postmodernist Exhumation,2 David Sherman’s In a Strange Room, and Erin E. Edwards’s
The Modernist Corpse,3 all of which inform my own approach to the intersection of death studies and
modernist studies. However, these works and in fact most scholarly studies that occupy this juncture
tend to adopt a historicist view oriented on how the many corpses of modernism allow us to better
understand the ways in which the living have coped with the changing role of the dead in modernity.
Consequently, modernist writing is often cast simply as another cultural mirror for how the living
have woven the dead into the social fabric, creatively coped with the challenge of mortality, and
gotten on with the business of life. In this vein, Perdigao centers her analysis on the “burial plot” in
modernist literature, whereby writers find ways to thematically encrypt their dead “as a tentative
resolution to the crisis of representation” that the modern corpse presents.4 Sherman similarly
explores how twentieth-century writers mine the “semiotic volatility” of the dead body in order to
shape new forms of ethical obligation to mortal remains that no longer rely on traditional religious
attitudes but nonetheless exceed “scientific objectification, cultural disenchantment, and economic
calculation and abstraction that defined the modernization of the West.”5 Edwards addresses the
ways in which the corpse “is involved in a trenchant reexamination of who—and what—counts as
human and as ‘alive’ in the twentieth century,” not with the intention of recuperating the “humanity”
of the otherized dead, but “to problematize the categorial privileging of the human that has made
such dehumanization possible.”6 Edwards’s posthumanist approach is closest to my own;
nonetheless, she still primarily focuses on what the dead body tells us about the constitution of the
modern body politic. And while I do not deny that the literary corpse is often a useful metaphor for

Lisa K. Perdigao, From Modernist Entombment to Postmodernist Exhumation: Dead Bodies in Twentieth-Century American Fiction
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2010).
2

3

Erin E. Edwards, The Modernist Corpse: Posthumanism and the Posthumous (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2018).

4

Perdigao, From Modernist Entombment to Postmodernist Exhumation, 73 and in passim.

5

Sherman, In a Strange Room, 7.

6

Edwards, The Modernist Corpse, 2.
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understanding broader changes in western society’s apprehension of mortality, what is clear is that in
a certain understudied strain of modernist literature that I address in this project, it is the tendency of
the dead body to refuse being made use of and to erode metaphor as such that is its most crucial
characteristic.
At the most basic level, much modernist writing of the corpse contends with the simple fact
that death annihilates consciousness and the representative economies by which it is articulated and
expressed. Representing death is thus explicitly presented as paradoxical. The corpse becomes a site
of what Ronald Schleifer calls a “crisis of the word and of meaning,” since bodying forth the dead in
language must necessarily entail confronting “the facticity of death, a facticity wholly resistant to
reason, to metaphor, to revelatory representation.”7 While many writers such as those addressed by
Sherman, Edwards, and Perdigao do seek to subvert this crisis by, as Perdigao puts it, “rescu[ing]
what is lost to figurative language in the process of memorialization and transformation,”8 I am
interested in those who dwell within and even deliberately intensify the ontological and aesthetic
challenges presented by the modern cadaver and its postmortem transformations. Such writers evoke
the decomposing body specifically through language that bears witness to its own incapacity to
“deal” with that body in any totalizing sense. They explore the material afterlives of the dead to invite
meditations on the profound inadequacy of the human process of categorizing concrete experience
according to the syntax of rational thought and language when put in confrontation with the
simultaneously physiological and semiotic crisis of the dead body. These are writers for whom such
bodies insistently evade any stable sense that the living try to make of them, and it is by mobilizing
this anti-representative capacity that their work attempts to gesture, within language, beyond the
limits of language, and further, as I will argue, beyond the limits of the human itself. In doing so they

Ronald Schleifer, Rhetoric and Death: The Language of Modernism and Postmodern Discourse Theory (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1990), 1-2.
7
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form part of an understudied tradition of posthumanist modernism which it is a chief goal of my
project to articulate.
Accordingly, what I find of particular interest in the modernist corpse is not so much what it
helps us understand about modern society and its institutions as how it forces us to think the limits
of the social, how it limns the silence into which the symbolic faculty by which human beings
articulate themselves as subjects and organize their experience of the world cannot penetrate. In
Symbolic Exchange and Death, Jean Baudrillard writes that “every society has always … staved off the
abjection of natural death, the social abjection of decomposition which voids the corpse of its signs
and its social force of signification, leaving it as nothing more than a substance, and by the same
token, precipitating the group into the terror of its own symbolic decomposition.”9 Instead of tracing
the various manners in which such staving off has taken place in modernist literature, I am interested
in those who deliberately engage the decompositional force of the ecology of decay, who allow it to
derange the restricted economy of human symbolic exchange and who thereby seek to open avenues
onto an engagement with the ecological and nonhuman. In the coming chapters on Charles
Baudelaire, Djuna Barnes, and Georges Bataille, I trace the posthumanist modernist aesthetic that
enacts rhetorical and rational disarticulations of otherwise articulate (human) consciousness and
expression that are precipitated by confrontations with bodily decay.
This focus on the literary or, perhaps, anti-literary function of the corpse leads to three
primary interventions in contemporary scholarship at the intersection of modernist studies and death
studies. In the first place, I address the literary cadaver as an agentive phenomenon rather than an
artifact, a process rather than an object, for it is as an active operation of discursive derangement
rather than as a historical case study for evolving attitudes toward death that the modernist corpse
holds further interest for contemporary literary scholarship, death studies, and posthumanist studies.
Second, I excavate the underlying ecological basis of posthumanist modernism, drawing out how the

9

Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, trans. Ian Hamilton Grant, (London: Sage Publications, 1993), 180.
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modernist engagement with the postmortem bears witness to an undertheorized interest in how the
human body is materially imbricated in more-than-human relationalities, or what Bataille
provocatively calls the “general ferment of life.”10 This second intervention leads to the third, which
focuses on the contemporary problem of Anthropocene discourse’s latent anthropocentrism. Taking
the dead body as a site of vastly multispecies and multitemporal encounters, I situate my analysis in
the context of Frédéric Neyrat’s concept of the “unconstructable” and Donna Haraway’s
“compostist” perspective, arguing that posthumanist modernism and its decompositional approach
to writing the cadaver precipitates a rearticulation of the limits of the human vis-à-vis entities and
forces that precede, traverse, and exceed it. Ultimately, this tradition unsettles the centrality and selfsufficiency of the human subject and gestures toward more ontologically capacious assemblages that
help us rethink the dominant contemporary discourse of the Anthropocene.
It is with the literary thesis of my project in mind that I arrived at the title of The Decomposing
Body. “Decomposing” is meant to be read both as a description of the process of organic decay and a
description of the literary effects depictions of such processes often entail. In decomposing, the body
is in between human and natural worlds; it occupies a fraught middle space widely regarded as
dangerous to the living individual who comes in contact with it as well as a general threat to the
social fabric in general. Decomposition is liminal and undecideable: is the process by which the body
moves from culture (back) into nature. It starkly reveals the inhuman substratum on which the
human depends and which, traditionally, it must nonetheless deny in order to be human in the first
place. Edwards writes: “Its fate dictated by enzymes and colonies of bacteria, the corpse marks the
cessation of rationalist control over the body, the moment when the socially defined person is given
over to biological forces, and the molar form of the human yields to the molecular processes of
decomposition.”11 Decompositional writing, as I call it, similarly tends toward the disaggregation and

10

Georges Bataille, Erotism: Death and Sensuality, trans. Mary Dalwood (San Francisco: City Lights Press, 1986 [1957]), 56.
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derangement of symbolic coherence, a deliberate erosion of rational control over language that
gestures toward modalities of expression in excess of the strictly human. In contrast to the traditional
conception of composing a text, decompositional writing rather inserts or exploits gaps in a given
representative matrix and amplifies instabilities in its own symbolic order. Overall the general
modalities of decompositional writing that I address in this project may be generally subsumed into
two basic categories. I term them, respectively, irruption and corruption.
Irruption refers in the broadest sense to the methods by which a writer deliberately engages
with the obscene and unspeakable, inserting into literary discourse that which modern culture
traditionally rejects in order to disrupt the smooth operation of the symbolic order that makes that
discourse and that culture cohere in the first place. From Baudelaire’s love poem to carrion, to Djuna
Barnes’s interspecies eroticism, to Bataille’s necrophiliac innuendoes, each work I analyze engages
with the frightful peripheries of the social and subjects that transgress such peripheries.12 Most often,
transgressive subjects are paired with transgressive substances: oozing, dripping, dirty, and generally
uncontained, my case studies are characterized by a concern with the “stuff” that propriety demands
we keep from mentioning in any detail or, preferably, at all. The supposed danger such writing
presented to censors (as in Baudelaire’s case) and editors (as in Barnes’s) resides in their refusal to
elide or mask subjects that the social and physical body must exclude in order to maintain an
articulate sense of properly human identity. Integral to the writing of the modernist corpse in general
is the primary quality that Denis Hollier attributes to Bataille’s “heterological writing” specifically: it

As is often the case with modernist writing in general, the work of Joyce can also be taken as exemplary of this particular
operation of modernist writing. In reference to the “cloacal obsession” that Leopold Bloom dwells on in the “Aeolus”
episode, Don Gifford and Robert J. Seidmen write that Joyce is likely riffing on H.G. Wells’s “rather severe” review of The
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man printed in the New Republic on 10 March 1917, p. 159, which they quote as follows: “Like
Swift and another living Irish writer, Mr. Joyce has a cloacal obsession. He would bring back into the general picture of life
aspects which modern drainage and modern decorum have taken out of ordinary intercourse and conversation.” (Quoted in
Don Gifford and Robert J. Seidman, The Annotated Ulysses: Revised and Expanded Edition [Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1974], 137). It is not by chance that this chapter also features Bloom’s continued musings on the material fate of
Paddy Dignam’s dead body: “This morning the remains of the late Mr Patrick Dignam. Machines. Smash a man to atoms if
they got him caught. Rule the world today. His machineries are pegging away too. Like these, got out of hand: fermenting.
Working away, tearing away. And that old grey rat tearing to get in” (James Joyce, Ulysses [New York: Vintage, 1990 [1934],
118).
12

6

“introduces the unassimilated exterior of discourse into itself.”13 The effect of this irruption of the
unspeakable into the order of discourse includes performative gaps, silences, and inarticulate or notquite-human sounds, which emerge from or orbit around descriptions of the decomposing body in
modernist texts as their authors seek ways to enact the breakdown of articulate language within
language itself. By staging the fragmentation of coherent expression, by making their work sites
where symbolic order meets that which it must refuse in order to be, modernists put forth a
posthumanist aesthetic that infuses the inhuman into the literary.
Where irruption transposes the exterior of discourse into its interior, corruption moves in
the opposite direction. Baudelaire, Barnes, and Bataille not only bring the marginal into discourse,
but they also attempt to corrupt it from within by mobilizing the inherent instability and polysemy of
literary language itself. Teresa de Lauretis approaches Nightwood in these terms, writing that while
traditional narrative “reaffirms the stable, familiar ground of referential meaning,” Barnes’s work
rather plays on a “terror of uncertain signs” that disallows any sure “narrative anchorage” or “resting
point where meaning could temporarily congeal.”14 By playing on both linguistic and ontological
liminality, Barnes as well as Baudelaire and Bataille engage in proto-deconstructive projects,
amplifying the ways in which supposedly stable signs can generate several distinct meanings
simultaneously. By drawing out this tendency, they open the possibility that symbolic order as such
bears potentially unrecuperable excess at its own core. “By opening up notions beyond themselves,”
Hollier writes, such a writing “upsets the symbolic code from within and dissolves the diacritical gap
guaranteeing that words make sense”15 Corruption is thus subtler than irruption: though both
techniques enact a breakdown of discursive coherence and disturb the sequential registration of
discrete meaning on which rational narrative depends, corruption attempts to sever a text from the
moorings of stable, functional meaning, and thereby puts in motion a crisis in how human beings
13

Denis Hollier, Against Architecture: The Writings of Georges Bataille, trans. Betsy Wing (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 132.

14

Teresa de Lauretis, “Nightwood and the ‘Terror of Uncertain Signs,’” Critical Inquiry 34, supplement (Winter 2008): 117-8.
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categorize and make sense of their experiences and their own selves as articulate, discrete, and selfcontained human subjects. As de Lauretis writes, the confrontation with uncertain signs and the
process of literary corruption entailed therein forces the reader to “acquiesce to the otherness in [the
text, to] the ‘inhuman’ element of language.”16
So, decompositional writing pierces the symbolic order from the outside by infusing it with
the unassimilable, and it also opens it out from within, revealing its inability to contain its own
semiotic metastasization. It attempts to bring the inhuman into or out of literature, and thereby to
reveal the human’s imbrication in orders of being that transect the strictly anthropic. The
implications of these general operations of posthumanist modernism laid the foundation for my
second intervention into contemporary work at the intersection of modernist studies and death
studies, which I term in shorthand The Decomposing Body’s ecological thesis. In the first place, the
operations of decompositional writing are markedly similar to the way in which I have described how
the corpse’s postmortem transformations present a disturbing “naturalization” of the body. Bluntly:
absent rituals of obscuring or quickening decomposition, the corpse quickly becomes food to fauna
and flora alike. It is a site for the very material irruption of the nonhuman into the human as
detritivores and decomposers feed on its decaying tissue. It also becomes prey to itself, as the
“bacteria, fungi, protists and such” that Donna Haraway points out compose 90 percent of human

De Lauretis, “Nightwood and the Terror of Uncertain Signs,” 118. De Lauretis is here citing Paul de Man’s reflections on
Walter Benjamin’s “The Task of the Translator” (Paul De Man, “Conclusions: Walter Benjamin’s ‘The Task of the
Translator,’” in The Resistance to Theory [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986], 96), where he writes:
16

If one speaks of the inhuman, the fundamental non-human character of language, one speaks of the fundamental
non-definition of the human as such. … [w]hat in language does not pertain to the human, what in language is
unlike nature and is not assimilable, or doesn't resemble, what in language does not resemble the human in any
way, is totally indifferent in relation to the human.
De man additionally links the “inhuman” to the “way in which the letter can disrupt the ostensibly stable meaning of a
sentence and introduce in it a slippage by means of which that meaning disappears, evanesces, and by means of which all
control over that meaning is lost” (“‘Conclusions’” 89), linking this heuristic not only to the linguistic function of
corruption as described above. De Lauretis explicitly links the “implacability of figuration” signaled by de Man’s conception
of the inhuman in and of language to the “resist[ance to] the self-assurance of subjecthood,” specifically reading “women
writers who both create and dispel the illusion of full consciousness and self-presence in the subject of speech” (“Figures of
Resistance” in Figures of Resistance: Essays in Feminist Theory, ed. Patricia White [Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2007],
256). She later situates the “inhuman,” pace de Man, at the core of her notion of “the terror of uncertain signs,” which she
develops through a reading of Nightwood.

8

genomic makeup begin to turn against their host for survival via the processes of autolysis and
putrefaction. “When ‘I’ die,” Haraway writes, “all these benign and dangerous symbionts will take
over and use whatever is left of ‘my’ body, if only for a while, since ‘we’ are necessary to one another
in real time.”17 The body swells with the gas produced by this necrobiotic efflorescence, which
generates the compounds of cadaverine and putrescine that jointly give off the distinctive smell of
bodily corruption. While it may repulse other humans, the odor attracts insects—still another host of
“tiny companions” who depend for their own life on the liminal ontology of dead organic matter.
Corruption then continues its outward creep, as increasing interior pressure forces the body’s
liquified organs out of its orifices.18 A period of dry rot follows, then skeletonization, all while critters
and weather carry on their work. Eventually little is left but a body-shaped stain of dead vegetation
and liquified organic matter. Forensic anthropologist Erin Kimmerle calls this a “burial silhouette.”19
Such a term appropriately describes the haunting image evoked in Nightwood when Nora
imagines pulling Robin into her own being “as the ground things take the corpse, with minute
persistence, down into the earth, leaving a pattern of it on the grass, as if they stitched as they
descended.”20 This image of two becoming one, of cellular walls breaking down and molecules

17

C.f. Donna Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 4:
Human genomes can be found in only about 10 percent of all the cells that occupy the mundane space I call my
body; the other 90 percent of the cells are filled with the genomes of bacteria, fungi, protists, and such, some of
which play in a symphony necessary to my being alive at all, and some of which are hitching a ride and doing the
rest of me, of us, no harm. I am vastly outnumbered by my tiny companions; better put, I become an adult
human being in company with these tiny messmates. To be one is always to become with many. Some of these
personal microscopic biota are dangerous to the me who is writing this sentence; they are held in check for now
by the measures of the coordinated symphony of all the others, human cells and not, that make the conscious me
possible.

Here, the frightfulness of bodily corruption achieves its height—at least according to Leopold Bloom, who remembers
when the carriage carrying the body of Paddy Dignam overturned on the road to the cemetery and the coffin burst open on
the road: “Quite right to keep [the coffin] closed,” he thinks, “Looks horrid open. Then the insides decompose quickly.
Much better to close up all the orifices. Yes, also. With wax. The sphincter loose. Seal up all.” Joyce, Ulysses, 98. The
truncated phrase, “Yes, also” clearly refers to the corpse’s anus, as Leopold himself soon admits by the oblique reference to
“the sphincter loose.” The performative absence marking an inability to bring the unspeakable into speech is one of the
modalities of decompositional writing that will be addressed over the course of this project.
18

“Decomposing Bodies to Solve Cold Case Murders,” Vice video, 20:00, June 5, 2019,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lqRo23h01qQ&t=261s.
19
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mingling, generates associations of love and death simultaneously, inviting the reader to consider the
morbidity not only of Nora’s obsession but the possibility that any love—any desire to join with, to
be lost in another—is itself the idealized obverse of an eroticized death drive, or a necrotized
eroticism, that ultimately derives from and returns to a nostalgia for what Bataille characterizes as
continuity with nature. I will explore this further in relation to Bataille’s necro-eco-eroticism in the
theoretical overview below. But in general this disturbing confluence of apparent contraries in the
imagery of decay, where attraction and repulsion orbit one another and a sense of the human’s
imbrication in broader ecological cycles is never far afield, is one of the touchstones of the modernist
cadaver. It is in precisely these terms, for example, that Leopold Bloom muses on the graveyard
caretaker’s love life in the “Hades” episode of Ulysses: “Courting death… Shades of night hovering
here with all the dead stretched about. … Love among the tombstones. … In the midst of death we
are in life. Both ends meet.”21 For Bataille, such “mingled horror and fascination aroused in us by
decay” springs from a primal repression of humans’ immanence to the natural world: “This belief is
behind a belief we once held about nature as something wicked and shameful: decay summed up the
world we spring from and return to, and horror and shame were attached both to our birth and to
our death.”22 Literature that preoccupies itself with the ecology of decay, then, presents a return of
this repression, and confronts the reader with the ecological intimacies human beings deny as a
condition of our own humanity.
A book may bear witness to the continuity with nature that we traditionally repress or
ignore; nature, for its part, does so as well. After some time, Kimmerle points out, “the vegetation
will grow back” in the space of the burial silhouette, and in fact “it will grow back larger and do

Djuna Barnes, Nightwood: The Original Version and Related Drafts, ed. Cheryl J. Plumb (Normal, IL: Dalkey Archives Press,
1995 [1936]), 51.
20
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Joyce, Ulysses, 108.
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Bataille, Erotism, 56
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better than the surrounding area.”23 The matter that once made up the body is thus metabolized and
transformed, and the cycle continues. “We”—taken in the grand, capacious sense that Haraway
intends—rejoin what might properly be termed a “general economy,” to paraphrase Bataille’s term
for the “circulation of energy on the surface of the globe.”24 It is perhaps in decomposition that such
a simultaneously planetary and molecular vision of vastly distributed human-being can be conceived
in the first place. Posthumanist modernism mobilizes exactly this by turns terrifying and exhilarating
vision of the dead body as the site where the barriers between the human and the entities and forces
traditionally excluded from that category break down from without and within. Thus Leopold Bloom
in the graveyard once again:
I daresay the soil [of the Dublin Botanic Gardens, downhill from Prospect Cemetery] would
be quite fat with corpse manure, bones, flesh, nails, charnelhouses. Dreadful. Turning green
and pink, decomposing. Rot quick in damp earth. The lean old ones tougher. Then a kind of
a tallowy kind of a cheesy. Then begin to get black, treacle oozing out of them. Then dried
up. Deathmoths. Of course the cells or whatever they are go on living. Changing about. Live
for ever practically. Nothing to feed on, feed on themselves.25
To recapitulate: the ecological thesis of my project bases itself on the conviction that the
“crisis of representation” embodied in the decomposing body is itself embedded in a deep
engagement with ecology. That is, it is not just that posthumanist modernism writes beyond the
human but that it writes the human more fully into natural cycles and multispecies entanglements
from which human beings traditionally attempt to except ourselves as a primary condition of
humanity as such. The horror and fascination engendered by the confrontation with the corpse in
decay is not merely a residue or premonition of the incapacity of language in the face of realities that
challenge its categories, but a questioning of the categorical basis of what it means to be human as
opposed to, say, maggot, insect, animal, mushroom, flower, or soil (all of which will play their
respective parts in the chapters to come). Being written into relationality with the nonhuman does
“Decomposing Bodies to Solve Cold Case Murders,” Vice video, 20:00, June 5, 2019,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lqRo23h01qQ&t=261s.
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not just entail the body coming apart, but it becoming part of a broader economy of experience and more
multifarious participations that are not ultimately reflective of or reducible to the human.
It is with this in mind that I orient my project’s final intervention in contemporary debates in
the environmental humanities by addressing the latent anthropocentrism that so often crops up in
the discourse of the Anthropocene. As is well-known by now, this proposed geological epoch was
first put forth in the article “The ‘Anthropocene’” by Eugene F. Stoermer and Paul J. Crutzen, who
made the case in that work for “the central role of mankind in geology and ecology” since the
invention of the coal-fired steam engine in 1784.26 Strangely, while Stoermer and Crutzen
consistently emphasize how humans’ geomorphic power has grown to godlike proportions over the
past two centuries,27 the Anthropocene concept has largely evolved in the humanities as the
watchword for new and more equable conceptions of human beings’ imbrication with nonhuman
entities and ecological forces. This somewhat counterintuitive development is what Christopher
Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz call “the Event of the Anthropocene”: under the sign of the
Anthropocene, a vast ontological upheaval has taken place, which dialecticizes human beings’
simultaneous transcendence of and immanence to the natural world. Within the space of this Event,
write Erik Swyngedouw and Henrik Ernstson, “the Anthropocene ostensibly announces a more
modest and horizontal ontology, an immanent and indeterminate process of co-shaping
heterogeneous socio-natural imbroglios. This then opens the promise of a mutually supporting and
diversified nurturing of human-non-human constellations.”28
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As might be guessed from just how irreconcilable the polarities that constitute the Event of
the Anthropocene are, however, latent anthropocentrism is often smuggled into such purportedly
symmetrical ontologies. I have written extensively on this subject in “Seeing the World: Visions of
Being in the Anthropocene,” focusing primarily on the work of Timothy Morton.29 Frédéric Neyrat
in The Unconstructable Earth additionally offers an extended critique of such confusion of human
transcendence of and immanence to nature, and the concurrent tendency to corral all earth into the
strict purview of the human dominion, focusing on the work of Bruno Latour. Neyrat zeroes in on
the “anaturalizing” discourse of the Anthropocene, which, he argues, enjoins us to “forget that the
end of the division between nature/culture was effectuated for the benefit of culture, technologies,
and human colonization.”30 Over time, the insistence on social dominance over the natural has
established a “self-validating discourse,” Neyrat argues, which “posits everything as being human”
and thus authorizes a unified, singular Anthropos “to humanize what would remain of the ‘natural
world’—in other words, to anthropoform and manage the whole thing.”31
In contrast to the discourse that has turned nature into “a gigantic mirror apparatus where
the unity of the subject called ‘humanity’ constructs and contemplates itself,”32 Neyrat proposes a
reconsideration of the earth as “unconstructable,” a rediscovery of “a relation with the Earth that
goes ‘beyond human experience’” by acknowledging its “transcendental dark side”—that which
remains fundamentally “unavailable” to human conscription or inscription.33 He suggests that
dwelling within our own incapacity to anthropomorphize certain entities, substances, phenomena,
University Press, 2005); Diana H. Coole and Samantha Frost eds., New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics (Durham:
Durham University Press, 2010); Graham Harman, Immaterialism: Objects and Social Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016).
Cory Austin Knudson, “Seeing the World: Visions of Being in the Anthropocene,” Environment, Space, Place 12, no. 1
(2020): 52-82.
29

Frédéric Neyrat, The Unconstructable Earth: An Ecology of Separation, trans. Drew S. Burk (New York: Fordham University
Press, 2019 [2016]), 64.
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and forces, and thereby bearing witness to what radically exceeds the human, might allow for a
deeper and more ethically nuanced form of posthumanist thought.
Interestingly, Neyrat himself invokes the imagery of decomposition in his description of the
titular unconstructable Earth: “The Earth is most exceptional in its joining the living with the
nonliving,” he writes:
The Earth’s singularity is derived more from its quality of being a “muddy planet” than a
living planet, a mud composed of the chemical alteration of soils, of the decomposition of
the living—in other words, composed of the permanent reassemblage of the Earth subject
to the encounter of the living with the nonliving, of their history and the endless stratification
of that history.34
For Neyrat, the conscious consideration of consciousness’s own limitations before the
unconstructable entails a recognition of what precedes, traverses, and exceeds the human both
synchronically and diachronically, and the resulting vastly multispecies and multitemporal sense of
enmeshment is embodied in the living-and-dead mud of the Earth. The temporal and spatial scales
involved in the encounter of the decaying-living with the fecund-dead in the molecular
“reassemblage” of earthly humus is a down-and-dirty instantiation of what Neyrat calls the radical
eccentricity of Earth-processes, their fundamental intransigence to being reduced to the scale and
ratio of the human. The soil of the “world that we spring from and return to,” to invoke Bataille
once more, represents and precipitates the decomposition of traditional human modes of
categorizing and dividing subjects from objects, selves from others, living beings from dead, insides
from outsides, and pasts from futures on which the anaturalizing discourse of the Anthropocene
depends. It is unconstructable, in Neyrat’s phrase; it is decompositional, in mine.
By holding space for the unconstructable rather than attempting to corral it into the human
domain, Neyrat effects what Donna Haraway describes as the replacement of human being with
human becoming with. Neyrat is indeed not far, in imagery or in theory, from Haraway’s own critique
of dominant posthumanist thinking. Haraway herself circumvents the latent anthropocentrism of the
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“Event of the Anthropocene” by focusing on the sympoietic becomings of assemblages of
companion species rather than “the inclusive/exclusive binary of humanism and the
identity/difference binary of (much) posthumanism.”35 Crucially, Haraway also makes recourse to
decomposition and the soil in making her case. I quoted Haraway’s ecstatic vision of the cadaver-asmicrobiome above. It is, in fact, under the sign of this flowering corpse that Haraway proposes a
“compostist” vision of participatory becomings of companion species “where who is/are to be in/of
the world is constituted in intra- and interaction.”36 To be compostist is both a philosophical and
material position, Haraway insists, insofar as we are all “at stake in each other in every mixing and
turning of the terran compost pile. … Critters—human and not—become-with each other, compose
and decompose each other, in every scale and register of time and stuff in sympoietic tangling, in
ecological evolutionary developmental earthly worlding and unworlding.”37 Haraway thus declares
herself partisan of the humusities rather than the humanities, excavating the latent meaning of the
word “human” as its own way of rearticulating the limits of the “critter”38 designated by that name,
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along with all its internal multiplicity, its unavoidable participation in orders of experience that exceed
it in every direction.39
Posthumanist modernism, and the decompositional techniques proper to it, are allied to the
unconstructable and a compostist vision of the human, tilling the soil for the humusities as far back as
a century before Haraway gave the idea expression. The operations of the posthuman aesthetics at
work in the literary corpses I analyze in this project help to intervene in dominant Anthropocene
discourse today by identifying and interrogating latent anthropocentrism and by articulating the
material relationality of the human amidst its myriad companion species. While probing the limits of
the human and its participation in broader economies of experience, Baudelaire, Barnes, Bataille, and
the theorists I bring to bear on their work bring out the exteriorities that cut through the human
itself: the inherent multiplicity of the supposedly singular, articulate human subject that can only
eventually erupt beyond itself.
The Decomposing Body addresses texts written between the mid-nineteenth and the midtwentieth century. This is precisely the period over which Crutzen and Stoermer argue that human
beings solidified their geophysical dominance over the Earth. Representing the “transcendental dark
side” of Anthropocenic dominion, these authors and theorists rather look to the points where the
human comes up against what exceeds it, and they bear witness to the impotence of
anthropomorphization at the scene of this confrontation. In the writing of the ecology of decay,
modernist writers articulate the limits of our ability to corral the nonhuman into the human symbolic
economy and mark the threshold where the human itself becomes a participant in a more general
economy.
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Haraway offers the following in Staying With the Trouble, 169n3:
From the Proto-Germanic guman later became human, but both come soiled with the earth and its critters, rich in
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It might seem strange that the modernist cadaver should become the locus of an antianthropocentric perspective in the very midst of the extension of human geophysical power. It is in
fact precisely over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that the corpse became newly obscene
and unspeakable, and its literary refraction came to embody an underlying anxiety over the extent of
human imbrication in multispecies assemblages and the degree of human impotence in the face of
overwhelming natural processes. This paradoxical historical development allowed modernists and
their legatees to evoke such profound questions about the human being and its involvement in,
and/or dissolution into, a broader, inhuman ecology in the first place. The profound alterity that the
corpse came to embody over this period, in other words, is itself embedded within particular
historical, political, religious, and cultural conditions. In the following section, I will show that it is in
fact the conditions in which this obscenification of the dead body became dominant that allowed the
posthumanist aesthetic as embodied in the modern literary cadaver to develop. The very fact that
modernism’s corpses generate meaning precisely out of their apparent unspeakability depended in the
first place on a historical revolution in deathways that rapidly removed the bodies of the dead from
the sphere of everyday life and reorganized them into new, specialized discourses oriented by
evolving conceptions of hygiene and public health. This reorganization in turn depended on
changing material practices of corpse disposal that had their roots in the Enlightenment and the
gradual retreat of religious institutions from the ideological core of communities and political
institutions. That the base materiality of the corpse became so disgusting and unspeakable in the
nineteenth century, informing transgressive writers’ approach to the ecological and anti-symbolic
power of the dead, is the subject that will occupy the historical overview of this introduction.

Historical Overview
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The first chapter of The Decomposing Body focuses on Charles Baudelaire’s Flowers of Evil,
published in 1857. By that time, the most far-reaching revolution in western deathways since the early
Middle Ages was largely complete. This revolution wholly rearticulated the dominant matrix of
practices and attitudes relating to the dead, and formed the basis on which Baudelaire’s particular
engagement with the literary corpse would so scandalize mainstream sensibilities in the first place.
This revolution overturned a millennium of custom. The last time a similar event occurred, it was the
seventh century, when Christians began revolting against the Roman paradigm of ex urbo burial that
had held throughout Europe and North Africa since antiquity.40 Between the eighth century and the
Enlightenment, Christian cities and villages would come to be built around the dead, both literally and
spiritually. The churchyard and the bodies interred therein, that is, formed the geographic and
religious core of the Christian community for a thousand years. By the end of the eighteenth century,
however, those communities began depositing their corpses beyond bounds of the city once more,
and the rites and ministrations associated with their disposal equally began departing from the sphere
of clerical control and the control of the families of the deceased.
The literal displacement of bodies from centrally-located churches into new, purpose-built,
cosmopolitan cemeteries located beyond the borders of the community accompanied an
administrative displacement, for by the end of the eighteenth century it was a largely impersonal,
secular apparatus of governmental and medical establishments that oversaw what would become of
one’s body after death. These paired shifts were themselves bound up in a whole host of intertwined
evolutions in how people treated, thought about, and wrote about the dead. The most striking
microcosm of this epistemic revolution is undoubtedly the closing of the Cimitière les Innocents in
C.f. Philippe Ariès, The Hour of Our Death, trans. Helen Weaver (New York: Knopf, 1981 [1977]), 5-94 and especially 3036. Here, Ariès traces the French word funeste to the dictum of burying the dead beyond the city walls (thus, ex urbo) so that
the corpse will not defile (ne funestus) those who live in the city. Early church fathers often agreed with their Roman
predecessors, such as Saint John Chrysostom, who wonders, “How can one visit the churches of God, the holy temples,
when they are filled with such a terrible odor?” (quoted Ariès, The Hour of Our Death, 30). In the sixth century, the Council
of Braga relented to the growing trend of burial in and around basilicas, indicating the cultural takeover of burial ad sanctos
(near the sacred—literally, near the remains of martyrs interred in Catholic churches), which began in north Africa before
spreading to Rome. “Henceforth and for a long time to come—until the eighteenth century,” Ariès writes, “the dead ceased
to frighten the living, and the two groups coexisted witin the same places and behind the same walls” (30).
40
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1780. This event illustrates the waning dominance of Christian eschatology over ways the dead were
treated and written about, while also serving as a stage where changing conceptions of hygiene and
public health played out in spectacular fashion. The “hygiene revolution” of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries renewed, with a modern twist, very ancient notions of the inherently polluting,
dangerous, and disgusting qualities of dead bodies, and les Innocents was squarely in the center of it
all. The ideological upheaval that emptied les Innocents laid the foundation not only for the
cultivation of Baudelaire’s Flowers of Evil, but also fertilized the soil out of which posthumanist
modernism as a whole would grow.
From its founding in the twelfth century on the site of a Merovingian burial ground, the
chapel of les Innocents, like all Catholic churches in the Middle Ages, interred those who could pay
within its walls and under its floors. The nave was the most expensive and sought-after spot for
wealthy parishioners’ eternal rest. Burial ad sanctos41 fanned outward from there. With Paris’s dead
soon filling the churchyard, King Phillip II ordered the grounds to be enlarged at the end of the
twelfth century. Like in all of Europe until the nineteenth century, burial at les Innocents was a
biphasic process in nearly all cases. Most of the deceased would be interred in winding sheets only,
buried in large, collective fosses or pits until decomposition was complete, at which point their bones

See note 43 above. C.f. especially the subsections “The Dead Within the Walls” and “The Cemetery as the Bosom of the
Church,” The Hour of Hour Death, 36-42. Ariès notably writes that “the traditional opposition between the dead and the
sacred” that held throughout antiquity and during the early centuries of the Church “was … not so much forgotten as
inverted” during the spread of ad sanctos burial practices:
41

The dead body of a Christian created by its very nature a space if not altogether sacred, at least, according to the
subtle distinction of Durandus of Mende in the thirteenth century, religious. A seventeenth-century ecclesiastical
writer was struck by the difference between the Christian attitude and the belief in the impurity of the dead that
was common to the Jews and the Romans. He attempted to explain it in terms of doctrine: “This notion [on the
part of the Romans (sic?)] was quite pardonable, since the law of Moses made such a point of warning men about
the contamination they risked from contact with dead bodies.” “Since the Son of God has not only sanctified,
but crucified death itself, not only in his own person but in his members, not only by his own resurrection but by
the hope he gives to us, by instilling in our mortal bodies his quickening spirit, which is the source of eternal life,
the tombs of those who died for him have been regarded as sources of life and sanctity. This is why they have
been placed in churches, or basilicas have been bilt to contain them.” (40)
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would be moved into the charnel houses that surrounded the churchyard in order to make room for
the more recently dead. Or their remains were merely churned into the soil of the burial grounds.42
Located directly next to les Halles (and itself a market- and gathering-place in its own right), les
Innocents was a place where Parisians co-habitated with the decomposed and decomposing bodies
of the dead. The great historian of French deathways, Phillipe Ariès, who so often intertwines literary
and social history, writes that the bones “came right up to ground level, where they mixed with
stones and pebbles.”
In the days of Pantagruel, skulls and bones were lying around anywhere and provided the
beggars of les Innocents with something to “warm their bottoms.” They inspired the
meditation of Hamlet. Painters and engravers depicted them inside the churches or beside
them, mixed with the earth that had been dug out of the ground.43
One such depiction can be found in the c. 1420 Book of Hours44 illuminated by the
anonymous Spitz Master:

Coffins were not in vogue for the general public until the seventeenth century, and even then, they were generally built of
materials that were meant to decompose as fast as, if not faster, than the body within. C.f. Thomas W. Laqueur, The Work of
the Dead: A Cultural History of Mortal Remains, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 140. Here, Laqueur also
discusses mortuary practices in England that are just as true of those on the Continent vis-à-vis the general lack of funerary
memorials for most people before the eighteenth century. Before then, churchyards were characterized more by the
“undulations of the earth marking a community of bodies” than by the rows of gravestones and statuary we think of today.
Burial grounds tended to be thought of not as memorial spaces where the deceased would remain undisturbed forever, but
sites specifically intended for the decomposition of the body (c.f. Laqueur, The Work of the Dead, 151 and Ariès, The Hour of
Our Death, 58).
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Phillipe Ariès, The Hour of Our Death, 59-60.

Detail of Spitz Master and Master of Sir John Fostolf, Book of Hours, c. 1420, Ms. 57 (94.ML.26), The Paul J. Getty
Museum, fol. 194.
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Illustration 1. Detail of Spitz Master and Master of Sir John Fostolf, Book of Hours, c. 1420, Ms. 57
(94.ML.26), The Paul J. Getty Museum, fol. 194.

Here, clergymen, mourners, and bystanders resting on the pediment of the preaching cross in the
background coexist among the disarticulated bones of their deceased fellow Parisians. Bones mingle
with the dirt freshly dug out of the open grave in the foreground. Either those bones will be reburied
along with the graveyard’s newest denizen, left strewn on the surface, or added to the charnels visible
in the background: looking closely, one can recognize the skulls stacked in the garrets. Life and death
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indeed mingle strangely on (and in) the grounds of les Innocents, as further evidenced in this midseventeenth-century etching by Israel Silvestre45:

Illustration 2. Israel Silvestre, “Veuë de l’Eglise et Cimitere des Saincts Innocens a Paris,” from Catalogue

raisonné de toutes les estampes qui forment l'œuvre d'Israel Silvestre (Paris: Hachette, 2018).

The graveyard constituted a protean landscape, as Silvestre depicts: it was constantly shifting and
churning as gravediggers filled pits that had reached capacity and opened old pits for reuse. As if
itself perversely alive, the very soil where commoners were deposited was thought of as flesh-eating,
imbued as it was with the corruptive power of hecatombs of Parisians’ decomposed flesh. This
quality was not regarded with the horror it may evoke for the contemporary reader. In fact, the
decomposition and eventual disarticulation of mortal remains was the entire point of burial. This is in
drastic contradistinction to today, when we do everything we can to preserve the dead body against
natural processes, from embalming bodies (legally required of most corpses not intended for

Israel Silvestre, “Veuë de l’Eglise et Cimitere des Saincts Innocens a Paris,” from Catalogue raisonné de toutes les estampes qui
forment l'œuvre d'Israel Silvestre (Paris: Hachette, 2018).
45
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cremation or disposal within 24 hours in most of the United States) to hermetically sealing them
away in caskets fabricated from stainless steel. As I will show further below, the horror of dissolution
first arises precisely in conversation with the increasing knowledge of the ecology of decay. Before
the eighteenth century, however, the ability for certain types of earth to help decomposition along
was a “peculiar virtue,” as Ariès puts it, and “when testators, sometimes bishops, who could not be
buried in les Innocents asked that a little of its soil be placed in their coffins, it was no doubt because
of this miraculous quality.”46 Writer and bookseller Gilles Corrozet relates, in the sixteenth century,
how it was then widely regarded that “the soil of [les Innocents] is so putrefying that it will consume
a human body in nine days.”47
Just the thought of a place like the Cimitière les Innocents is indeed enough to turn our
stomachs today. But until the end of the eighteenth century, it was completely normal to see, touch,
smell, and hear the dead.48 In the first place, people for the most part died at home, and it was the
bereaved families who were primarily responsible for the storage, preparation, and transportation of
their relatives’ bodies before burial. Additionally, anyone who went to church simply couldn’t avoid
encountering human remains. Hamlet coming across Yorick’s skull was not merely a fanciful literary
device, but a reasonable occurrence in a seventeenth-century graveyard. The sensuous presence of
the dead was not restricted to the outdoors, either: clerics constantly opened vaults in the walls and
floors for the interment of affluent parishioners, so much so that contemporaries comment on the
noxious smell of chapels during mass.
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Gilles Corrozet, cited in Valentin Dufour, “Le Cimitière des Innocents,” in Fedor Hoffbauer, Paris à travers les ages : Aspects
successifs des monuments et quartiers historiques de Paris depuis le XIIIe siècle jusqu’à nos jours, vol. 2 (Paris: Firmin Didot et Cie, 187582), 29.
47

The very notion that the dead make noise (a result of the gaseous buildup described above) is unknown to many modern
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Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries in particular, this insistent sensuous presence
of death filtered into the infamously macabre themes of so much baroque art and literature. The danse
macabre in painting and engraving, transi funerary sculpture, memento mori and ubi sunt literary formulae,
and vanitas vanitatem themes circulated most intensely in the centuries following the Black Death,
suffusing European Christendom with the themes of bodily corruption and subterranean decay.49
Each author I study in The Decomposing Body pulls from this baroque macabre tradition, often quite
explicitly. Baudelaire’s Flowers of Evil, for example, often mirrors the motifs and rhythms of Pierre de
Ronsard’s poetry. Some of Ronsard’s most famous macabre poems come from his Derniers vers, a
sequence dedicated to the theme of death and the dead body. Here, the so-called “prince of poets” of
the sixteenth century writes a poem from the perspective of his own corpse:
Je n’ay plus que les os, un Squelette je semble,
Decharné, denervé, demusclé, depoulpé,
Que le trait de la mort sans pardon a frappé,
Je n’ose voir mes bras que de peur je ne tremble.
Apollon et son fils, deux grans maistres ensemble,
Ne me sçauroient guerir, leur mestier m’a trompé
Adieu plaisant Soleil, mon œil est estoupé,
Mon corps s’en va descendre où tout se desassemble.
[I have nothing more than bones, a Skeleton I seem
De-fleshed, de-nerved, de-muscled, de-pulped
That the unforgiving arrow of death struck down
I dare not look at my arms for fear of trembling
Apollo and his son, two great masters together
Could not cure me now; their profession deceived me
Farewell, pleasant Sun, my eye is stopped up
My body is going to go down where everything comes apart.]50
Ronsard’s verses enact the dissolution they describe, expressing the decay of the body first through
the punishing repetition of words beginning with “de-” and thus making language an agent of
undoing, a mirror of the biological fact of a singular entity becoming increasingly molecularized and
C.f. Merritt R. Blakeslee, “Eros and Thanatos: The Erotic Element in the Macabre Tradition in Continental Art and
Literature of the Fifteenth Century,” Fifteenth Century Studies no. 3 (January 1980).
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undone. Emphasizing this linguistic process of deformation, the speaker appropriately implies a
downward movement that I mark out in my translation with the phrases “struck down” and “going
to go down,” both of which play on the etymological root of the word cadaver as cadere, meaning to
fall or sink. The subject of Ronsard’s poetic (de-)composition in this way seems to defy resurrection
(from the Latin resurgere, meaning to lift or restore) just as the body described defies the intercession
of Apollo and his son Asclepius, the god of medicine. As the eyes descend the page in the act of
reading, the body descends into the earth, coming increasingly apart as it does so. “Mon corps s’en va
descendre où tout se disassemble [My body is going to go down where everything comes apart],” says
the speaker. Ronsard’s idiosyncratic approach to the traditional sonnet form is also operative in this
process of degradation and disassembly. For the second two lines of the second verse each introduce
an internal rhyme—“soleil/estoupé” and “descendre/disassemble”—which operate as a kind of
implied caesura, dividing what had been a larger whole in the previous verse into smaller, less
coherent linguistic units. Prefiguring modernist decomposition, Ronsard’s language takes on a
deliberately apophatic function of deforming both the object of his poem the symbolic structure of
the poem itself.
But there is one unavoidable difference between the respective epistemic foundations of
modernist decompositional writing on one hand and that of baroque decomposition on the other. As
a rule, the macabre in baroque art and literature always appears in the broader context of pious
themes, and the image of the decomposing body that is such a touchstone for the times is therefore
primarily an inverse vision of the glorious, resurrected body. Thus, the nothingness of the body is
consistently and directly counterposed to heavenly plenitude in Ronsard’s Derniers vers. “Je n’ay que
des os” ends with the following stanzas:
Quel amy me voyant en ce point despouillé
Ne remporte au logis un oeil triste et mouillé,
Me consolant au lict et me baisant la face,
En essuiant mes yeux par la mort endormis ?
Adieu chers compaignons, adieu mes chers amis,
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Je m’en vay le premier vous preparer la place.
[What friend seeing me in this stripped-bare condition
Does not return to his home with a mournful and damp eye,
Consoling me on my bed and kissing my face,
Wiping my eyes put to sleep by death?
Farewell, dear companions, farewell, my dear friends,
I am going first to prepare a place for you.]51
Though he begins by detailing his own bodily demise, the speaker of the poem turns his pity to his
friends in the final six lines, enjoining them to consider that they will soon join him. The manner in
which this memento mori is expressed is particularly telling, however, as the speaker clearly evokes Jesus
Christ’s words to his apostles before his death as related in the gospel according to John:
Let not your heart be troubled, ye believe in God, believe also in me. In my father’s house
are many mansions: if it were not so, I would have told you. I go to prepare a place for you.
And if I go to prepare a place for you, I will come again and receive you unto myself; that
where I am, there ye may be also. And whither I go ye go, and the way ye know.52
By aping Jesus’ words to the disciples fearful of his (and their own) imminent death, Ronsard’s
speaker emphasizes that the return to humus effected via the decomposition of the poem’s first
stanzas is symbolically recuperated into resurrection promised to good Christians. The epitaph
Ronsard provides for himself in the Derniers vers distills still further the baroque dualism of the
decomposing body in the valedictory line, “Son âme soit à Dieu, son corps soit à la terre / [May his
soul go to God, his body to the earth].” The first part of this sentence makes the other bearable—
indeed, the parallelism attests to a broader conception of the place of bodily corruption within the
symbolic economy of Christian redemption. Because at the time death was a primarily religious event
and not merely a material one, the spiritual overlaying of memento mori themes over the physical
processes of decomposition rendered those processes palatable, making of them a foretaste of the
eventual restitution of the human creature to the kingdom of its creator. It is crucial to understand
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that it is only within the ambit of this symbolic structure that macabre themes became so pervasive in
European Christendom between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.
This general view lost its hold as increasingly secular, scientific, and materialist approaches to
death and the dead became more and more common over the course of the Enlightenment. It is this
vast change that accounts for the worlds of difference between the epistemic grounding of the
speaker of “Je n’ay plus que les os” on the one hand and Leopold Bloom on the other, the latter of
whom scoffs at the priest’s traditional invocation, “I am the resurrection and the life” during the
funeral of Paddy Dignam. “Lots of them lying round here: lungs, hearts, livers,” thinks Bloom, his
eyes wandering over the graveyard as he mentally decomposes the bodies interred therein to their
constituent material parts. “Old rusty pumps,” he calls them, “damn the thing else. The resurrection
and the life. Once you are dead you are dead.”53 It is necessary to insist on the scale of this change in
mortuary epistemes. It is also necessary to show how quickly the shift occurred. Strictly speaking, the
millennium during which dwelling with the materiality of the dead and their postmortem
transformations was a normal, even celebrated part of Christian life was itself an exception to the rule
in the grand scope of human history. Before and after this period, stringent regulations regarding the
separation of the dead from quotidian experience take hold.
As the Enlightenment began, it quickly began to appear that the horrors of bodily
dissolution had taken on new meaning. At the turn of the eighteenth century the “baroque pleasure
in imagining the dead as rotting corpses [transformed] into a horror of such an image.”54 Rather,
according to historian Thomas Laqueur, death increasingly became “a largely negative category, a
word for the abyss toward which all life was hurtling more or less quickly.”55 It is as if the redemptive
lines provided at the end of Ronsard’s “Je n’ay que les os” had been cut away: no longer does the
dying man “prepare the place” for those to come. His body goes into the earth, but his soul no
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longer, or at least no longer assuredly, goes to God. This destabilization of the Christian
eschatological schema made the cadaver in all its revolting facticity suddenly and newly repulsive.
Laqueur writes that during the eighteenth century, death became “stripped of superstition and
revealed in all its natural boldness”; as a result, “doctors and the enlightened public retreated from its
now exclusively materialist realities.”56 Ariès additionally specifies that “it required only … a decline
in eschatological concern within the Christian faith for the balance to be destroyed and for
nothingness to take over. The way was now open for all the fascinations of nothingness, nature, and
matter.”57
Why did attitudes so quickly change? One possible reason is that the dead had truly begun to
press in all around. Laqueur goes into extensive detail on how “there were unquestionably ever more
bodies, ever more cheek-by-jowl with one another and with the living” as the European population
increased at the turn of the eighteenth century.58 This growth was bound up in a discursive change in
how people treated and wrote about corpses and postmortem corporeality itself, which, as Ariès
indicates, grew ever more materialist in character as new scientific, medical, and philosophical
attitudes toward the human body and its functions evolved during the early years of the
Enlightenment.
As the distance between the cadaver’s this-worldly aspect and its otherworldly aspect
increased, an intense concern over the potential danger of mortal remains also came to prominence.
Specifically, the “enlightened public” began to claim that “dead bodies are deadly,” in Laqueur’s
epigrammatic formulation. “By the late eighteenth century,” he writes,
progressive policymakers not only recognized this universal truth but also the fact that the
dead were getting deadlier all the time; there were manifestly too many of them in too little
space; they smelled bad; and they were thus causing illness and death among the living.

56

Ibid., 237.

57

Ariès, The Hour of Our Death, 346.

58

Laqueur, The Work of the Dead, 218.

28

These reformers gained the upper hand politically, and the clean, tidy, and well-managed
extramural cemetery was the result.59
Laqueur’s reference to the “extramural” aspect of the modern cemetery evokes the ancient Roman
practice of ex urbo burial, which Christianity overthrew a thousand years previously. Not since before
the Council of Braga grudgingly allowed for the general adoption of burial ad sanctos did the graveyard
as the geographic and spiritual center of the Christian community receive such widespread criticism.
Indeed, the ever-growing volume of bodies in need of disposal made the situation unsupportable
even for some members of the clergy. In 1745, The Jesuit Abbé Charles-Gabriel Porée wrote a tract
entitled Lettres sur la sépulture dans les églises, in which he stunningly contends that the spiritual benefits
associated with burial ad sanctos are “purely psychological,” and advocates for churches to become
“clean [and] well-ventilated, where one smells the odor of burning incense [i.e., instead of
putrefaction], and where one is not in danger of breaking one’s neck because of the unevenness of
the floor.”60 This humorous implication of the threat that the dead posed due to their disposal in
churches and churchyards underwrote a much more serious imperative to, in the Abbé’s words,
“love health, and the cleanliness that is so important to preserving it.”61 Already in the midst of the
Enlightenment we can recognize the themes of public hygiene that will come to determine the
nineteenth-century revolution in western deathways that will, in turn, shape modernism’s approach to
the postmortem.
Andrew Miller’s brilliant historical fiction, Pure, which narrates the closing and clearing of les
Innocents, captures the chief contours of the rapid change in public perception toward the cemetery
in particular and the social position of the corpse in general. Opening in the year 1786, the novel’s
fictional protagonist, an engineer named Jean-Baptiste Baratte, is approached by a government
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minister who tells him the story of les Innocents. “Corpse upon corpse” had been buried there since
the plague, he tells Baratte,
A number beyond any computation. Vast legions packed into a smudge of earth no bigger
than a potato field, yet no one seemed troubled by it. There were no protests, no expressions
of disgust. It may even have seemed normal. And then, perhaps it was a generation ago, we
began to receive complaints. Some of those who lived beside the cemetery had started to
find the proximity an unpleasant one.
Food would not keep. Candles were extinguished as if by the pinch of unseen
fingers. People descending their stairs in the morning fell into a swoon. And there were
moral disturbances, particularly among the young. Young men and women of hitherto
blemishless existences . . .
A commission was established to investigate the matter. A great many expert
gentlemen wrote a great many words on the subject. Recommendations were made, plans
drawn for new, hygienic cemeteries that would once again be outside the city limits. … The
dead continued to arrive at the doors of les Innocents. Somehow room was found for them.
And so it would have continued, Baratte. We need not doubt it. Continued until the Last
Trump, had it not been for a spring of unusually heavy rainfall, five years past now. A
subterranean wall separating the cemetery from the cellar of a house on one of the streets
overlooking it collapsed. Into the cellar tumbled the contents of a common pit. You may,
perhaps, imagine the disquiet felt by those who lived above that cellar, by their neighbours,
their neighbours’ neighbours, by all those who, on going to their beds at night, must lie
down with the thought of the cemetery pressing like the esurient sea against the walls of
their homes. It could no longer hold on to its dead. One might bury one’s father there and
not in a month’s time know where he was. The king himself was disturbed.62
Miller captures in athletic prose how the changing attitudes associated with sensuous proximity to the
rotting dead parallels developing concerns over public health. Like they had been to the ancient
Romans, the dead once more became a threat to the living, seemingly over the course of a “single
generation.” The specific tale that the minister recounts in the runup to the closing of les Innocents
is an actual event that occurred on May 30th, 1780, when a wall collapsed between the most recently
dug burial pit and a house on the border of the graveyard. This grotesque high-water mark of the
“esurient sea” of the dead crashing into the land of the living was the last straw, and from that time
onward no more bodies would be buried in the grounds of les Innocents. Intramural burial was
banned throughout the city immediately. Thereafter, the government began looking for ways to
dispose of the great masses of the dead that posed such an apparently immediate physical and even
moral danger to those in the vicinity of the noxious Cimitière des Innocents.
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In 1786, the demolition of the church and the clearing of the grounds began. Millions of
bones were exhumed and removed from the charnel houses. Subsequently, the dead were moved
into the exhausted limestone mines that webbed under Paris’s left bank, creating the ossuaries
beloved of visitors today. Workers also collected vast deposits of apidocere or “corpse wax,” formed
by the anaerobic bacterial hydrolysis of bodily fat during putrefaction, which was later made into
candles and soap. The church was torn down, the square paved, and today, only a staid, Classicalstyle fountain commemorates the hecatombs of les Innocents on what is now known as La Place
Joachim du Bellay.
In the epistemic space opened by the clearing of les Innocents and the expansion of
increasingly materialist approaches to death and the postmortem that lead to it, reformers began to
push for more supposedly hygienic methods of corpse disposal. Larger cemeteries were constructed
on the peripheries of cities. Individual graves became the norm, and laws regulated their depth with
an eye to keeping weather and scavengers (both human and nonhuman) from easily unearthing
bodies once interred. Politicians, scientists, and public reformers vociferated on the dangers of putrid
miasma. Born two years before Abbé Porée published his unprecedented Lettres sur la sépulture dans les
églises, the chemist Antoine-Alexis Cadet de Vaux would compellingly reinforce the Abbé’s
suggestions with the backing of science. According to Cadet de Vaux, the “cadaverous gases” or
“mephitis” given off by the dead wreaked havoc on the living both physically and morally.63 Cadet de
Vaux is only one exponent of the “smell science” that grew to prominence in the nineteenth century
and would continue into the twentieth.64 After the revolution, this period would turn into what
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Laqueur calls “the century of olfactory vigilance.”65 Building on Cadet de Vaux, hundreds of
pamphlets, reports, scientific articles, and books would be published pushing the theory that, in
English hygiene reformer Edwin Chadwick’s lapidary phrase, “all smell is disease.”66
According to Laqueur, it is over this period that “the borders shifted” in the western
sensorium vis à vis smell. Though “people in the West have always found the smell of exposed dead
bodies disgusting, … [t]he historical question is why the ancient smell of hidden corrupting flesh
became pollution, why a commonplace odor became a threat not just to health but also to the social
and moral order. The dead became dirty and therefore dangerous.”67 I have shown above how part
of the answer to this historical question lay in how dead bodies were thrown symbolically off-kilter
toward the end of the eighteenth century, when the religious equalization of the decomposing corpse
as a metaphor for future resurrection and life everlasting first began to go out of balance. It was also,
as we have seen, a more basic function of the increasing volume of dead bodies that went along with
urban growth. The parallel development of the sciences of biology and anatomy joined population
growth and the waning influence of traditional Christian eschatology to challenge the pedigree of
human life as anything particularly distinct from any other organic phenomenon. At the onset of the
nineteenth century, death’s “metaphysical and spiritual aspects began decisively to go their separate
ways: the death of humans and the death of animals, once so distinct, came together in a new and
powerful language of science. … A carcass was a carcass was a carcass.”68 Decay became an allencompassing category: as burial reformer Sir Henry Thompson Thompson put it, “the problem
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which Nature sets herself to work in disposing of dead animal matter is always one and the same.”69
Decomposition and its material effects—notably its smell—came to embody the breakdown of the
exceptionality of the human vis-à-vis the natural world. In the midst of this simultaneously sensuous
and discursive evolution, the most prominent questions about death and the dead moved from the
religious sphere to the scientific, as scholars and the lay public alike began to chiefly discuss death in
terms the physical elements that composed the body rather than in the metaphysical terms of the
disunion of the body and soul that preoccupied Ronsard and his contemporaries. Debates over the
proper disposal of the body and the possible injuriousness to public health of mephitis therefore,
according to Laqueur, “offered a thin disguise—perhaps it would be more precise to say, an
alternative register—for what was in fact, a radical turn to thinking about the dead as mere, abject
matter.”70 Accompanying this breakdown of borders between the human and the rest of nature was a
natural repulsion that Laqueur hints at in his use of the word “abject.” The dead became mere
matter, yes—they were “beastly dead,” to quote the brutal phrase of Buck Mulligan71—but this
“mereness” is, in and of itself, the source of a newfound horror, which is a horror of one’s own
personal continuity with an ecological cycle that radically exceeds the human. Increasing knowledge
of the postmortem challenged the exceptionality of the human with regard to the rest of nature, and
this challenge became the focal point for cultural anxieties about the postmortem and the strange
material afterlives of the corpse.
It is no secret that popular fears over the evolving status and function of the dead in modern
society and their transferal into an increasingly secular, scientific domain in which they were treated
the same as any other form of decaying organic matter undergirded much popular fiction of the
nineteenth century. Anatomists, mesmerists, and galvanists all provided fodder for the century’s
preoccupation with the spooky afterlives of the dead and with just how blurry the line between the
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living and the dead, the human being and the rest of nature, could become. At times this is made
explicit, as in the story that Mary Shelley claims first inspired Frankenstein: while Percy Bysshe Shelley
and Lord Byron discussed “various philosophical doctrines,” one that drew Mary Shelley’s attention
in particular was that which had to do with “the nature of the principle of life.” As she tells it in the
preface to the 1831 edition of Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus:
They talked of the experiments of Dr. Darwin, (I speak not of what the Doctor really did, or
said that he did, but, as more to my purpose, of what was then spoken of as having been
done by him,) who preserved a piece of vermicelli in a glass case, till by some extraordinary
means it began to move with voluntary motion. Not thus, after all, would life be given.
Perhaps a corpse would be re-animated; galvanism had given token of such things: perhaps
the component parts of a creature might be manufactured, brought together, and endued
with vital warmth.72
This story, erroneously if tellingly attributed to the very person so responsible for precipitating the
beginnings of an epistemic collapse of the exceptionality of the human with regard to the animal
kingdom, provided the galvanic spark necessary for the birth of Frankenstein. One of the most wildly
popular of its time, the tale is deeply expressive of the modern revolution in western deathways,
particularly as regards the renegotiation of the line between death and life, and between the human
and the rest of nature.
Early in the novel, the eponymous Frankenstein commits himself to the study of anatomy,
that science of sciences of the early nineteenth century, based on his observation that “to examine
the causes of life, we must first have recourse to death.”73 He then “observe[s] the natural decay and
corruption of the human body” and “spend[s] days and nights in vaults and charnel houses” studying
how “the corruption of death succeed[s] to the blooming cheek of life, … how the worm inherited
the wonders of the eye and the brain.”74 Tied thus to the lowly worm, the supposed pride of place of
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the human is brought to the level of Darwin’s writhing vermicule. Frankenstein can therefore note as
a matter of scientific fact that “the dissecting room and the slaughterhouse provided many of my
materials,”75 there being no fundamental distinction between the biological operations of one
organism versus another. Such “filthy creation” depends on a radically new approach not only to
anatomy but to the principle of life itself that sees in the body no object of superstition or receptacle
for an incorruptible soul but an agglomeration of material functions embedded within a broader
circuit of nature that abrogates the traditionally exceptional place of the human with regard to all
other orders of matter. As Frankenstein puts it, mobilizing yet again the potent image of the worm:
“a churchyard was to me merely the receptacle of bodies deprived of life, which, from being the seat
of beauty and strength, had become food for the worm.”76
At the same time, of course, Frankenstein is a horror story. The fact that Frankenstein can so
literally dehumanize the human body in pursuit of his object is the starting point for his own
undoing. The novel is anything but an endorsement of a radical materialist view of the human
body—indeed, the opposite would be closer to the mark. But the fact is that Frankenstein and its
eponymous anti-hero manage to tap into the fraught admixture of horror and fascination, repulsion
and desire, that characterizes the popular nineteenth-century attitude toward the materiality of death
and the dead. Frankenstein as a whole, as much as Frankenstein himself, mines the affective volatility
of this interstitial space where disgust and desire meet, and in this way the novel as a paradigmatic
statement on the undecideability of the modern corpse in the context of modernizing deathways.
This interstitiality and the proto-modernist literary operations proper to its expression are nowhere
more evident than in the leadup to the monster’s awakening:
[T]he moon gazed on my midnight labours, while, with unrelaxed and breathless eagerness, I
pursued nature to her hiding-places. Who shall conceive the horrors of my secret toil as I
dabbled among the unhallowed damps of the grave or tortured the living animal to animate
the lifeless clay? My limbs now tremble, and my eyes swim with the remembrance; but then a
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resistless and almost frantic impulse urged me forward; I seemed to have lost all soul or
sensation but for this one pursuit. It was indeed but a passing trance, that only made me feel
with renewed acuteness so soon as, the unnatural stimulus ceasing to operate, I had returned
to my old habits. I collected bones from charnel-houses and disturbed, with profane fingers,
the tremendous secrets of the human frame. … my eyeballs were starting from their sockets
in attending to the details of my employment. … and often did my human nature turn with
loathing from my occupation, whilst, still urged on by an eagerness which perpetually
increased, I brought my work near to a conclusion.77
The sexual implications of the passage are less than subtle. Frankenstein’s “midnight labours,” his
bodily tension and breathlessness as he explores feminized nature’s “hiding places,” his injunction for
the reader to “conceive” what he did in “unhallowed damps” all border on the scandalous. Here,
Frankenstein stages the confusion of the division between scientific and sexual pursuits, discovery
and climax. As the symbolic gap separating the domains of the intellect and that of the lower
passions is corrupted in his project, so too does his embodied experience come to manifest a
disturbing confluence of opposing emotions. Trembling limbs, swimming eyes, and a monomaniacal
focus can all characterize either horror or ecstasy, and here they seem to characterize both
simultaneously. Perhaps in resistance to this unsettling duality of his pursuit and its effects,
Frankenstein suddenly declares that it was all a “passing trance” and that his normal, “human nature”
often revolted from his project, only to immediately contradict himself by calling it the product of
“an eagerness which perpetually increased.” Ultimately, Frankenstein is unable to escape the
reciprocal nature of his attraction and repulsion to/from his pursuit and, by implication, its object.
The monster, as simultaneous realization of Frankenstein’s desire and the transcendental
object of his revulsion, then comes to embody the aporia that theorists of disgust have identified at
the core of the phenomenon, the intensification of which is centrally characteristic of the new (or
renewed) status of the dead in the modern west. According to Suzanne Ashworth, “disgust agitates
clashing yet interconnected sensations, working through an oscillation between desire and
renunciation, craving and queasiness”78; it “can attract as well as repel,”79 according to William Ian
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Miller, author of The Anatomy of Disgust; it is “deeply ambivalent,” adds Sarah Ahmed, “involving
desire for, or an attraction towards, the very objects felt to be repellent.”80 The depiction
Frankenstein offers of his pursuit is paradigmatic of the nineteenth-century preoccupation with the
postmortem, which plays on disgust’s deep affective ambivalence. The reasons for such an
intertwinement of apparently contrary experiences may be manifold, but some argue that it is a result
of what Ashworth calls a “coercive relationship” whereby “disgust circumvents and contains unruly
hungers”:
Miller maintains that disgust prevents the activation of “unconscious desires, barely admitted
fascinations, or furtive curiosities.” [Aurel] Kolnai says, “we shun what is disgusting only
because otherwise we should take hold of it, something which must not happen.” McGinn
likewise claims that disgust operates to restrain “infinite, unquenchable” wanting.81
Of course, the coercive theory does not unravel the problem of the ambivalence of disgust so much
as give it a new, libidinal valence. The question remains, whence these perverse attractions, and how
does disgust come to curtail them in the first place?
McGinn attempts to account for the basis of the phenomenon of disgust in the cultural
necessity for coherent identity: disgust, he writes, helps “mark the boundaries of culture and the
boundaries of the self.”82 It polices the social as well as the physical body, which, he reasons,
accounts for the centrality of liminal substances and objects in precipitating the experience of disgust.
That which blurs categories and thereby reveals the leakiness of supposedly discrete subjects is
paradigmatically disgusting. We revolt at the implied prospect of our own dissolution that is tokened
in the breakdown of the symbolic structures that establish coherence and guarantee identity. Thus,
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McGinn reasons that the corpse is “the paradigm of the disgusting object,”83 embodying the
transition of the singular human subject into the assemblages of necrobiotic ecologies that constitute
bodily putrefaction. Disgust, then, is focalized around the maintenance of the borders of the human
subject in contradistinction to entities, phenomena, and forces that exceed it. It is an ecological
horror that tests the limits of the human qua human, to recapitulate a central thesis of my project.
This is why, for Victor Frankenstein, it is his “human nature” that he invokes in a futile bid to
backtrack his lurid fixation on creating his monster, and it is perhaps his own human nature that the
pursuit and realization of his project fundamentally destabilizes.
Part of Frankenstein’s popularity in its own time and the tale’s enduring fascination can be
attributed to how profoundly it grasped and bodied forth the simultaneous horrors and fascinations
of the evolving relationship between death and life, and the dead and the living, in the modernizing
west. The retreat of religious institutions and development of the sciences of anatomy and biology
grew in somewhat paradoxical conversation with a rearticulation of the western sensorium that
placed disgust, in all its ambivalence, back at the center of the relationship with the dead, based on
quasi-scientific pronouncements concerning corpses’ supposedly malefic influence. What Frankenstein
explores is this paradox and this ambivalence: it shows how the horror of an exploded human
exceptionality is perhaps the obverse of a more fundamental eco-eroticism, a desire to transgress the
boundaries of the human and to attain an intimacy with the decompositions that connect us with
broader human-nonhuman relationalities. It stages, in other words, how a horror of the continuity of
matter is precisely born of an attraction to that which the human must reject in order to have a
distinct “human nature” in the first place. It questions whether we may be ultimately unable to resist
the pull of the inhuman. Bataille would, much later, give voice to the eco-eroticism characteristic of
the literary-historical milieu of which Frankenstein is so paradigmatically expressive and in which
posthumanist modernism developed: “Nature herself is violent,” he says,
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and however reasonable we may grow we may be mastered anew by a violence no longer
that of nature but that of a rational being who tries to obey but who succumbs to stirrings
within himself which he cannot bring to heel. … There is in nature and there subsists in man
a movement which always exceeds the bounds, that can never be anything but partially
reduced to order. We are generally unable to grasp it. Indeed it is by definition that which
can never be grasped, but we are conscious of being in its power: the universe that bears us
along answers no purpose that reason defines.84
It is clear at this point is how multifarious and internally contradictory social evolution of
death in western modernity truly is. For, while death became interrogated and understood in ever
more minute intimacy in the domain of science, and while the care of the dead became an ever
increasingly central to modern political and medical institutions, the dead body at the same time
became ever more obscene, and thus ever more simultaneously attractive and repulsive. On one
hand, this meant that, as Ariès puts it, in the face of the modern corpse, “the doctors lose their
composure as they approach the floodgates through which the chaos of nature threatens to invade
the rational city of man.” Before the Enlightenment, says Ariès, the fear of death and the dead “was
translated into soothing words and channeled into familiar rites. People paid attention to death.
Death was a serious matter, not to be taken lightly, a dramatic moment in life, grave and formidable,
but not so formidable that they were tempted to push it out of sight, run away from it, act as if it did
not exist, or falsify its appearances.”85 At the onset of modernity, however, “people started fearing
death in earnest,” so much so that, today, most have simply “stopped talking about it.”86 This is the
source of what he calls the “silencing of death,” which he claims is centrally characteristic of modern
deathways. The same goes for Michel de Certeau, who argues in The Practice of Everyday Life that an
institutionalized silence around dying and death has prevented “the dying person … from saying this
nothing that he is becoming.”87 Manuel Castells reinforces this analysis in the first volume of The Rise
of the Information Age, concluding his own account of contemporary culture with the thesis that “it is a
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distinctive feature of our new culture [to] attempt to exile death from our lives.”88 All three august
historians propose that modernity is characterized by a general obscenification of death and the dead.
As I have already shown, this obscenification, while certainly shunting the discourse of death into a
new register and moving it out of the sphere of the everyday life, did not mean that people stopped
speaking about death at all. Ashworth catalogues the many ways in which nineteenth-century
Americans, for example, engaged intimately with death culture:
nineteenth-century America … gravitated to the corpse, even its detachable parts and decay.
Antebellum death rituals necessitated a sustained closeness with the recently dead body:
loved ones reverently washed, shaved, and dressed the corpse in a shroud or winding sheet.
The body remained at home for one to three days and was constantly attended. Mourners
braided the corpse’s hair into “bracelets, broaches, watch chains, and other jewelry items.”
Posthumous mourning pictures—paintings and photographs—were “taken from the
physical remains before burial,” capturing dead bodies upright, in chairs, in the arms of
family members, holding books, or in their “last sleep.” Scholars implicate postmortem
photography in a pervasive cultural urge to deny or domesticate death, but this archive also
documents a coincident attraction to morbidity. A circa 1843 photograph depicts a dead
woman in profile with dried blood running from nose to neck; an image dated 1846 portrays
a mother cradling a child obviously stiff with rigor mortis; and a number of pictures
showcase visibly emaciated children—pale, gaunt, skeletal, and grotesque. These images
evidence a keen preoccupation with dead corporealities.
This enthrallment outlasted funeral rites and burials. Laderman affirms that
nineteenth-century culture exhibited a “consuming interest in detailed descriptions” of
terminal disease and “a powerful desire to observe bodily decay.” Lewis Saum notes the
excessive “physiological detail” that pervades accounts of death in antebellum letters.
Nineteenth-century diarists also tracked quotidian signs of decomposition in the recently
deceased; mourners lifted coffin lids to see putrefaction in the faces of lost loved ones;
indeed, Ralph waldo Emerson opened his late wife’s coffin a full year after her death.89
Diana Fuss puts the matter pointedly: over the course of the nineteenth century, “people did not, in
fact, fall silent in the face of a depersonalized and dehumanized death, but rather began speaking
about the dead in new and increasingly creative ways.”90 Thus Mary Shelley mobilizes the obscene
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charge of the corpse as an aesthetic resource and perverse draw. In this category, we can include
many of the tales of Edgar Allan Poe, principally “The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar.” The
characters of George Eliot’s The Lifting of the Veil partake of the modern complex of repulsionfascination characteristic of the literary refraction of corpse-disgust, as do the resurrection men that
thread through Charles Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities and Robert Louis Stevenson’s The Body
Snatchers. The massive popularity of literary variations on the material afterlives of corpses is
inseparable from the discursive shift that Ariès, de Certeau, and Castells have argued rendered
corpses “unspeakable” in modernity. They are in fact two sides of the same coin. The crucial
difference between pre- and post-Enlightenment deathways is, then, not necessarily in how “silent”
this or that period appears in the face of death, but rather the epistemic structure in which death
culture is embedded. For the baroque period, the corpse is a photo-negative of Christian
resurrection, a symbol of the ultimate salvation promised to the pious. In the nineteenth century, the
body has largely moved out of this discourse and into one characterized by scientific fascination and
concerns over public hygiene that jointly rendered the dead simultaneously repulsive and fascinating.
The obscenification of the corpse occurs in tandem with its ecologization; just as the dead body is
now the object of a fitful, contradictory rearticulation of the western sensorium, so too is it the
embodiment of the both terrifying and thrilling absence of distinction between the human and those
entities, forces, and phenomena that radically exceed the human.
Posthumanist modernism evolved in this contradictory, volatile semiotic space, and the
modernist cadaver accordingly became a site for writers to explore not only the limits of the human
symbolic faculty but of the human itself. It set the stage for creative renegotiations of the distinction
between the living and the dead as well as between the human and its nonhuman others. Innovative
literary operations emerged through which modernist writers imbued their work with the fraught and
undecideable qualities attributed to the modern cadaver, generating an aesthetics of decomposition
that is both a thematic and functional concern of an understudied tradition that it is the purpose of
41

this project to explore. This emergence depends on the materialization of death and the dead and the
obscenification-ecologization of the decomposing body that are jointly characteristic of modernizing
deathways. What the writers I bring together in this project were ultimately able to do is mobilize this
revolution in western deathways to access fundamental problems of the representation of death that,
in some cases, are as old as language itself. In the next section, I outline the nature of these
fundamental problems and articulate the theoretical scaffolding through which I approach them.

Theoretical Overview
The nineteenth century saw a revolution in social, political, scientific and religious attitudes
toward death the likes of which the west had not seen since the end of the Roman empire. In the
span of roughly a hundred years, the corpses among which people had lived, worked, and
worshipped for a millennium suddenly became a threat. Anecdotal and (at least supposedly) scientific
evidence of this threat abounded.91 Bodies were once more brought ex urbo, confined to meticulously
landscaped, purpose-built cemeteries that became the site of the new cult of the dead. Here, an
increasingly secular and cosmopolitan west shunted the spiritual value once centralized in Christian
death ritual. Carefully preserved bodies along with their often elaborate (but at least always
individual) graves became the new prime locus of death culture. As with anything endowed with
sacred power, the newly sacralized body was, at base, semiotically ambivalent: both revered and
reviled, accursed and holy. Laqueur gestures to this duality inherent in modern deathways in noting
that, just as corpses “in their capacity as rotting flesh … created a new and paradigmatic medical—
not ritual—uncleanness,” so too did public hygiene discourse “[help] open spaces where a new
idolatry of the dead was coming to supplant old superstitions.”92 Speeding up (as with cremation),
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indefinitely pausing (as with embalming), or otherwise circumnavigating the process of bodily
decomposition was the countereffect of a materialist scientific discourse that denied human
exceptionality with regard to the rest of the natural world. The modern cadaver and its refraction in
nineteenth-century literature emerged at this nexus of rapidly evolving beliefs and practices bound up
in the proliferation of the discourse of public hygiene, increasing scientific understanding of the
human body and the ecological system in which it is embedded, and the threat of the obliteration of
the distinction between the human and matter in general. In the nineteenth century, as Ariès shows,
the west both started to understand and to fear the corpse in new ways.
Perhaps the most fascinating thing about the hygiene revolution is that, as pervasive and
rapid as it was, and for how thoroughly it overhauled a millennium of broadly shared attitudes and
practices towards the dead, its own claims about the dangers of corpses were rooted in junk science.
Nearly all the arguments concerning the polluting qualities of the dead were either greatly
exaggerated or outright nonsense. Some recognized this at the time. In the very midst of the “century
of olfactory vigilance,” notable doctors expressed skepticism about the growing hysteria over the
dead and their supposedly mortal threat to the living. Mattieu Orfila of the Sorbonne pointed out in
1835 that, if the danger of mephitis were indeed so great, then doctors, priests, and gravediggers
would have significantly shorter lives than those in other occupations, which was not the case. Even
one of the architects of the public health movement, Thomas Southwood-Smith, demurred from
condemning the dead as particularly dangerous. Responding to a draft of Chadwick’s wildly
influential On the Use of the Dead to the Living, Southwood-Smith wrote that “the Evidence of that
fundamental truth in your report [that animal matter in a state of decomposition is injurious to
health] is neither so strong, so succinct nor so varied as it might be.”93
Nor would such evidence—strong, succinct, or varied—come to light. To this day, nearly all
arguments concerning the danger of decomposing remains are based on misrepresentations or
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superstitions dressed in the garments of science. The fact is that dead bodies are less a threat to
health than live ones. As Laqueur points out, “fleas abandon a corpse, bacteria … and viruses die
quickly once their host is dead. Putrefying, stinking bodies are even more innocent than fresh ones,
which are innocent enough: bacteria do not thrive in the alkaline conditions of decomposition.
Rotting flesh may be disgusting, but it is not a good vector of disease.”94 The World Health
Organization, accordingly, has insisted that dead or decayed bodies do not present any inordinate
threat to the living, and that in fact “the result of this mistaken belief is the overlooked and
unintended social effect of the precipitous and unceremonious disposal of corpses.”95 The WHO
accounts for the origin of this “mistaken belief” in the following way: “although empirical evidence
suggests otherwise, strong aversion to the dead may represent a natural instinct to protect ourselves
against disease.”96 The palpable hand-waving here is telling, as this “natural instinct” is in fact
anything but. Disgust for the dead is fairly exclusive to humans and many anthropologists associate
the origins of homo sapiens as an identifiable species with the incipience of organized death ritual.97 At
the origins of human attitudes toward corpses is therefore not so much natural instinct as cultural
conditioning.
Taken in the grand scope of things, the hygiene revolution can be seen as precisely the
opposite—that is, as a thoroughgoing regression to what, throughout human history, has been the
rule: a fear of dead bodies that, while clearly culturally conditioned, spans time periods and cultures
such that it may truly be called a generally human phenomenon. As mentioned, elaborate
prescriptions and proscriptions governing interactions with corpses have been a feature of human
societies since the birth of homo sapiens—Giambattista Vico thus writes that “humanitas in Latin comes
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first and properly from humando, burying, [because] humanity had its origin in humare, to bury.”98
Robert Pogue Harrison’s The Dominion of the Dead bases its central premise, in spirit if not in letter, on
Vico’s notion: “Humanity,” he writes, “is a way of being mortal and relating to the dead. To be
human means above all to bury.”99 In this general light, the focus on regulating corpse-contact in the
turn to public health and hygiene in the nineteenth century that fueled the modern revolution in
western deathways can be seen as a new articulation of very ancient themes that have always central
to how human beings have defined their own being-human. Vico continues:
what a great principle of humanity burial is, imagine a feral state in which human bodies
remain unburied on the surface of the earth as food for crows and dogs. Certainly this bestial
custom will be accompanied by uncultivated fields and uninhabited cities. Men will go about
like swine eating the accords found amidst the putrefaction of their dead. And so with good
reason burials were characterized by the sublime phrase “compacts of the human race”
(foedera generis humani), and with less grandeur were described by Tacitus as “fellowships of
humanitiy” (humanitatis commercia).100
The unburied, decomposing body represents the failure of the human to be human at all and
bespeaks, according to Vico, a regression to animality. Without burying the dead, civilization as such
would have no basis: as Sherman writes with respect to Vico’s views, “corpse disposal … is our most
dramatic principle for the exclusions that mark our species as something apart.”101
Yet burial itself is not so simple, as shown in Robert Hertz’s classic anthropological essay,
“A Contribution to the Study of the Collective Representation of Death,” which has remained
fundamental to modern death studies.102 Taking its departure from the mortuary practices of the
Dayak and Olo Ngaju peoples of Borneo, Hertz theorizes that death is not a molar event but a twophased process. The first encompasses what he calls the “wet” medium of the body—the
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decomposition of organic tissue—while the second has to do with the body’s “dry” remains—ashes,
bones, or preserved mummies left over after decomposition is complete. In general, the first phase is
sped along or occluded as much as possible by such methods as burial, cremation, or excarnation103
(or artificially subverted, as in mummification and embalming). As a student of Émile Durkheim,
Hertz sees the individual, and the individual’s body, as a microcosm of the social body it helps
comprise. The death of the individual thus represents the threat of the death of the social order itself,
and dealing with mortal remains emerges as a way of overcoming this threat. What is crucial,
according to Hertz, is that in so doing, the dead themselves can be reincorporated into the social
body such that that body maintains its sense of identity, continuity, and coherence in the face of the
radical symbolic challenge of death. Implicit in Hertz’s argument is that it is the decomposition of the
body—the first, “wet” phase of death—that has the particular capacity to erode and destabilize the
identity, continuity, and coherence of the social body. Decomposition, that is, is symbolic of the
death of the symbolic itself, tokening the dissolution of the human into more capacious and morethan-human assemblages. Thus, what Hertz calls “mortuary infection” that is passed on by physical
contact with the dead or through the sensible presence of decomposition is the embodied presence
of the death of meaning, the sensuous sign of the evaporation of the human into a world over which
it no longer has symbolic control.104
The simultaneous denial of and demand for symbolization that is at the core of human
mortuary practices, and indeed the collective representation of death, is constitutive of human as
such, according to Sherman: “Humans tend to each other’s corpses; humans signify.”105 In this light,
the “mortuary infection” that is the subject of ritual proscription among the indigenous peoples of
Borneo is little different from the “mephitis” of Cadet de Vaux. What is at stake, Hertz understood,
“is not a matter of hygiene (as we understand the word)” but of the coherence of human identity
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over and above a world that is in the final analysis fundamentally intransigent to anthropic
inscription. To radicalize the implications of the foregoing, the investiture of the corpse with
meaning (and its insistent refusal to be so invested) is the beginning and, indeed, the end of human
signification as much as it is of the human itself.
Perhaps it is not so radical, however. Durkheim suggested that “the first rites were funeral
rites … and the first altars were graves.”106 Ritualized corpse disposal does precede both language
and agriculture, extending as far back as the upper paleolithic. Some even go so far as to argue that
corpse care not only precedes language, but is its necessary basis, such as Jacques Lacan, who in his
work on Antigone writes that it is in funeral rites where the being of “man,” “someone who was
identified by a name,” originates: “The unique value involved is essentially that of language. …
Outside of language it [that is, human-being] is inconceivable.”107 Harrison agrees: “It is not for
nothing that the Greek word for ‘sign,’ sema, is also the word for ‘grave.’ For the Greeks the grave
marker was not just one sign among others. It was a sign that signified the source of signification
itself, since it ‘stood for’ what it ‘stood in’—the ground of burial as such.”108 Sherman concludes on
the basis of Harrison’s insight that “the symbolization of the dead is inseparable from the symbolic
faculty itself as a kind of ground for every cultural signification.”109 It is the embodied instantiation of
the confrontation with the terminal end of meaning, and the manner in which it is proscribed and
ritually reincorporated into the human community indexes the degree to which it threatens the
exceptionality of the human over and above the operations of the natural world in general. It is the
basis of any structure of differentiation and compartmentalization necessary for the genesis of the
symbolic.
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As the above shows, I am not the first to make this point by any means. In fact, the
contemporary field of death studies is dependent on a host of thinkers who were able to critically
reflect on the modernization of western deathways and the discourse of public hygiene in which it is
bound up. Hertz is perhaps its most prominent ancestor, but the high-water mark for the broadbased reconsideration of modern beliefs and practices concerning dead bodies occurred in the middle
of the twentieth century. It was then that cultural theorists, anthropologists, and philosophers began
to truly come to terms with the profound symbolic role of corpses and death-ritual to what it means
to be human and who, even more crucially, identified in relations with the decomposing body a
challenge to the coherence of the notion of the human as such. Three in particular guide my thinking
and serve as the theoretical cornerstones of this project: Mary Douglas, Georges Bataille, and Julia
Kristeva.
Each of these thinkers establishes a central theoretical manifold encompassing the pollution
and threat to symbolic integrity of which the corpse is paradigmatic. For Douglas it is “dirt,” for
Bataille “base” or “heterogeneous” matter, and for Kristeva “abjection.” Beyond the core theoretical
continuity of these concepts, each theorist allows a particular way of approaching the modern corpse
that, put together, forms the basic theoretical scaffold of The Decomposing Body. Douglas provides a
systematic anthropological account of the centrality of bodily integrity to the human representation
of itself as human. Bataille theorizes the foundational ambivalence of this threat, drawing out how
the loss of distinctly human consciousness and meaning is also an enticement, and how the horror of
the death of the self embodied in the corpse may give over into a more general, eco-erotic desire for
dissolution into what he terms the continuity of nature. Kristeva—a student of Douglas and
Bataille—both synthesizes the insights of her predecessors into a compelling psychoanalytic account
of the emergence of the articulate self in language while also identifying how it is in modernist
literature where the corpse most powerfully challenges—and even, in her words, “explodes”—that
articulate self.
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Douglas’s Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo first brought the
case for a radical rethinking of the hygiene-paradigm explicitly as a criticism of the then-dominant
thinking in her field of “primitive religions” as “governed by fear” and “inextricably confused with
defilement and hygiene.”110 According to Douglas, this field-wide case of the pot calling the kettle
black essentially misunderstood the central symbolic role of rules pertaining to pollution and purity in
defining the boundaries of the social body and establishing a coherent identity for what it means to
be human in both indigenous and Euro-American cultures. “The more deeply we go into [these]
rules,” she argues, “the more obvious it becomes that we are studying symbolic systems. … [A]re our
ideas hygienic where [so-called primitive cultures’] are symbolic? Not a bit of it: I am going to argue
that our ideas of dirt also express symbolic systems and that the difference between pollution
behavior in one part of the world and another is only a matter of detail.”111
“Dirt” is Douglas’s basic example for that which pollutes—a category which allows her to
draw together the modern western world and its others in the seemingly trans-human obsession with
cleanliness. “Dirt is essentially disorder … Dirt offends against order. Eliminating it is not a negative
movement, but a positive effort to organize the environment.” This positive value of ritual
cleanliness is crucial to Douglas’s thinking, for what it betokens is not so much an “anxiety to escape
disease” (as the WHO suggests above) but rather a way of “positively re-ordering our environment,
making it conform to an idea.” By means of rituals of purity and atonement, “symbolic patterns are
worked out and publicly displayed. Within these patterns disparate elements are related and disparate
experience is given meaning.”112 The working out of the symbolic order and the categories by which
it is collectively expressed organizes a stable ground for the shared articulation of experience. It is not
so much fear of disease, then, as a fear of the derangement of the syntax of collective meaningmaking that “dirt” threatens.
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One of Douglas’s most profound and far-reaching insights is that the human body provides
the symbolic basis for how humans “impose system on inherently untidy experience” in general: “just
as it is true that everything symbolizes the body,” she claims, “the body symbolizes everything
else.”113 Hertz (following Durkheim) and Baudrillard have explored how the decomposition of the
corpse tokens the decomposition of the social body of which the individual body is a part. Douglas
extends this into the realm of daily life: keeping the body clean and judiciously dealing with those
substances that enter and exit the body are not just matters of physical health and propriety, but are
inseparable from a proper sense of being part of a distinct human community as well as the human
community writ large. The care of the living and the dead dovetail in this sense, since both share a
desire for personal and social coherence in the face of the threat of the nonhuman.114
Attendant to her self-declared reductionism vis-à-vis the body as prime locus of the
symbolic, Douglas also declares that “just as the focus of all pollution symbolism is the body, the
final problem to which the perspective of pollution leads is bodily disintegration.”115 This is the first
and last danger of dirt, along with all its material and symbolic analogues. Douglas includes in this
category the “marginal stuff” that issues from the vulnerable margins of the body: “Spittle, blood,
milk, urine, faeces or tears by simply issuing forth have traversed the boundary of the body. So also
have bodily parings, skin, nail, hair clippings and sweat.”116 These substances, and the places they
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issue from, are invested with the value of metaphysical danger insofar as they represent or
foreshadow the final disintegration of the corpse, the human-become-dirt itself. For Douglas, if the
body is the zero-point of all symbolism, the cadaver is the primary, insuperable challenge to the
symbolic faculty itself: the threat against which its structure was initially built. It is for this reason that
the dead both seem to deny and demand such scrupulous symbolization in human cultures
throughout history. As the “ground for every cultural signification,” as Sherman puts it, it is also and
for that reason the condition both of the possibility and the impossibility of representation as such—
the real on which the symbolic is built, in Lacanian terms. This understanding of the simultaneous
demand and refusal of signification is a major theoretical touchstone of The Decomposing Body and my
approach to the modernist corpse.
Douglas does several things for my project. First, she provides a systematic overturning of
the hygiene paradigm, which still holds sway over much contemporary thinking of cultural attitudes
toward corpses. Second, she identifies the centrality of concepts of purity and pollution, health (in
the sense of “being whole”) and affliction in the human symbolic faculty. Lastly, she shows how
these concepts originate in and return to the body and the primordial anxiety over its disintegration,
the ultimate embodiment of which is in the decomposition of the dead body but which is also
tokened in the liminal substances that transgress the boundaries of both the individual and the social
body.
The second theorist whose approach to death and the dead serves as a cornerstone to The
Decomposing Body is Georges Bataille, to whose work I have already made reference in this
introduction. Bataille holds a particular pride of place as being both an influence on my theoretical
outlook and a case study in this project—as might be guessed, this gives him more of a prime status
in The Decomposing Body than others, and he will emerge as a theoretical backbone to the project more
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so than the other theorists explored here. Similarly to Douglas, Bataille identifies culture rather than
nature at the core of the peculiarly human form of pollution-disgust. He writes:
We imagine that it is the stink of excrement that makes us feel sick. But would it stink if we
had not thought it was disgusting in the first place? We do not take long to forget what
trouble we go to pass on to our children the aversions that make us what we are, which
make us human beings to begin with. Our children do not spontaneously have our reactions.
They may not like a certain food and they may refuse it. But we have to teach them by
pantomime or failing that, by violence, that curious aberration called disgust, powerful
enough to make us feel faint, a contagion passed down to us from the earliest men through
countless generations of scolded children.117
This passage from Bataille’s later work, Erotism, conveys a core tenet of my own project. Specifically,
the symbolic structure surrounding the phenomenon of disgust (particularly for what Bataille calls
“heterogenous” or “base” matter—a theoretical analogue for Douglas’s “dirt” and in which he also
prominently includes the corpse) “makes us human beings to begin with.” This implies that
precipitating a crisis in this symbolic structure therefore precipitates a crisis in the basis of what it
means to be human at all. Bataille pursues this line of thinking in Erotism, arguing that general
revulsion toward heterogeneous or base matter in general and the corpse in particular is attendant on
what he calls “Man’s ‘no’ to nature.”118 Here and elsewhere, Bataille identifies “nature” with a
principle of violent, all-encompassing cyclicity, wherein generation and decay are not opposed but
complementary. “The death of the one being is correlated with the birth of the other,” he claims:
“Life is always a product of the decomposition of life. Life first pays its tribute to death which
disappears, then to corruption following on death and bringing back into the cycle of change the
matter necessary for the ceaseless arrival of new beings into the world.”119 Bataille’s vision becomes
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literalized in related processes of predation, decomposition, and germination. “We must consider the
devilish cycle from start to finish,” Bataille insists:
The growth of vegetable life implies the continuous piling up of dissociated substances
corrupted by death. Herbivorous creatures swallow vegetable matter by the heap before they
themselves are eaten, victims of the carnivore’s urge to devour. Finally nothing is left but
this fierce beast of prey or his remains, in their turn the prey of hyenas and worms. There is
one way of considering this process in harmony with its nature: the more extravagant are the
means of engendering life, the more costly is the production of new organisms, the more
successful the operation is!120
It is the disturbing continuity and cyclicity of nature to which humans “say ‘no’” in order to achieve a
coherent, unified sense of being human in the first place, according to Bataille. Like Douglas, this
refusal of the “untidiness” of existence wherein there is no coherent identity but only endless flux
necessitates a rejection of the kinds of liminal matter that embody such flux. Bodily limits and the
matter that comes out of them are accordingly invested with metaphysical danger. In the final
analysis, it is the corpse that most plainly and undeniably confronts the living human being with its
continuity with nature, its place in the ecological cycle that radically transcends any individual or
social identity. This is Bataille’s ecological thesis, which he insists on with characteristic bluntness
while paraphrasing Hertz’s notion of death as a biphasic process:
Spontaneous physical revulsion keeps alive in some indirect fashion at least the
consciousness that the terrifying face of death, its stinking putrefaction, are to be identified
with the sickening primary condition of life. … [w]hite bones do not leave the survivors a
prey to the slimy menace of disgust. They put an end to the close connections between
decomposition, the source of an abundant surge of life, and death. But in an age more in
touch with the earliest human reactions than ours, this connection appeared so necessary
that even Aristotle said that certain creatures, brought into being spontaneously, as he
thought, in earth or water, were born of corruption) The generative power of corruption is a
naive belief responding to the mingled horror and fascination aroused in us by decay. This
belief is behind a belief we once held about nature as something wicked and shameful: decay
summed up the world we spring from and return to, and horror and shame were attached
both to our birth and to our death.121

“Back now; it is our turn.” So as we see others pass ahead of us, others will see us pass, and themselves present
the same spectacle to their successors.
120

Ibid., 60.

121

Ibid., 56.

53

In the end, Bataille argues that “nature demands … surrender” on the part of human beings who
bear witness to their own decomposition, claiming that the confrontation with the corpse is the
plainest and most powerful means for precipitating such an experience.
Bataille goes yet further, identifying a perverse pleasure at the prospect of entering into this
ebullient ecological flow. He does this first by showing how the orifices and liminal substances of the
body are not just associated with danger, as Douglas tends to do, but also with deep desire. “The
sexual channels are also the body’s sewers,” he points out, and thus “there do exist unmistakable
links between excreta, decay, and sexuality.”122 This association is central to Bataille’s thought in
general, but for the purposes of this project it has the virtue of bringing out the inherent ambivalence
of human attitudes toward decay across time periods and cultures while linking this ambivalence
specifically to an conception of human beings’ fundamental inseparability from an ecological cycle we
nonetheless refuse as a condition of our humanity. Bataille therefore brings out a double-bind he sees
as inherent not only to the sexually perverse, but to human beings in general, who at one and the
same time desire to separate themselves from nature and lose themselves in it. Shane Weller points
out that “this longing for lost continuity (or absolute formlessness) explains why the decomposing
body is not only a threat but also a promise. The necrophiliac desire that lies at the heart of all erotic
experience, as Bataille sees it, is essentially a form of nostalgia.”123
Ultimately, Bataille adds to Douglas’s account three crucial insights that inform my approach
to the decomposing body. First, he makes explicit the ecological facet of the disruption of the human
symbolic via liminal matter generally and the corpse specifically. He shows that the threat represented
by the corpse is in the very real, down-and-dirty encounter with the giving over of the human body
to the forces of predation, decomposition, and germination inherent to the general economy of
matter and energy that precedes and exceeds the human, and which shows that we have never been
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truly able to separate ourselves from the “swelling tumult”124 of nature. Second, he radicalizes the
attraction and power of transgression that is downplayed or redirected in Douglas’s account.
Douglas’s main insights hinge on how societies articulate their relationship to “dirt” in order to
establish order and provide a stable ground for communal experience. Dirt should not be attractive,
therefore, for if it is, the categories and separations on which that order and that stable ground
depend begin to blur. Bataille agrees with this thesis at base, and in fact he insists on the transgressive
and disruptive power of base matter throughout his work. But Bataille also identifies in this power an
inevitably seductive quality, seeing therein a residue of what for him is the unavoidable fact that
“there is in nature and there subsists in man a movement which always exceeds the bounds, that can
never be anything but partially reduced to order.”125
The final thing Bataille adds to my project’s theoretical basis is the staging of the role of
language in not only mirroring but precipitating the experience of decomposition that he describes.
This is why Bataille is both an intellectual cornerstone and a case study of The Decomposing Body:
throughout his work, he enlists literary techniques in the task of effecting the processes he describes
at the level of theory. See, for example, the following passage in the unpublished History of Eroticism,
which was adapted from the chapter of Erotism that I have been working from in this overview:
We have no greater aversion than the aversion we feel toward those unstable, fetid and
lukewarm substances where life ferments ignobly. Those substances where the eggs, germs
and maggots swarm not only make our hearts sing, but also turn our stomachs. Death does
not come down to the bitter annihilation of being—of all that I am, which expects to be
once more, the very meaning of which, rather than to be, is to expect to be (as if we never
received being authentically, but only the anticipation of being, which will be and is not, as if
we were not the presence that we are, but the future that we will be and are not); it is also
that shipwreck in the nauseous. I will rejoin abject nature and the purulence of anonymous,
infinite life, which stretches forth like the night, which is death. One day this living world
will pullulate in my dead mouth. Thus, the inevitable disappointment of the expectation is
itself, at the same time, the inevitable horror that I deny, that I should deny at all costs.126
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This complex passage both philosophically and rhetorically traces this dialectical mobius strip of the
ecological flux in which the human is embedded as embodied in the decomposing body, the
simultaneous denial and desire of which constitutes for Bataille a kind of ontological zero-point for
human-being itself. For Bataille, the decomposing body is both posthuman in that it comes posterior
to what we are given to think of as the properly human—it is the sign of the end of an individual
human being’s participation in systems of differentiation on which coherent identity depends—and
in that it is the overcoming of the very differentiation of life and death on which human being
founds itself in the first place. As it reveals the life in death (the “purulence of anonymous, infinite
life” to which dead matter gives rise), so too does it reveal death in life by disrupting the coherence
of “all that I am” from within. Bataille emphasizes how this coherence of the human self falls apart
in the revolting facticity of the corpse, whose non-being, he argues, has always already lain at the core
of our being. “We [are] not the presence that we are,” Bataille says, “but the future that we will be and are
not”—i.e., dead matter. This double consciousness of human meaning as structurally opposed to
death and human being as nonetheless centrally oriented on death is one that often organizes
modernist approaches to writing the corpse. It rhetorically reproduces the tension between the
decomposing body’s capacity to de-signify—to irrupt into discourse, cut it, reveal the silence on
which it is founded and to which it must return—and to hyper-signify—to corrupt and proliferate
meaning, to make the corpse something that always points elsewhere. It is in the space of this tension
that the texts explored in this project play out.
Bataille’s work establishes an implicit connection between the theoretical exploration of the
significance of bodily decay and the aesthetic modality of its presentation. This is an understudied
aspect of Bataille’s work generally, which so often blurs the distinction between the philosophical and
the literary. The reason for this modal transgression resides in the fact that, For Bataille, the
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representation of that which resists the traditional distinctions, categories, and symbolic syntaxes on
which coherent representation itself depends necessarily means that the only truly justified
representation is one that undoes itself, that represents precisely its own impossibility. Bataille
generically terms language that addresses and indeed speaks its own impossibility, “poetry.” Poetry,
he writes in Theory of Religion, “describes nothing that does not slip toward the unknowable. …
[P]oetry is only a way by which a man goes from a world full of meaning to the final dislocation of
meanings, of all meaning, which soon proves to be unavoidable.”127 Bataillean poetry, then, is a
bridge linking the domains of coherent reason and the ineffable: leading beyond language precisely
through language, “poetry is … the negation of itself: it denies itself as it conserves itself and denies
itself in going beyond itself.”128 Bataille’s approaches poetry, according to Romi S. Mukherjee, as “an
ineffable non-substance that is only intimated in the aporia of signification,” a “language of agitated
descent where the self no longer can imagine totalities or even preserve itself as human.”129 Crucially,
it is conceived a movement toward death: Bataille speaks of how it “leads us to death, and through
death to continuity.”130 It effects this movement by intimating and enacting the breakdown of rigid
distinctions—the polyvalence of poetic language, that is, bears witness to the “blending and fusion of
separate objects,”131 and thus it is this language only that is commensurate with the representation of
the dead body, itself the sign of the human dissolution into the continuity of a more general, morethan-human ecology/economy.
Bataille’s decompositional poetics and its relation to his idiosyncratic anti-philosophy would
be the subject of its own monograph. Not least because Bataille himself never articulates the
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particular role of the literary in his work in any explicit, coherent fashion, but rather (and perhaps
appropriately) only offers hints and fragments throughout his œuvre. It is Julia Kristeva who draws out
the implicit aesthetic thesis embedded in Bataille’s approach to death and the dead—her Powers of
Horror clearly lays out the role of the literary in approaching what she calls “abjection.”
Analogous both to Douglas’s dirt and Bataille’s heterogeneous/base matter, Kristeva’s concept of
abjection emerges from an analysis of western notions of defilement and purification. Like Douglas
and Bataille—on whose work her own is in fact based—Kristeva finds that our ideas about filth are
not ultimately about hygiene, but rather the residue of a need for coherence and systematicity in
order to establish personal and social identity. Kristeva writes that it is “not lack of cleanliness or
health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders,
positions, rules, the in-between, the ambiguous, the composite.”132 Also like Douglas and Bataille,
Kristeva consistently links the “waste-body” with the “corpse-body”133 with the aim of drawing out
how rituals of cleanliness and purgation come back, in the final analysis, to a horror of our inevitable
dissolution into continuity of nature that it tokened in the base-material facticity of the decomposing
corpse. The corpse is cast as the final, totalizing fusion of the subject (back) into the abject. “Nothing
remains in me,” Kristeva writes, “and my entire body falls beyond the limit—cadere, cadaver. If dung
signifies that other side of the border, the place where I am not and which permits me to be, the
corpse, the most sickening of wastes, is a border that has encroached upon everything. It is no longer
I who expel, ‘I’ is expelled.”134
This “falling beyond the border” is articulated along the axis of language. For the
decomposition of the body and re-entry into what Bataille would call the continuity of nature is
typified, for Kristeva, in the rupture of the symbolic order. She writes:
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A decaying body, lifeless, is completely turned into dejection, blurred between the inanimate
and the inorganic, a transitional swarming, inseparable lining of a human nature whose life is
undistinguishable from the symbolic—the corpse represents fundamental pollution[.] … In
other words, if the corpse is waste, transitional matter, mixture, it is above all the opposite of
the spiritual, of the symbolic, and of divine law.135
What is perhaps most important in Kristeva’s Powers of Horror for the current project comes to the
fore here, which is Kristeva’s explicit focus on the role of language and literature in approaching
abjection. As we have seen, Bataille draws out the latent ecological and erotic aspects of Douglas’s
anthropological account of the symbolic structure of pollution and purity that undergirds the social
body. In the same way, Kristeva makes explicit the latent aesthetic thesis of Bataille’s account, which
itself mobilizes the polysemy of literary language in order to disrupt the logical registration of
meaning that constitutes the symbolic foundation at the basis of what it means to be a human
subject. She explicitly references Bataille in this connection, writing that “any fictional theme is, by
definition, a challenge to the single signified since it is a polyvalent signified, a ‘blasting of selfhood’
(Georges Bataille).”136 According to Kristeva’s definition of the inherent liminality of the abject,
literature is then always already a mode of approaching abjection, possessed, in a paraphrase of
Bakhtin, of a “fundamental dialogism, a basic bivalence” which actually or at least potentially pairs
“the high and the low, the sublime and the abject.”137 Kristeva is yet more direct in the eponymous
final chapter of Powers of Horror:
it is within literature that I finally saw [abjection] carrying, with its horror, its full power into
effect.
On close inspection, all literature is probably a version of the apocalypse that seems
to me rooted, no matter what its sociological conditions might be, on the fragile border
(borderline cases) where identities (subject/object, etc.) do not exist or only barely so—
double, fuzzy, heterogeneous, animal, metamorphosed, altered, abject.138
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Approaching abjection, for Kristeva, is in and of itself literary in form. It precipitates a “Crisis of the
Word” the expression of which promises an “indefinite catharsis” whereby the individual subject
opens onto a world that precedes and succeeds its own self-enclosed being. For Kristeva, the
modernist writer—a category in which she prominently includes Bataille himself—is particularly
“fascinated by the abject … [he] imagines its logic, projects himself into it, introjects it, and as a
consequence perverts language—style and content.”139 Kristeva accordingly offers a model of
reading that does not take the impulse to establish meaning as its raison d’être, but to trace the impulse
toward abjection in literature, to follow a text to its own “apocalypse” and its own engagement with
the impossibility of coherent “naming” and of “signifiable identity.”140 Reading in this way is a tall
order, but it is what I will attempt in this project by tracing the manner in which modernist texts
effect their own modalities of literary decomposition.
Kristeva, Bataille, and Douglas form the principal theoretical touchstones for my approach
to the decomposing body in modernist fiction. All three agree that aversion to the dead is
paradigmatic of the human symbolic faculty and thus central to how humans establish a coherent
identity as human in the first place. Douglas establishes the central role of the relation between the
metaphorical and literal body in establishing what is polluted and what is pure, showing the common
human aversion to dirt as that which which transgresses limits and tokens the paradigmatic concern
over the disintegration of the body, which she projects as the basic anxiety undergirding all symbolic
activity. Bataille radicalizes this aversion by emphasizing the fundamental ambivalence to which it
gives rise: a desire coupled with an revulsion to decomposition. Most importantly, he marries this
erotic engagement explicitly with an ecological sense of the human as a being that excepts itself from
nature but which nonetheless desires a return to continuity with nature. Bataille’s literary approach to
articulating the ambivalence of decomposition also implicitly indicates what will become explicit in
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Kristeva: that the category-defying liminality of which the decomposing body is a prime example can
only be truly approached in a literary mode. Kristeva makes clear that modernist writing, though
itself a function of the symbolic, has the counterintuitive capacity to undo the symbolic from within,
disordering language by deepening disruptive polyvalence and thereby decomposing the articulate
self via the very symbolic by which it is articulated in the first place.
Though the corpse presents an insuperable limit to human symbolic economies, modernist
attempts to articulate precisely its disarticulating force in literature test the limits of the language itself
and push toward a posthumanist aesthetic. For some, the undecideable, liminal status of mortal
remains, and the violent wrenching of the self from the self with which the dead threaten the living
seem to become emblematic of the space of literature as such. For those I explore in this project, the
mysterious semiotic afterlives of the body entail that the corpse becomes a fraught meeting-point
between the human and the myriad entities and forces that precede and exceed it. The dead body is a
site at which it becomes possible to encounter inhuman alterity. It is not by corralling the inhuman
into the symbolic but by allowing language itself to decompose in the space of this encounter, and by
making this breakdown itself the object of writing, that modernist writers body forth the corpse and
generate an immanent critique of anthropocentrism avant la lettre. Both embedded in and reacting
against the rapid evolution of modern western deathways, Baudelaire, Barnes, and Bataille each
present innovative ways of presenting such encounters and bearing witness to the breakdown of the
human symbolic economy, and the human itself.

Chapter Summaries
In chapter one, I address the decompositional modalities at play in the poem “A Carcass,”
from Charles Baudelaire’s Flowers of Evil. Infamous in its time, this work synthesizes many themes
and literary operations that will thread throughout modernist representations of the decomposing
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body. I first situate the poem within the historical context of the revolution in western deathways
that had by and large become been completed by the time Flowers of Evil was published in 1857. Part
of the reason the poem was so provocative, I show, is precisely because it flies deliberately in the face
of the modern obscenification of the corpse. Baudelaire, in composing a Baroque-inflected lovepoem to decomposition that prominently includes its unvarnished sights and smells, harks back to
pre-enlightenment species of corpse-contemplation. His distinctly modern(ist) twist, however, resides
in the fact that the imagery he evokes is not equalized within a coherent symbolic order anchored by
Christian eschatology. In the modern, post-enlightenment world, decay does not lead to God—it
leads rather into the earth, into what he calls the “teeming world.”
Images of ecological cyclicity, animal predation, and decay amplify rather than assuage the
terrors of mortality in “A Carcass.” Moreover, they introduce into the poem what might be called a
decompositional agency: the maggots, flies, and worms described enact a cancerous proliferation of
unstable signifiers that disrupt the symbolic order of the poem from within. I show how the poem
thus ultimately performs its own breakdown. This manner of tapping into and ultimately falling apart
as a result of the inhuman agencies unleashed within the human symbolic economy is how Baudelaire
figures a posthumanist aesthetic, and prefigures later instantiations of the disruptive power of the
modernist cadaver. Embedded in this symbolic self-destruction precipitated by the decomposing
body is a prototype of the modernist critique of self-contained and self-assured human subjectivity.
“A Carcass” in fact dramatizes the corruption of such a subjectivity, highlighting its own tendency to
exceed itself via the uncontainable vagrancy of cadaverous efflorescence. The writing of the corpse
becomes a way to figure an approach to dissolution and the flux of broader economies of matter and
energy that are not reducible to human thought, language, and being.
Chapters 2 and 3 present a diptych on the works of Djuna Barnes. Chapter 2 traces how
Barnes’s early works—including her poetry, illustrations, and short prose—embrace the same kind of
decompositional tendency of the modernist writing of the corpse by which the symbolic order of “A
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Carcass” is undone. Throughout her body of work, Barnes mobilizes the ecology of decay as an
aesthetic and philosophical resource, a touchstone for her general suspicion of the power of language
to meaningfully grasp the formless flux of the material reality in which the human is fitfully
embedded.
I identify three specific modalities for embodying this suspicion at play in her work, which I
call, respectively, fragmentation, decadence, and animality. Fragmentation refers to the process by
which Barnes formally and figuratively disassembles the human body in her work as a means of
deconstructing the possibility of articulate meaning as such. The coherence of the body is thus linked
with the coherence of symbolic structure, and its disassembly indexes of the limit of anthropic
inscription and control of nature and material experience generally.
Next, I analyze Barnes’s engagement with decadence. Barnesian decadence, like
fragmentation, deals with the disassembly of previously molar entities, but for Barnes, it also
specifically indicates the human’s dissolution into a broader economy of being that is represented in
her work via figures of hybridity, indications of silence, nonsensical language, and the blank page. By
performatively indicating absence and thus making space for that which has no figuration and cannot
be expressed, Barnes’s engagement with literary decadence pushes her mode of posthumanist
modernism into the realm of an explicit anti-aesthetic. It ultimately gives rise to a conception of the
power of art as one that can gesture beyond the bounds of the symbolic faculty and thereby the
human itself.
Finally, I address the function of animality in Barnes’s illustrations and short fiction. By
focusing on figures and modalities of expression that traverse the liminal space between the human
and the animal, Barnes generates crises of meaning at the very basis of what it means to be human as
opposed to animal. Such figures become the stand-in for a desire for pre- and/or post-subjective
immanence, a continuity with the flux of nature that participation in the human symbolic precludes.
However, for Barnes, all animality is ultimately tragic, as it requires the very representative structures
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it critiques in order to be envisioned in the first place. Therefore, actually attaining animalistic
immanence would annihilate the ability to be conscious of such immanence. However, the early
articulation of Barnes’s posthumanist aesthetic and the decompositional modalities proper to it still
allow for an articulation the limits of discourse and, by implication, the limits of a self-possessed, selfcontained vision of the human subject as excepted from broader circulations of matter and energy.
The third chapter, brings each of these concepts to bear on Barnes’s fitful masterwork,
Nightwood. Pushing Barnes’s critique of the possibility of symbolic coherence in a formless world to
its furthest extent, I show in this chapter how Nightwood stages a dialectic of language and silence in
relation to themes and operations of fragmentation, decadence, and animality in order to radicalize
her posthuman preoccupations. This dialectic arises most forcefully between the characters of
Doctor Matthew O’Connor and Robin Vote. O’Connor pushes language to its breaking point,
speaking beyond the bounds of sense and presenting increasingly bizarre mutilations of discourse
that both reflect and enact his own fragmented and incoherent being. Robin, on the other hand,
consistently refuses language, and the novel renders her uncategorizable and unsymbolizable being
through performatively anti-discursive interactions with flora and fauna. Both O’Connor and Robin
are intimately bound up in Barnes’s preoccupation with death and the literary cadaver, presenting two
versions of the critique of subjectivity via visions of bodies falling increasingly apart. One of these
versions ends in ignominy and disaster, and one opens onto a more capacious sense of ecological
relationality.
Ultimately, though for Barnes, human communion with the nonhuman can only be gestured
toward, orbited and not fully accessed, given the limitations of the very symbolic faculty by which
such communion could be articulated. In the space of this impossibility, language can only bear
witness to its own breakdown. This enactment of discursive decomposition becomes the site of a
posthumanist aesthetic that acknowledges and avows the limitations of the human before that which
precedes, traverses, and exceeds it. It equally precipitates an ecological awareness of the openness of
64

supposedly discrete subjectivity to entities and forces that lie beyond its grasp, revealing the porosity
of the human, our imbrication in a more general economy of experience that is not reducible to
anthropic inscription or control.
In my final chapter, I explore how Georges Bataille radicalizes the implications of Barnes’s
articulation of the limits of discourse via modernist decomposition. A similar recognition of the
simultaneous impossibility and seductiveness of subjective dissolution as figured in the literary corpse
animates the fictions of both Barnes and Bataille. Analogous forms of decompositional writing
proper to the modernist representation of death and the dead are additionally present in the works of
each. However, for Bataille, what he variously calls immanence, communion, intimacy, and
continuity—by which he means the state of openness to the ecological and nonhuman that both
Baudelaire and Barnes before him have recognized in the decomposing body and the natural entities
and forces for which it is a lively nexus—this continuity is not just impossible but, paradoxically, also
inevitable. The shattering of structures of meaning on which properly human consciousness depends
to define itself as human in the first place, which for all three authors occurs in the confrontation
with the dead body, is for Bataille the effect of an ineluctable movement of being toward its own
self-destruction, embodied in its most capacious form in the “devilish cycle” of nature.
Drawing together how transgressing the syntaxes of the symbolic order are part and parcel
of this movement, I situate the place of transgressive literature in the precipitation of what Bataille
calls “extreme states,” wherein one’s sense of defined, stable subjectivity is called into question. Such
texts dramatize and even enact a state of what Bataille explicitly calls anti-anthropocentric
“ungroundedness.” This ungroundedness descibres, via a deep engagement with death and the dead,
a radical openness to the circulations of matter and energy that he associates with the concept of
general economy. Approaching what he calls “dead language,” defined as the residue of a deliberate
movement from articulation to formlessness, Bataille invites meditations on the postmortem as a way
of engendering an intimate experience of the self as a locus for more-than-human relationalities. I
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analyze these theoretical preoccupations of Bataille in relation to his fiction, particularly his last
published work of fiction, Blue of Noon. This work, more than any others, dramatizes the
“ungroundedness,” “extreme states,” and “dead language” that are at the core of his particular
apprehension of the literary cadaver. The final scene in particular embodies the destabilization and
fusion of the human subject, via death, with a simultaneously earthly and cosmic sense of radically
open being.
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CHAPTER 1

Flowers and Evil:
Corruption, Compost, and Companion Species in “A Carcass”

Though not included among the six poems censored for outraging public morality, Jonathan
Culler writes that in the years following the publication of The Flowers of Evil, “there was one poem
ineluctably tied to the name Baudelaire: ‘A Carcass.’”141 “Une charogne”142 has certainly drawn
significant critical attention and ire from Charles Baudelaire’s day to ours. The poem opens with a
scrupulously traditional invocation to the speaker’s beloved, wherein he enjoins her whom he calls
his “soul” (“mon âme”) to recall a rotting carcass (“une charogne infâme”) that they encountered
while out for a stroll. As he goes on, the increasingly deranged and sadistic speaker reminds his
audience how she almost fainted at the sight—and, moreover, the smell—of the festering carrion. He
then dwells extensively on the necrobiotic efflorescence of gases, liquids, maggots, and flies that
exude from and swarm around the scene of decomposition. Finally, he turns his attention back to his
human companion, telling her that she will eventually be just like this rotting carcass. The speaker
then claims in an enigmatic terminal stanza that he will keep, presumably in the safe deposit of his
poetic verses, the “form and essence divine” of his “decomposed loves.”
While the subject of “A Carcass” is just one of a scant few explicit references to
decomposing bodies in The Flowers of Evil, Baudelaire’s many critics nonetheless fixated on this image
to focalize their condemnations of the poet’s excesses. Culler speaks of a contemporary journalist
who “complained that Baudelaire had invented ‘carcass-literature,’”143 while in the twentieth century,
René Galand, J.D. Hubert, and Martin Turnell each single out “A Carcass” as the most significant
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stain on Baudelaire’s body of work.144 The widespread fixation on the poem led Baudelaire himself to
complain about his predicament to his friend, the photographer, writer, and balloonist, Nadar. “It is
painful for me to pass for the Prince of Carcasses,” he writes, “You have without doubt read a host
of things about me, which are not all musk and roses.”145 Playing off his friend’s self-deprecation and
the offending poem itself, Nadar would compose a gouache caricature depicting a bobble-headed
Baudelaire happening across a rotting carcass among a tangle of thistles.146
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Illustration 3. Nadar, Baudelaire à la charogne, in Charles Baudelaire intime: Le poète vierge (Paris: A.
Blaizot, 1913 [1859]), 9.
The figure’s stance and expression are markedly ambiguous. His bent knees may indicate that he is
turning away in horror or, fascinated, turning toward the fly-swarmed carrion at the bottom left. His
raised arms and splayed fingers can be interpreted with equal justification as a gesture of revulsion or
of delight.147 His round, bulging eyes are directed askance in a fashion that recalls someone trying

C.f. Cheryl Krueger’s ekphrasis in “The Scent Trail of ‘Une Charogne,’” French Forum 38, no. 1-2 (Winter-Spring 2013):
50-1.
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desperately not to look at something yet unable to turn away. The overall expression seems to
oscillate between aversion and attraction—with its slight and indeterminate curl at the corner, the
figure’s pursed mouth particularly invites the viewer to wonder whether cartoon-Baudelaire’s
stomach turns with disgust or rumbles with desire at the sight of the not-exactly-identifiable but
distinctly festering carrion. As if themselves growing out of the brittle shrubbery that surrounds and
unites the dandy and the carcass, spidery, blood-red words manifest from the top left of the
illustration: “FLEURS DU MAL.”
What was intended as a playful burlesque actually offers keen insight into the disturbing
ambivalence of repulsion and attraction that characterizes “A Carcass.” As set out in the historical
outline of this project’s introduction, the nineteenth century saw increasing horror and disgust
directed toward dead bodies because of growing anxieties over the supposedly noxious and polluting
qualities of decomposing flesh. Nevertheless, this horror and disgust was only half of a more dualistic
relationship to death and the dead. As decomposition came to be regarded as profoundly dangerous,
it was also becoming the source of scientific and popular fascination that tipped, at times, into the
libidinal. Nineteenth-century preoccupations with the simultaneously intriguing and repulsive
qualities of dead corporealities that threaded through popular culture and medical discourses alike
attest to William Ian Miller’s insistence that disgust itself might well be a reaction-formation that sets
boundaries on “unconscious desires, barely admitted fascinations, or furtive curiosities.”148 Nadar’s
friendly caricature certainly captures something of the fraught undecideability that made “A Carcass”
such a fixture of the poet’s artistic vision, and such a magnet for those expressions of critical
revulsion that, at times, may have protested just slightly too much.
The duality of corpse-disgust was tied to more specific anxieties associated with the cultural
changes in attitudes and practices relating to the dead, as I have also shown. Michael Sappol’s study
of the nineteenth-century cadaver trade, A Traffic of Dead Bodies, charts how authorities worried that
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too keen an interest in the dead among medical students could not only “incite desire (necrophilia),”
but also “inspire contempt for humanity, or lead students to reject Christianity … and so jeopardize
their immortal souls.”149 “A Carcass” plainly charts this fascination with the transformations of rot as
it tends toward necrophiliac desire. The “contempt for humanity” of which Sappol writes is also
present in the poem. I read this contempt as of same kind that, as I have previously written, inspired
Victor Frankenstein—that is, the study of death and decomposition had begun to incite a broadbased interrogation and even, for some, outright denial of the exceptionality of the human in the
context of complex organic life in general. Such contempt for traditional anthropocentrism, and
interest in new relationalities between the human and the nonhuman that were rooted in the fact that
everything that lives will eventually rot and be recycled into the ecosphere, is particularly brutally
showcased in “A Carcass.” Finally, the rejection of Christianity that Sappol cites harks back to the
destabilization of the symbolic order that I have argued anchored pre-Enlightenment representations
of bodily decomposition to the eschatology of resurrection. This symbolic order is parodied and
ultimately rejected in Baudelaire’s scandalous adoption-cum-deformation of Baroque literary
precedent. In brief, “A Carcass” pierces to the core of those “unconscious desires, barely admitted
fascinations, [and] furtive curiosities” that undergirded the modern revolution in western deathways.
Accordingly, part of the purpose of this chapter is to trace how the poem positions decomposition at
the center of a fraught oscillation between attraction and repulsion that is intimately connected with
the ecology of organic decay, destabilizes the separation between the human on one hand and
nonhuman entities and ecological forces on the other, and situates the corpse in the context of an
increasingly materialist worldview that rejects traditional, religious representations of bodily decay.
In addition to this historical component, throughout this chapter, I map decomposition as it operates
as a literary function in “A Carcass.” I show how Baudelaire’s flattened ontology in which humans,
insects, and animals are put on an ecological continuum of sorts insofar as they all, inevitably, rot and
Michael Sappol, A Traffic of Dead Bodies: Anatomy and Embodied Social Identity in Nineteenth-Century America (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2002), 79.
149

71

feed on one another—a literary instantiation of Bataille’s “devilish cycle” if there ever was one—is
bound up in his irruptions into and corruptions of the symbolic system on which the poem itself
depends. Baudelaire’s decompositional approach to literary tradition and poetic creation stages the
disruptive agency of the nonhuman and gestures toward that which cannot be recuperated by
symbolic inscription. This occurs despite the best efforts of the speaker of “A Carcass”: though the
speaker ultimately claims to preserve the “form” of decomposition through poetry, what the poem
actually effects is a decomposition of its own form. By both describing and effecting decomposition,
then, “A Carcass” draws a link between the corporeal and textual corpus in order to articulate the limit
of the human capacity to give form to what exceeds a traditionally anthropocentric perspective,
clearing the way for a posthumanist modernist aesthetic that will be taken up by Barnes and Bataille.

From Heaven to Earth: Repositioning the Literary Corpse
“A Carcass” begins as follows:
Rappelez-vous l’objet que nous vîmes, mon âme,
Ce beau matin d’été si doux:
Au détour d’un sentier une charogne infâme
Sur un lit semé des cailloux
[Remember the object we saw, my soul,
That beautiful, sweet summer morning:
At a bend in the path a vile carcass
On a bed sown with stones]
Immediately, the reader is confronted with a series of violent contrasts. At the level of content, a
traditional, even archaic opening line wherein the speaker addresses his beloved as “my soul” and
recalls a “beautiful, sweet summer morning,” is immediately followed by the brutal evocation of a
“vile carcass.” The use of a tense traditionally reserved for formal writing heightens this sense of a
collision between courtly, cultured formality and disgusting, earthly content. Additionally, the first
line is an alexandrine, which was such a dominant metric commonplace in French poetry from the
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sixteenth to the nineteenth century that it “[rose to] the status of national symbol and eventually
came to typify French poetry overall.”150 That august meter, associated with high tragedy and lauded
by Joachim du Bellay for its proximity to prose, is jarringly coupled with a bright, sing-song
octosyllable. Strictly enforced throughout, this alternating pattern mirrors the speaker’s movement
between evocations of ideal beauty and descriptions of material decay, priming the reader for the
discordant interplay of vitality and rot, ideal beauty and material ugliness that is the primary theme of
“A Carcass.” Soul and body, from the outset, are at odds.
It is significant that this poem appears in the first part of The Flowers of Evil, grouped under
the subtitle of “Spleen and the Ideal.” To understand what is at play in its drastic shifts in imagery
and register, and to grasp the basic epistemic underpinnings of Baudelaire’s poetry more generally, it
is necessary to gloss the nature and relation of these concepts, which are central to Baudelaire’s
aesthetics. For Baudelaire, in extremely broad strokes, “the Ideal” refers to beauty, form, and clarity
of meaning. It is associated with the poetic act itself (or with other modalities of artistic creation,
such as painting, which figures frequently in Flowers of Evil), and is therefore related to a more or less
conventional conception of the artist as one who deciphers the world and organizes experience into
coherent representative forms. “Spleen,” by contrast, is associated with ugliness, disturbance,
emptiness, solitude, the refusal or erosion of clear meaning, and the attendant inability to generate
meaningful form out of material experience. Elissa Marder explains further that
spleen is always accompanied by pain that is simultaneously psychic, spiritual, and bodily.
Because it comes from the body and keeps one bound to a body that is always a body in
pain, spleen is intimately related to sin and failed spirituality as well as to a full range of
unsatisfied bodily wants, needs, vulnerabilities, and desires. Sometimes translated as bile,
spleen is related to excremental waste, violent rage, and to anything that is produced by an
economy (be it bodily, spiritual, social, or political) to which it cannot be returned and by
which it cannot be represented. Like bile, it is unmetabolized and unmetabolizable
material.151
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For Baudelaire, poetry is a product of the friction generated where the ideal and spleen meet, and this
fraught interplay is typified in the first place by the very image of flowers of evil. Certain poems, of
course, focus more on one than on the other—readers could justifiably place “Elevation” and
“Correspondences” on the side of the ideal and “Don Juan in Hell” and “Poison” on the side of
spleen, for example. But ultimately, for Baudelaire, flowers and evil are inseparable. Forests of
symbols cannot be navigated, much less mapped, without the struggles of the ennui-afflicted artist,
just as the painful, limping days of modern life require poetic recollection and form in order to
become legible.
At the same time, however, the Baudelairean dialectic never reaches equilibrium and is never
overcome. The interaction of spleen and the ideal does not tend toward Hegelian Aufhebung, but
rather sustains an inescapable out-of-joint-ness that is characteristic of the particular experience of
Baudelaire’s poetry. Invocations Baudelaire’s status as the prime example of a modern poet and the
originator of modernism (however arguable) tend to hinge on precisely this quality. Culler writes that
Baudelaire’s poetry has the distinct ability
to bring into verse the banal, the prosaic, or the disgusting—thought to loom especially large
in modern life—and give it a poetic function. Praising the power of the beloved’s saliva as
well as her eyes (“Poison”), comparing the sky to the lid of a pot (“Spleen (IV)”), or
suggesting we become attached to feeling remorse, “as beggars take to nourishing their lice”
(“To the Reader”), Baudelaire produces dissonant combinations, which can be seen as
reflecting the dissociated character of modern experience, where consciousness is
confronted by objects, sensations, and experiences that do not go together.152
From the outset, “A Carcass” models the simultaneous intimacy and disjointedness of spleen and the
ideal, staging “the exaggeration created through the juxtaposition of opposites in different categories”
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that is located at the philosophical and aesthetic core of The Flowers of Evil.153 In the case of the
opening lines of “A Carcass,” abstraction and metaphor govern the classically-structured first and
third lines, while materiality and sensuous experience crash into the poem via the less stately second
and fourth lines. This shuttling between opposed metric and thematic registers presents an act of
memory—the imaginative recreation of a past experience that holds immediacy at bay—in direct
confrontation with immediate, physical horror. The effect of whiplash produced at the scene of this
meeting disrupts both readerly expectation on the one hand and traditional poetic form and content
on the other.
In fact, Baudelaire’s assault on the symbolic order of traditional literary discourse that is on
display in “A Carcass” is more pointed than merely evoking scandalous subject matter in the context
of a poetic recollection that partakes of long-established formalisms and tropes. Commentators have
identified that “A Carcass” is, in fact, deliberately modeled on Baroque memento mori poems, and
particularly the work of Ronsard.154 As I have laid out in the introduction to this project, Ronsard
and Baroque poets generally would often mobilize macabre imagery to keep readers in mind of the
state of their eternal souls. However, while “A Carcass” partakes of this tradition, the epistemic
foundations of the poem are fundamentally different, as it does not rely on Christian eschatology to
cast bodily decay as a foil to the glorious resurrection to come. Rather, Baudelaire imports a modern
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sense of the biological and ecological participations of death in life, decomposition in reproduction,
to stage a new and distinctly modern relationship to the literary cadaver.
This decisive turn from precedent is introduced in atrocious fashion in the second verse:
Les jambes en l’air, comme une femme lubrique,
Brûlante et suant les poisons,
Ouvrait d’une façon nonchalante et cynique
Son ventre plein d’exhalaisons.
[Legs in the air, like a lubricious woman
Burning and sweating poisons,
Opened in indolent, cynical fashion
Its belly plump with exhalations.]
Convention enjoins that the figuration of the decomposing body be invoked primarily as a deterrent,
a way of impelling the audience to avert their eyes from a restrictive focus on the present and to
direct their attention to the life everlasting. “A Carcass,” however, insists on the figuration of death
itself inviting and arresting the gaze “like a lubricious woman” whose legs appear temptingly
“opened.” Death, drawing in the simultaneously shocked and captivated gaze of the speaker, the
addressee, and the reading audience together, seems to draw in life as such, paradoxically necrotizing
the sexual and spiritual implications evoked in the first stanza and rendering the dead belly of the
carcass itself—or “womb” as most translations gender the indeterminate “ventre”—plump and
teeming with heterodox significations. Reinforcing this precipitous symbolic vacillation is a pendular
movement between contrary designations. The first and third lines of the stanza describe what are (at
least for the speaker) the seductive qualities of the carcass while the second and fourth designate its
repellent aspects, namely, the “poisons” and “exhalations” attendant to bodily putrefaction. A
modern sense of the dead body as both repulsive and attractive here displaces the traditional focus of
poetic depictions of decomposition by centering on the base materiality of death and eschewing any
spiritual counterweight. In the context of Baudelaire’s aesthetics of clashing contrarieties, a new
relation to dead matter is foisted into a traditional format, heightening the contrast between form and
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content and effectively repositioning the literary cadaver as a material phenomenon rather than
spiritual symbol. It brings the literary cadaver from heaven to earth, in other words.
The decomposition of the titular carcass also effectively becomes a figure for the poetic act
itself. In this way Virginia Krause and Christian Martin write that, in “A Carcass,”
natural decomposition is … a way of speaking of the relationship of a poem to previous
poetic matter. It is commonplace to see poetry as “composition.” Baudelaire’s gesture
amounts to reintroducing the negative work of undoing existing poetic material as the
counterpart to any artistic creation. For poetry is a two-part process, a dialectic composed of
decomposition and (re)composition.155
Without losing anything of its excremental and repulsive character, the carcass nonetheless takes
center stage as both a thematic focus and a literary function. Like a black hole, it draws in speaker,
addressee, and audience as the poem goes on, with the speaker only finally tearing himself from what
will soon become his quasi-devotional contemplation to mock any idea of his addressee’s escape
from the fate of the carcass in the poem’s final stanza. The second stanza, therefore, sees Baudelaire
set the stage for the second major section of the poem—wherein the perversely lively features of the
carcass are explored in minute detail—as well as the poem’s climax and final section, where the
confusion of life and death, as well as the heavenly/ideal and earthly/splenetic, will reach a fever
pitch and push beyond the boundaries of anthropocentric representation.
This gradual slippage toward the dissolution of the human evidenced in “A Carcass” refracts popular
fears and fascinations about the material afterlives of the dead in the nineteenth century. Joining the
supposedly opposed registers of sexual attraction and visceral disgust is an example of what Ariès
describes as the “perverse games” that people began to play with death in the post-Enlightenment
period. “A connection,” says Ariès, “has been made between death and sex; the one has become as
fascinating and obsessive as the other.”156 This connection is itself tied to the “temptation of
nothingness” that supplanted Christian eschatology in western deathways as well as the fascination
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with material dissolution that the literary corpse came to embody. The proximity between decay and
new growth, as Bataille observed, comes to be bound up in the desire to rejoin the continuity of
nature, an eco-erotic impulse that partakes equally of horror and fascination, and it is this eco-erotic
desire that will take center stage in the next section.

From Disgust to Desire: The Eco-Erotics of Dissolution
Considering the connection between death and sex, along with its relation of this connection
with the attractive and repulsive qualities of organic decay that were on the rise in the nineteenth
century, it would be justifiable to turn back to the whispered obscenity embedded in the language of
the first verse. Given the likening of the carcass to a “lubricious woman,” the “bed” of line four now
seems as much a metaphorical stand-in for a site where a dead body is disposed—as in when we refer
to a grave as a “resting place”—or a literal flowerbed as a site for more lively pursuits between lovers.
Thus, it is as implied in “A Carcass” as it is in the Prospect Cemetery of Ulysses that “in the midst of
death we are in life. Both ends meet.”157 The scandalous association of decay with generation is a
central thematic component of The Flowers of Evil, one which is in direct conversation with evolving
attitudes toward the dead. What “A Carcass” accesses is the slipperiness of the modern necrocorporealities, a slipperiness that affects the stability both of traditional discursive forms as well as
the sense of the exceptionality of the human in the context of the the natural world more broadly.
The “temptation of nothingness” that Ariès sees as constitutive of modernizing deathways underlies
a pervasive, if furtive and scarcely so plainly articulated sense that both ends, indeed, meet. “A
Carcass” stages the eco-erotic relationship to dead matter that draws the living to imaginatively test
the limits of their own humanity in the face of the literary cadaver and the ecological relationalities
that open by way of its decomposition.
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Consider the liquid qualities of the carcass. It is a wet, slippery object, both in terms of
description and in terms of its literary function. It traverses the traditionally opposed registers of
reproduction and decay, moving from disgust to desire and mingling the qualities of each. In my
translation of the second verse I prefer to render “femme lubrique” as “lubricious woman” rather
than the more common “whore” to highlight this aspect of the poem. For, given that the woman to
whom the carcass is analogized is “lubrique,” a word derived from a root meaning slippery or wet,
the speaker seems to refer as much to a figuratively lustful disposition ad the physical effects of
arousal as the more metaphysically slippery qualities of the carcass. The reference to “sweating”
reinforces a reading that accounts for the metaphoric evocation of liquids secreted during intercourse
while heightening the sense of symbolic confusion between sex and decomposition. In this same
vein, the “bed” being “semé” appears as much an agricultural metaphor—a flowerbed sown with the
seeds of evil flowers, as it were—as a reference to semen. But the bed on which the carcass
languishes might be less moist than its seminal descriptor implies, for in an appropriately
blasphemous take on the parable of the sower or perhaps even a reversal of the postdiluvian creation
myth of the Metamorphoses, the ground/bed on which the carcass rests is strewn with seeds/semen
that are figured as dead rocks. As part of a bouquet of flowers of evil and thus an exploration of the
death and decay that dwell at the root (or in the “womb”) of life, it is appropriate that “A Carcass”
opens by sowing not seeds but stones, dead matter in the bed where perverse life will bloom. Thus
both usurping and reversing the role of God, the speaker positions the carcass on its rocky bed,
heightening the sense that the confusion of life and death signified therein is the material
substructure of all “creation.” Moreover, by focalizing the bast matter and filth that precedes and
succeeds complex organic life, Baudelaire confronts the reader with that which the human being
both depends on and denies in order to be human in the first place. Emphasizing rather than eliding
or transliterating the ambivalence of the carcass here opens a posthumanistic challenge: if, as
Douglas, Bataille, and Kristeva each show, to be human is intimately connected to the need to
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exclude filth and deny its liminal, undecideable status in favor of the clean, self-contained categories
on which human culture and even human-being depend, then a poem that takes such filth and
dissolution as its central subject must seek to destabilize a stable and coherent sense of the human as
such.
In so doing, “A Carcass” inscribes human-being within a more general economy of material
and energetic circulation. This becomes apparent in the third and fourth stanzas, where the ecology
of decay is revealed as the locus of exuberant efflorescence and visceral desire:
Le soleil rayonnait sur cette pourriture,
Comme afin de la cuire à point,
Et de rendre au centuple à la grande Nature
Tout ce qu’ensemble elle avait joint;
[The sun shone down on this rottenness
So as to cook it just so,
And to render hundredfold to great Nature
All she united in one]
Ainslee Armstrong McLees indicates that Baudelaire here begins to “ironically sugges[t] that decay is
a form of multiplication rather than of disintegration,” with the “hundredfold” indicating the
“perversely alive” aspects of the corpse that become particularly apparent in stanzas five through
seven.158 For Baudelaire, McLees says, “the carcass is now a microcosm: life begins, is lived, and ends
in a cycle of procreation and death.”159 It is here that the carcass crosses definitively from the status
of a discrete object as a nexus where that which precedes, traverses, and exceeds the very idea of selfcontainedness on the part of any organic lifeform is brutally apparent. The carcass and the teeming
“hundredfold” it renders up to “great nature” thereby implies the replacement of human-being with
human becoming-with, to paraphrase Haraway, highlighting how every being is “the outcome of
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lateral transformations, assimilations, digestions and ejections through which living beings materially
compose and decompose, live and die together.”160
As a common symbol for the ecological cycle in toto, it is appropriate that it is the sun that
“opens” the carcass to the decomposing influence of natural processes, stimulating the teeming
carrion to cook down or—in the fraught metaphor of the fourth stanza—to bloom:
Et le ciel regardait la carcasse superbe
Comme une fleur s’épanouir.
La puanteur était si forte, que sur l’herbe
Vous crûtes vous évanouir.
[And the sky watched the superb carcass
Bloom like a flower.
The stench was so strong, you believed
You would faint on the grass.]
The appearance of the flower in bloom introduces a—perhaps the—privileged symbol in the context
of Baudelaire’s poetic and philosophical universe. Théophile Gautier, to whom The Flowers of Evil is
dedicated, wrote that the core of the work resided in Baudelaire’s ability “to find … morbidly rich
nuances in more or less advanced decay,” and he likens the collection to a palette of floral colors
“pushed to the most intense degree, which corresponds to autumn, sunset, to the extreme ripeness
of fruits, and the final hour of civilizations.”161 The association of flowers with decay and death cuts
to the core of Baudelaire’s dialectical poetics of spleen and the ideal, by which the poetic impulse
attempts to recuperate the messy, recalcitrant, and often disgusting aspects of material experience
into precise symbolic figuration but nonetheless bears witness to the impotence of the symbolic
faculty itself in the face of realities that resist inscription. The operations of nature, like flowers
themselves, partake as much of pristine beauty as of formless filth, and thus Baudelaire’s poetic
vision of the natural world, according to James Whitlark, departs simultaneously from the “unidimensionally bad nature of Occidental tradition” on the one hand and “the good nature of the
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Romantics,” in which nature is taken “to be a forgiving, subordinate presence,” on the other. Rather,
Baudelaire “recognizes the independence and thus the insubordinate character of nature” and
thereby generates “an aesthetics that recognizes flowers grow from compost.”162 In the third and
fourth stanzas, “A Carcass” presents the decomposing body as a site where both biological and
psychological boundaries break down and the molecules that once made them up mingle in strange
and fecund new formations. Crucially, the second stanza has already primed the audience for the
possibility of that this breakdown is not only beautiful, but desirable. The line of connection drawn
or, rather, revealed between decay and reproduction that is tokened in the perverse growth of the
swelling, swarming carrion reinforces the speaker’s openly necrophilic presentation of the carcass as a
“lubricious woman.” In so rendering it as the site of eco-erotic desire, the poem, its speaker, and its
audience are all made to approach death closer and closer, and to bear witness to the uncomfortably
contrary effects such an approach entails.
Bataille is useful in this connection, for, writing about Baudelaire in Literature and Evil, he
explicitly brings out the congruence of the erotic and the necrotic as a figuration of what he earlier
characterizes in Erotism as the repressed desire to surpass the human and rejoin the continuity of
nature: “That which destroys a being,” he writes,
also releases it: besides, release is always the ruin of a being which has set limits on its
propriety. … Sexual disorder discomposes the coherent forms which establish us, for
ourselves and for others, as defined beings—it moves them into an infinity which is death.
There is a turmoil, a sense of drowning, in sensuality which is similar to the stench of
corpses. … There was once a young man who could not attend a burial without experiencing
a physical thrill, and he therefore had to leave his father’s funeral procession. His conduct
differed from ordinary behavior. But we cannot reduce sexual desire to what is agreeable and
beneficent. But we cannot reduce sexual desire to what is agreeable and beneficent. There is
in it an element of disorder and excess which goes as far as to endanger the life of whoever
indulges in it.163
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This sense of “physical thrill” at the “stench of corpses,” according to Bataille, is equally desirable
and dangerous precisely because it represents the “release” of limited, defined, and coherent
beings—the passage beyond the self into the realm of continuity that is, for Bataille, characteristic
both of orgasm and death and that I have termed eco-erotic. In “A Carcass,” this passage beyond the
human is figured as “a swoon.” This reference to fainting evokes the kind of “release” that Bataille
associates with the discomposing force of both sexual desire and the stench of corpses that are both
at play in the poem. It indexes the loss of distinctly human consciousness when confronted with the
sensuous extravagance of the corpse—and indeed, the speaker will not mention his beloved again
until the final two paragraphs of the poem. Fainting thus expresses more or less what Bataille
describes in Literature and Evil. It prefigures and opens onto “the infinity which is death,” signifying
the disintegration of the “coherent forms which establish us, for ourselves and for others, as defined
beings.” The simultaneously necro- and eco-erotic implications of this experience is present in “A
Carcass” via the pairing of the words “s’épanouir” and “evanouir,” which imply the congruence of
the movements of “opening up” and of “passing out.” In opening itself to the carcass, the human
being focalizes that which it must shun in order to maintain its own humanity as a discrete and
coherent being that is separate from the general order of nature. The invocation of the loss of
consciousness at this point then figures a more general passage beyond the human as such that the
next three stanzas explore. Here, “A Carcass” unforgivingly places the repressed seductiveness of the
corpse center stage while also gesturing toward its newfound ecological significance.

From Representation to Enactment: Decomposition as Literary Function
As mentioned, this is the point in “A Carcass” when the speaker seems to forget about his
beloved, his “âme,” entirely. As she has lost consciousness, so has the speaker lost consciousness of
her, and instead he loses himself more and more entirely to the strange metastasizations of the
carcass itself.
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Les mouches bourdonnaient sur ce ventre putride,
D’où sortaient de noirs bataillons
De larves, qui coulaient comme un épais liquide
Le long de ces vivants haillons.
[The flies buzzed around its putrid belly,
From which sallied black battalions
Of larvae, which flowed like a thick liquid
Down its living rags.]
This stanza presents the first direct reference to complex nonhuman life in the poem. The carcass is
placed squarely at the juncture of fully-grown flies and embryonic larvae, and thus at the nexus of an
entire biological lifecycle. Echoing the decaying “ventre” from the second verse, which can be
translated as “belly” or “womb,” similarly recalls the carcass’s introduction as the glutinous meetingpoint at which life feeds on and develops out of death. The sound of the flies’ and maggots’
simultaneously aerial and liquid movement, which transforms into “a strange music / like running
water or wind” in the seventh stanza implies an elemental, symphonic and synesthetic unity of life
and death, where all life is joined by the shared capacity to break down matter and the equally shared
fate of becoming broken-down matter.
In this connection, reading “A Carcass” as a literary instantiation of Bataille’s “devilish cycle”
associates Baudelaire’s splenetic experience of ever-growing, de- and reforming materiality with a
posthumanist impulse to gesture beyond the limits of human corporeality and psychology equally. By
focalizing the interprenetration of the human with entities and forces beyond the ambit of symbolic
recuperation, then, “A Carcass” prefigures Haraway’s “compostist” perspective as well as Neyrat’s
notion of the “unconstructable.” It emphasizes “the nocturnal, unobjective, and asubjective part …
which is withdrawn from human dominance and is subsequently established as the condition of
humanity,”164 while also highlighting how any given being, and particularly any given human being, is
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not and has never been anything more than “a microbiome of fermenting critters … companion
species, at table together, eating and being eaten, messmates, compost.”165
Timothy Morton has made a similar argument, tying Baudelaire to his anti-anthropocentric
concept of “Dark Ecology.” Baudelaire’s poetry typifies an “ecological awareness,” Morton writes, in
which the human subject recognizes itself as “surrounded and penetrated by other entities such as
stomach bacteria, parasites, mitochondria.”166 Given a reading of “A Carcass,” Morton might have
added maggots and flies as well. Baudelaire’s evocations of the disruptive and disgusting workings of
the material world evokes for Morton a flattened ontological perspective wherein poetic “beauty”
begins to “lose its anthropocentric equalization.”167 “I find it,” Morton adds, in a characteristically
personal aside, “disgusting and yet fascinating.”168 Morton focuses on Baudelaire’s “Spleen” poems,
though what he describes is rather more brutally evident in “A Carcass.” The more direct ecological
implications of this poem might have driven him to pursue the “disgusting and yet fascinating”
aspect of Baudeaire’s “ecological awareness” further, and to recognize that this disturbing admixture
is not just a useful example but an instantiation of what happens to the human symbolic in
confrontation with what radically precedes, traverses, and exceeds it. What could supplement this
perspective, then, is a closer attention to the discursive operations proper to the nonhuman
“penetration” of the human. For it is not just that Baudelaire stages the irruption of the nonhuman
into the human, but that poems like “A Carcass” mobilize the simultaneity of corpse-disgust and
corpse-desire to precipitate an experience of the breakdown of the symbolic faculty in the face of
what fundamentally resists clear symbolization. Baudelaire does not merely present or represent the
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posthuman in the figure of the decomposing body, but places representation in the service of the
posthuman, and bears witness to its own decomposition in so doing.
This operation of discursive interruption begins to become more apparent in the sixth
stanza.
Tout cela descendait, montait comme une vague
Ou s'élançait en pétillant;
On eût dit que le corps, enflé d’un souffle vague,
Vivait en se multipliant.
[All this fell and rose like a wave
Or rushed forth, bubbling;
One could say that the corpse, swollen with a vague breath
Lived in multiplying itself.]
That the carcass “live[s] in multiplying itself” is the key to this second part of the poem. It is here
that the percolation of life feeding on death that is first indicated in the third stanza and repeated
here becomes not just the description of a poetic subject but a literary operation in and of itself. As
the speaker warps the corpse through several rapid-fire comparisons, the description reaches the
point where increasing ambiguity indicates a corruption of the symbolic system of the poem. The
repetition of “comme [like],” which is repeated in each stanza after the second, syntactically effects a
semiotic process of expansion that mirrors the crescendoing ooze and buzz of the fifth stanza as well
as the wave-like rise, fall, rush, and bubble of the sixth. As “analogy is already in an active state,
transforming the physical into more than itself,” this poetic “movement of enlargement” synthesizes
the “inexhaustible … ‘exhalaisons’ emanating from matter to extend it beyond itself.”169 In focusing
so scrupulously on the workings of its necrobiotic efflorescence, the speaker’s own symbolic system
has also started to come apart at the seams. Dirty, heterogeneous, and abject, the carcass has become
the site of a teeming multiplicity that defies both physiological and semiotic containment. Like this,
then like that, then like yet something else, its similitudes grow until it surpasses similitude itself. “A
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Carcass” in this way not only shows but performs “the insubordination of nature in relation to
culture, the continuous rebellion of life against all limits, in short, growth.”170
Appropriately, this bubbling-forth of life seemingly ex nihilo sees the poem once again
replace the themes of traditional Christian corpse-poetry with the base workings of biology. Where
Genesis 2:7 says that “The LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his
nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul,” “A Carcass” rather sees the “vague breath”
“inflating” dead matter with the percolations of nonhuman companion species and the gases that
result from their operations. Fruitful and multiplying, the teeming hordes that constitute this
sacrilegious resurrection indicate that the creative force of God has been definitively diverted from
his own image—the human—into more capacious assemblages of species and phenomena that
participate in but ultimately surpass the human. The breath of life becomes the breath of life in
general, a biological rather than spiritual transubstantiation that unites the biosphere. “A Carcass”
therefore describes not a teleological progression toward resurrection and eternal life but the
operations of a “devilish cycle” in which life and death always already participate in one another.
This cyclicity becomes yet more apparent the seventh stanza:
Et ce monde rendait une étrange musique,
Comme l’eau courante et le vent,
Ou le grain qu’un vanneur d’un mouvement rhythmique
Agite et tourne dans son van.
[And this world made a strange music,
Like running water and wind,
Or the grain that a winnower by a rhythmic movement
Shakes and turns in his winnowing-fan]
Evoking again the sense mentioned at the start of the poem’s second section, the various
percolations, bubblings, buzzings, and teemings here combine into a horrific harmony, a “strange
music” redolent of the formless symphony of water and wind. Beyond mere diegesis, the elemental
expansion of the carcass also takes the form of a semantic scissiparity: that is, the disjunctive “or”
Asger Sørenson, “The Inner Experience of Living Matter: Bataille and Dialectics,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 33, no. 5
(2007): 604.
170
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now joins the additive “like” as a repeated analogical conjunction enacting the corpse’s
metastasization. In reference to this increasing space introduced between the respective terms of
poetic similitudes, Peter Broome writes that “the reciprocity of images, sprouting from the words
‘Vivait en se multipliant,” seems endowed with an autonomous life and stands virtually unsupported.
The similes, no longer contained within the enclosure of the single, evolve towards a kind of
infinity.”171 This proliferative infinity finds a parodic foil in circular infinity, that is, the “rhythmic
movements” of the winnower tossing wheat into the air to make the chaff blow out and rejoin the
overall cycle of decomposition and growth. Thus conjuring the image of the endless interchange of
sowing and reaping that takes place not only in the human sphere but is constitutive of nature as
such, the cancerous spread of the carcass’s both semiotic and material exudations beyond the bounds
of formal coherence begins to seem all the more irreducible to human conscription. What is being
represented here is the movement of the human toward the inhuman, effected in ever more atomic
decompositions, until the very notion of discrete being dissipates into the atmosphere like chaff in
the wind.
Crucially, this stanza solidifies that the poem not only represents the supersession of discrete
being—foreshadowed in the first place, as indicated above, by the reference to the loss of human
consciousness in stanza four—but rather enacts decomposition as a textual function. The irruption of
flies and maggots in the poem tokens an irruption of the decompositional agency of nonhuman
entities in the symbolic structure of the poem itself, making the speaker’s very language begin to
break down, as if itself infected by the corruption of the carcass it describes.
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From the Form of Decomposition to the Decomposition of Form:
The Poetic Failure of “A Carcass”
Any honest reading of Baudelaire must pause at this point and affirm that he was not, by any
stretch, a materialist. His was a philosophy of spleen and the ideal, as I have shown above. The
figuration of the loss of human consciousness and the increasingly monomaniacal and deranged
emphasis on the material workings of the titular carcass, its myriad companion species, and its
relationality with the broader workings of the natural world therefore seem absurdly one-sided in the
context of his emphasis on the “universal law of alternation.” It is with this in mind that many
readers have read the final four stanzas of “A Carcass” as the poet’s attempt to recuperate the alltoo-earthly imagery of the second movement of the poem (between the “swoon” and the end of the
eighth stanza) back into the realm of the ideal—to make poetry out of compost, rather than compost
out of poetry. In the conclusion to this chapter, I will show that while this attempt is made, it is
ultimately a failure, and that while “A Carcass” ultimately evangelizes the poet’s ability to distill and
keep the “form of decomposition,” what he ultimately achieves is a decomposition of form. This
poetic failure emphasizes the new status of the modern literary corpse as a force of discursive
interruption, a site where the human symbolic faculty as such breaks down, and thus stages a
posthumanist aesthetic that will be adopted and adapted by Barnes and Bataille.
At the division of the seventh and eighth stanza a wedge of sorts is hammered into the flow
of the poem. Having established the first part as a brutal rupturing of the traditional structures and
commonplaces of French poetry by the brutally material experience of a repulsive carcass, the second
part of the poem, in following the carcass’s virulent expansion, equally expands on the excremental
character of the carcass such that it begins to seem uncontrollable, and a grinding halt is effected in
the eighth stanza to slow the molecular dissipation of the object of the poem as well as the poem
itself.
Les formes s’effaçaient, et n’étaient plus qu’un rêve,
Une ébauche lente à venir,
Sur la toile oubliée, et que l’artiste achève
89

Seulement par le souvenir.
[The forms wore away, and were no more than a dream,
A sketch slow to arrive,
On the forgotten canvas, and which the artist completes
Only by remembering it.]
This splash of cold water represents the poetic attempt to reestablish “A Carcass” as a contrived
product of artistry rather than a synesthetic, disgusting communion with natural processes. It must
be stressed that this sudden shift occurs at the very apogee of the carcass’s biological apotheosis. The
seventh stanza, after all, most powerfully represents the carcass as a unified whole expressing itself as
a perversely active, even “alive” subject. The first two stanzas are written expressly from the
perspective of the speaker, who is addressing an interlocutor about the carcass (“Remember the object
we saw”), the third and fourth approximate a heavenly perspective on the carcass (“The sun shone on
this rottenness,” “And the sky watched the superb carcass”), while the fifth focuses on the buzzing
and flowing of the flies and maggots exuding from the carcass. Even the sixth stanza—which sees the
various elements of and companion-species attendant to putrefaction “united in one,” as it were,
“f[alling] and r[ising] like a wave”—still describes the carcass as a more or less passive receptacle of
divine or, perhaps more properly, infernal inspiration, “blown” as it is “with vague breath.” Only the
seventh stanza begins with a direct invocation of the carcass as the unified subject of its own activity,
saying that “this world made a strange music” that encompasses and imitates the sounds of both
nature and the human cultivation thereof.
The artificer, seemingly losing control of the object of his contemplation, has dove too far
into the “discomposing” tendency of the literary corpse and must pull back in order to establish his
control over the metastasizing cadaver. The attempt, however, is feeble. The “forms” are said to
“w[ear] away” or efface themselves, seemingly receding into a “dream”-like fog, while in the next line
they are described as “a sketch” (i.e., by definition not worn away or effaced) and that this sketch is
“slow to arrive.” The first two lines read together, in short, don’t seem to be clear on whether the
forms are going or coming (or, to look ahead to the next two lines, where they are going or coming—
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to the artist’s “rememb[rance]” or the material “canvas”?) The stanza’s punctuation and lack of
conjunctions only confuses the matter further, as it is not clear whether the second line is even
supposed to be read as a subordinate clause to the first at all, or if it is actually supposed to
correspond with the third line. This latter is perhaps more reasonable, as a sketch would be “slow to
emerge” on a “forgotten canvas,” since if the canvas is “forgotten,” the artist would ipso facto not be
able to draw anything on it in the first place, whether he remembers what to draw or not. Of course,
the last line says that the artist “remember[s] it,” but then—horror of horrors—what is “it”? The
canvas? The sketch? The “dream” into/from which his effaced/inscribed forms have
receded/emerged? Certainly any one without the other would be meaningless, but it is clear (insofar
as anything is clear in this jumble) that this is part of the point. Oxford World Classics translator
James McGowan prefers to entirely elide these semantic and syntagmatic difficulties: as his
translation has it,
The shapes wore away as if only a dream
Like a sketch that is left on the page
Which the artist forgot and can only complete
On the canvas, with memory’s aid.
Dropping the maddening commas, adding the conjunction “like” to the second line and “which” to
the beginning of the third, while also situating “forgot” as a verb corresponding to “the artist” rather
than the adjectival “forgotten” attached to “the canvas” as it is in the French clears away the
difficulties of trying to make head or tail of this stanza’s ordering logic. McGowan’s impulse to do so,
however, introduces too much ideal order to the insistently splenetic experience of the carcass. “A
Carcass,” in its eighth stanza, is legible only if one figuratively “rises above” its own derangement of
sense and order, requiring its reader to overlook the very obstacles to form and structure the poem
itself engenders and, even in its desperate grasp to restitute form, cannot entirely escape.
This inability to escape the carcass’s insistent, deranging semiotic infection through invoking
memory, dream, and artistic creation is ultimately ensured by the precipitous fall back into the depths
of material experience in the next stanza:
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Derrière les rochers, une chienne inquiète
Nous regardait d’un oeil fâché,
Épiant le moment de reprendre au squelette
Le morceau qu’elle avait lâché.
[From behind the rocks, a restless bitch
Watched us with an angry eye,
Awaiting the moment to retake from the skeleton
The morsel she had let fall.]
In “A Carcass,” the “forms” of poetry, memories, and dreams founder immediately. The slavering
“bitch” unites in one image the uncomfortably confluent experiences of hunger and arousal as she
counts the moments before she can pounce again on her “morsel,” recalling the early stanzas of the
poem, while the rapid shift in register and imagery implicitly leads the reader to draw an
uncomfortable parallel between the artist and the animal. It seems that artistry ultimately gives over
the universal predation of the natural world. As if once again attempting to overcome this overly
splenetic thesis, the artist makes another attempt at asserting his control over the recalcitrant object
of his creation, this time turning his attention back to his long-forgotten beloved:
—Et pourtant vous serez semblable à cette ordure,
À cette horrible infection,
Étoile de mes yeux, soleil de ma nature,
Vous, mon ange et ma passion.
[—And in time you will resemble this rot,
This horrible infection,
Star of my eyes, sun of my nature,
You, my angel and my passion
The hyperbolic address, recapitulating the commonplaces of love poetry (“my angel and my
passion”), synthesizes the amorous tradition placing the woman-as-object of the love poem. The
repetition of “my” similarly establishes speaker as a unified subject, no longer lost in the hypnotic
metastasization of the carcass—the “eyes” and “sun” referred to at various points earlier in the poem
no longer refer to a shared perspective (“Remember the object we saw”), a heavenly point of view
(“The sun shone down,” “And the sky watched”), or a canine vigilance (“a restless bitch / Watched
us with an angry eye”), but rather poetic perspective here centers solely on the point of view of the
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poet himself (“Star of my eyes, sun of my nature”). Mirroring this reduction, the analogy that
introduces the stanza—“you will resemble this rot, / this horrible infection,”—no longer serves to
open or expand the semiotic/material boundaries of the carcass (and, metaphorically, of the woman
with whom it is symbolically conflated), but to concretize and constrict them, thus hemming the
woman, the carcass, and “A Carcass” within a definable frame of reference. Thus the speaker
recapitulates the dichotomies structuring the poem since its introductory pairings of “mon âme” with
“charogne infâme” and “doux” with “cailloux”—here, “ordure” sees itself as the distorted mirrorimage of “nature,” “infection” of “passion”—and, in so doing, reins in the cancerous analogical
expansion of “A Carcass.” This attempt at synethesis turns out to emphasize the split personality of
the poem, as the self-conscious, deliberate artist attempts to effect an act of repossession over the
vagabond impulses of nature and the poetic object that partakes of them. Now transposed onto the
human audience of the woman to whom the poem is initially addressed, the speaker seems to
attempt to establish some species of utilitarian purpose to his address. It is here, after all, that some
overall meaning is ascribed to the poem as a whole, sending the reader we are back in the ambit of
memento mori:
Oui! telle vous serez, ô la reine des grâces,
Apres les derniers sacrements,
Quand vous irez, sous l'herbe et les floraisons grasses,
Moisir parmi les ossements.
[Yes! Thus you will be, O queen of the graces,
After the final sacraments,
When you go, beneath the grass and the flowering weeds,
To molder among the bones.]
The woman, who “nearly fainted on the grass” at the end of the first part of the poem, here goes
even further, descending “beneath the grass and flowering weeds, / to molder among the bones” in a
movement that seems to dialectically mirror that of the carcass’s perverse growth. Where the dead
carcass seemed to “come alive” under the watching heavens and express itself in a “strange music”
radiating through the atmosphere, the live woman is made to die and descend into the depths of a
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much less insubstantial element, breaking down and nourishing the “grass and the flowering weeds”
in the dank soil where she will “molder among the bones.”
The speaker terminates with the following address, which has given critics much trouble
since the publication of The Flowers of Evil:
Alors, ô ma beauté! dites à la vermine
Qui vous mangera de baisers,
Que j’ai gardé la forme et l’essence divine
De mes amours décomposés!
[Then, O my beauty! Say to the vermin
Who will eat you with kisses,
That I kept the divine form and essence
Of my decomposed loves!]
Twentieth-century critics Jacques Crépet and Georges Blin claim that this stanza presents an “ardent
spiritualism,”172 attempting to vindicate “A Carcass” according to the argument by which Baudelaire
himself once defended his poetry. The poem, they argue, is ultimately a moral lesson, one which
raises a figurative “flower” from the noxious mud of material experience—more specifically, the
speaker of “A Carcass preserves his ‘love’ in art, rendering the corruption of flesh into the much
more durable and pristine form of poetic composition.”173 Similarly Jean-Pierre Richard states that
the bodily decomposition “ A Carcass” is “finally denied by the affirmation of a spiritual power that
succeeds in conserving in itself ‘the form and divine essence’ of flesh nonetheless decomposed: it can
certainly grow moldy, spread and dissolve; its idea will survive it, an invulnerable and eternal
architecture.”174 Broome also terminates his reading of the poem with the following analysis of the
final stanza:
As [the speaker] implants his last word “décomposés,” one sees all the more emphatically
that he has distilled and preserved the immortal essence of which this creature seemed
devoid or to which she was insensitive. The fullness, rhythmic contour and grammatical
totality of the Alexandrine … contrasts here with the dwindling energy and expiring
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intonation of the weaker octosyllable, … as if to depict prosodically the triumph of form
over matter … The spiritual and the carnal are finally separated and called to their respective
fates. As the longer phrase rises confidently like an âme, the shorter one falls away haltingly
like a sloughed skin.175
However, these readings are far too generous to the last stanza and disregard its complications in the
context of the thrust of the poem as a whole. As I have shown, the semiotic infection that the carcass
introduces into the poem is not fully inoculated by the speaker’s attempts to tear himself away from
it in the eighth stanza. In fact, that stanza only further expresses the disordering effect of abjection
that the experience of the carcass introduces into the symbolic structure of the poem, which is itself
further emphasized by the implicit connection drawn between the artist and the hungry dog. While
the speaker attempts to recapitulate the Renaissance and Baroque theme of vita brevis, ars longa by
setting up a distinction between the ephemerality of flesh and the stability of language in the final
stanza, the relentless assault on self-contained, coherent identity that is the structural core of “A
Carcass” nonetheless gives the lie to idea that such a distinction can be maintained. The “infection”
exuded by rotting carrion becomes a textual function, and “A Carcass” becomes, itself, a carcass:
“poetry’s boast to immortality” is thus, in the final analysis, “no different than that decaying hunk of
flesh: … poetry and carcass are effectively united in the oxymoron, mes amours décomposés.”176
The failure to recuperate his splenetic object into the realm of the poetic ideal is evident in the fact
that the injunction of the final stanza—where the speaker finally reveals why he has enjoined the
audience to “remember” in the first place—is “literally impossible twice over,” as Kraus and Martin
point out: it is “the sum of two figures of impossibility: adynatio (this will happen when corpses talk
to worms) coupled with oxymoron (I have kept the form of my decomposed loves). Literally speaking,
then, Baudelaire’s poem ends by claiming to seek only impossible effects.”177 This discursive
recursivity effects textually what the carcass figures in the poem as the breakdown of organic
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coherence via the irruptive and corruptive operations of necrobiotic activity. It precipitates categories
themselves to merge and blend as the poem performs the effects of its incapacity to recuperate an
experience that denies anthropic inscription. And in the final stanza, the worm remains within the
apple: the “vermine” to whom the speaker commands his beloved to convey his message recall
worms and poetic stanzas simultaneously—vers, after all, being the word for both. The poem thus
terminates in an experience of signifier and signified “seem[ing] to swap places,” as Ian Fleishman
writes: “Are earthworms being allegorized as authors or are lines of poetry being allegorized as
earthworms? Is the corpse being rendered as a flower or are Baudelaire’s Flowers themselves being
cast as corpses, as images of rot, of decadence?”178 These questions are insoluble, and that
undecideability is the terminal effect of the poem: having been infected by the corruption of the
modern literary corpse, the very vers that simultaneously compose and decompose “A Carcass” have
definitively surpassed definition. Attempts to read the end of “A Carcass” as a symbolic redemption
of spleen and the ideal may well partake of the perspective that Baudelaire himself brutally mocks in
La Fanfarlo: “There is an amiable philosophy that can find consolations in what would seem to be the
most unworthy objects.”179 In the end, even art becomes subject to the universal predation of the
“devilish cycle” when it engages too closely with those entities and phenomena that transect the
human. Baudelaire’s fraught engagement with modernizing deathways sets up a posthumanist
aesthetic that centers the breakdown of human discursive coherence and, by implication, the human’s
exceptionality, its self-identity, its self-containedness in the broader context of the operations of
nature. In the three succeeding chapters, I will show how this posthumanist aesthetic is taken up and
adapted by Djuna Barnes and Georges Bataille.
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CHAPTER 2

Modalities of Decomposition in the Corpus of Djuna Barnes

Barnes’s Shattered Object
“Why such morbidity?”
In a 1919 interview, Greenwich Village publisher Guido Bruno asked this question of the
ascendant but still decidedly marginal writer, artist, and journalist Djuna Barnes. Barnes responded as
follows:
Morbid? … You make me laugh. This life I write and draw and portray is life as it is, and
therefore you call it morbid. Look at my life. Look at the life around me. Where is this
beauty that I am supposed to miss? The nice episodes that others depict? Is not everything
morbid? I mean the life of people stripped of their masks. Where are the relieving features?
… Today we are, tomorrow dead. We are born and don’t know why. We live and suffer and
strive, envious or envied. We love, we hate, we work, we admire, we despise… Why? And
we die, and no one will ever know that we have been born.180
This embrace of what many of her readers called “morbid”181 and what Barnes herself called “life as
it is” is more thoroughly fleshed out as a central element of Barnes’s aesthetics in a letter dated
November 5, 1935. In this letter to the diarist and editor of Nightwood, Emily Holmes Coleman,
Barnes takes issue with their mutual friend Peter Neagoe’s response to an early draft of Barnes’s
most significant novel. Neagoe specifically complained that “there is not one ounce of cheer” in
Nightwood: “Cheer?” Barnes scoffs, “Who wants cheer of any kind except truth? Split the most
beautiful woman in half and is it cheering in [Neagoe’s] sense? No. In mine yes, to see the guts and
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gall and heart embroiled in that pit in which beauty boiled.”182 Beauty and aesthetic honesty, for
Barnes, are inseparable from the image of a disassembled body, a decomposed corpus. In the margin
of this letter, Barnes further explains: “There is always more surface to a shattered object than a
whole object—and likewise the surfaces of a fragment are less ‘cheering.’”183
Taking the “shattered object” at the core of her artistic vision as its point of departure, this
chapter will lay out the various surfaces on and through which Barnes’s decompositional corpus is
inscribed. Far from being merely a throwaway retort, the heuristic of the literally de-composed body
in fact suggests a roadmap by which new avenues for the interpretation of her works may be
explored in the context of the modernist engagement with the ecology of decay. In this chapter, I
explore the modalities of aesthetic “shattering” at play in Barnes’s work by way of the concepts of
fragmentation, decadence, and animality, outlining each as they appear in Barnes’s early works. Collectively,
these three elements of Barnes’s decompositional aesthetics will in turn provide the basis for a more
extensive reading of Nightwood, which will be carried out in the succeeding chapter. In brief, I present
fragmentation as the strategy by which Barnes uses representations of bodily dismemberment and
decay to stage irruptions into and corruptions of the symbolic coherence of her own works and the
literary traditions of which they are a part. This favored device places the decomposing body at the
center of Barnes’s more general critique of the capacity of language to meaningfully encompass
realities that are fundamentally intransigent to the human symbolic faculty. In the section on
decadence, I look to Barnes’s floral imaginary to further trace her decompositional approach to
literary tradition before articulating how her illustrations visually enact the more literal, molecular
decadence of the human subject and its dissolution into economies of experience in excess of the
strictly anthropic. I then push this exploration further by addressing the form and function of
animality in Barnes’s art and short fiction. In this section, I show how Barnes engages with the
Djuna Barnes, “Correspondence to Emily Coleman,” Folder 12, Emily Coleman Papers, University of Delaware Library
Special Collections, Newark, DE.
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nonhuman as a way of gesturing toward a form of pre- and/or post-subjective immanence that
attempts to destabilize or even surpass human identity. Ultimately, I argue that Barnesian
fragmentation, decadence, and animality collectively provide a compelling critique of the notion of a
self-possessed, self-enclosed human subjectivity that is excepted from broader circulations of matter
and energy, and I accordingly mobilize the critique in order to place Barnes’s “morbidity” within the
context of a broader posthuman aesthetic.
Fragmentation, decadence, and animality have each been central—if unavowedly so—to a
strain of established scholarship that recognizes in Barnes’s work a radical critique of language and an
insistence on human impotence in the face of grasping what Neyrat would call the
“unconstructable,” or the “transcendental dark side,” of that which exceeds human inscription. It is
as shattered objects that bodies, both textual and corporeal, provide the most compelling prism
through which Barnes enacts what Kate Armond identifies as “the … disintegration of forms that
sought to register man’s immortality and creative genius,” which is to say, man’s capacity to project
himself and his forms onto reality as a whole.184 “Rag[ing] against the imprisoning structures of the
language,” as Donna Gerstenberger similarly writes, Barnes “inaugurates a semiotic movement
whereby binary oppositions and distinct significations that are the cornerstones of the symbolic
integrity of narrative begin to fall apart.”185 Built around the very inability to build lasting or
meaningful structures against the incoherence of what she called “life as it is,” the “deconstructive
impulse” inherent to Barnes’s work “is an attack,” Tyrus Miller writes, “on the recuperative mission
attributed to artistic form … by modernist writers and critics.”186 Here Miller is clearly thinking of
T.S. Eliot’s “Ulysses, Order and Myth,” in which Eliot claims that modernist technique “is simply a
Kate Armond, “Allegory and Dismemberment: Reading Djuna Barnes’ Nightwood Through the Forms of the Baroque
Trauerspiel,” Textual Practice 24, no. 5 (2012): 861.
184

Donna Gerstenberger, “The Radical Narrative of Djuna Barnes’s Nightwood,” in Breaking the Sequence: Women's
Experimental Fiction, ed. Ellen G. Friedman and Miriam Fuchs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 130.
185

Tyrus Miller, Late Modernism: Politics, Fiction, and the Arts Between the World Wars (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1999), 124.
186

99

way of controlling, of ordering, or giving a shape and a significance to the immense panorama of
futility and anarchy which is contemporary history.”187 Contrary to her one-time publisher and
somewhat grudging champion, Barnes emphasizes her lack of interest in giving the world a shape she
does not think it can hold, in redeeming vita brevis through ars longa. Art’s function, for Barnes, is
always to bear witness to “life as it is,” which for her means refusing to turn away from the elements
of life (and death) that do not fit neatly into discourse. This honesty with regard to the limitations of
language necessitates a decompositional project: one that purposely disarticulates the forms that art
would give to life, deranging, as Merill Cole writes, “the sequential registration of meaning
indispensable to the progression of all traditional narratives, as well as to their reception, in order to
contrive an altar to the unspeakable.”188
Many scholars recognize Barnes’s critique of the human in her more focused critique of the
representative economies by which human consciousness is articulated and expressed. Few, however,
have explicitly recognized how deeply this critique and its attendant posthumanist aesthetic is tied to
Barnes’s understanding of human imbrication in and eventual dissolution into the unfigurable natural
world as represented in the decomposing body that so often crops up in her works. Gutkin hints at
how Barnes “organicizes the experimental disarticulation of the formal parts of works of art,”189 but
does not push far enough into how her strategies of “experimental disarticulation” are deeply
engaged in modern understandings of the ecology of organic decay. The fact is that Barnes
recognizes in the decadence of the human subject that the supposedly self-enclosed and singular self
is in fact bound up in more-than-human relationalities, and she stages the decomposition of the body
along with the language in which such decomposition is articulated as a refraction of the dissolution
of the human into a world that precedes, traverses, and exceeds it. Barnes’s critique of language, then,
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is not just about gesturing toward what people cannot put into words, but showing how in doing so
we may recognize our involvement in more capacious relationalities with entities, forces, and
phenomena that transect and indeed shatter human subjectivity itself. Though never offering a
“cheery” vision of such subjectivity, Barnes’s posthumanist aesthetic destabilizes a traditional
anthropocentricism that hinges on the capacity for categorizing, organizing, and controlling reality. In
outlining the fragmentation, decadence, and animality at play in Barnes’s early work, I draw together
the semiotic and organic function of the decomposing body and highlight the connection between
Barnes’s critique of language and her more implicit ecological commitments.

Fragmentation
So she lies in a closed place apart,
Her feet grown fragile for the ghostly tryst;
Her pulse no longer striking in her wrist,
Nor does its echo wander through her heart.
Over the body and the quiet head
Like stately ferns above an austere tomb,
Soft hairs blow; and beneath her armpits bloom
The drowsy passion flowers of the dead.190
Given the opacity typically associated with Barnes’s works, this simple—or perhaps even simplistic—
poem might come off as a strange initial case-study of Barnes’s engagement with modernist
decomposition. Written in a neat iambic pentameter and in a style more reminiscent of the
eighteenth-century Graveyard Poets than the boundary-pushing avant-garde prose with which Barnes
has become associated, “The Flowering Corpse” bears little to no trace of the more insistently
difficult Barnes of Nightwood infamy. However, considered in the context of Barnes’s first collection,
A Book, where the poem appears between two decidedly avant-garde short stories, “The Flowering
Corpse” and its stilted archaism appears to be in the service of a broader experiment with textual
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form that will characterize much of Barnes’s early work. Poems like “The Flowering Corpse” are
included among modernist prose works, one-act plays, and a series of disturbing, often alien-looking
portraits, to the end of making A Book itself a shattered object, a textual body-in-pieces comprising
several mutually incommensurable aesthetic traditions and forms at once. In the previous chapter, I
explored how Baudelaire approaches tradition in a decompositional manner, joining the conventions
of established form with the disruptive content of modern life. Barnes’s early work engages in a
similar sort of experimental anachronism and pastiche, and “The Flowering Corpse” specifically
recalls “A Carcass” insofar as it pairs strict, traditionalist form with the disturbing image of a rotting
corpse while refusing to situate the imagery of decomposition within its traditional mantling of the
Christian eschatology of redemption. This poem itself serves as a decompositional agent in the
context of A Book as a whole, breaking up the surface of the text and typifying its insistent
disruptions of literary tradition and readerly expectation. Ultimately, this symbolically self-destructive
impulse inaugurates a movement whereby the text itself dissolves into more and more fragmentary
units, refracting the very molecularization of the literary cadaver that is represented in “The
Flowering Corpse.” The decomposing body that is so central to Barnes’s aesthetics is thus both a
thematic preoccupation and a literary function, a figure by which stable meaning and the rational
consciousness that depends on it eventually and inevitably breaks down in the face of the
unconstructable.
The poems in A Book often center around images of death and decomposition, as well as the
strange flora that grow in the space left by the dissolution of the human body. “First Communion,”
for example, opens with the lines “The mortal fruit upon the bough / Hangs above the nuptial
bed,”191 drawing the ever-present liason between love and death, sex and decomposing flowers, so
often invoked in decadent art, while the final page of A Book bears the single brief stanza of “Finis,”
which reads:
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For you, for me? Why then the striking hour
The wind among the curtains, and the tread
Of some late gardener pulling at the flower
They’ll lay between our hearts when we are dead.192
This poem clearly stages a vision of nature in over-ripeness and decay, representing by its very
brevity and disconnection from the work preceding it the decomposition of the part from the whole,
and thus effecting the both textual and biological dissolution out of which frightful new growths can
percolate. The flower growing between the two dead bodies prefigures the gradual molecularization
of formerly distinct entities and their material transferal into the soil that will become central to
Barnes’s vision of the inherent unity of the erotic with the necrotic and the ecological.
Pavlina Radia writes that Barnes’s “preoccup[ation] with decomposing bodies,” functions as
“a necessary preamble to poetic formulation or enfleshment” aimed at “expanding the former limits
of artistic expression.”193 It is through the dead body that binaries break down and symbolic wholes
give way to allegorical metastasization: as Rebecca Loncraine points out, Barnes’s poetry “presents
live bodies as decaying flesh, while corpses have a perverse vitality. Her muse is a dead woman.”194
“The Flowering Corpse” and its analogues introduce Barnes’s particular approach to the perverse
vitality of the dead. She presents a materialist resurrection of sorts, similar in character to Leopold
Bloom’s observation in Prospect Cemetery concerning how the decomposed elements of the dead
fecundate the soil of the nearby botanical gardens. Barnes thus stages a transubstantiation of the
body rather than of spirit: a movement of the vital force of human matter and energy, via death, to
nonhuman entities and forces, to “stately ferns” and “drowsy passion flowers” in the case of “The
Flowering Corpse.” Mirroring the movement of the literary cadaver from heaven to earth that is
effected in Baudelaire’s “A Carcass”, Barnes’s decomposing body is expressive of a movement
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beyond the human and into more capacious relationalities that deny clear figuration in language that
will preoccupy her mature work.
So far, everything said about “The Flowering Corpse” is just as true of “A Carcass”—
however, the epistemic difference between these two works resides in Barnes’s radicalization of the
decompositional poetics that are somewhat grudgingly at work in Baudelaire’s poem. Barnes presents
an amorous rather than controlling embrace of the form of decomposition/decomposition of form
at the core of the modernist engagement with the literary cadaver, circumventing the inevitable
interconnection of spleen and the ideal in order to inaugurate a semiotic fragmentation that
compounds of its own momentum. For all it does to set the stage for posthumanist modernist
aesthetics, “A Carcass” is nonetheless presented as a masturbatory harangue directed at a silent,
feminine audience whose implicit (if ultimately ineffective) interment/devoration by the speaker
becomes disturbingly apparent in the final stanza. In “The Flowering Corpse,” for example, no such
separation is introduced. In fact, the poem’s lack of even implicit deictic distinctions between who is
speaking and who is listening gives the poem the sense of a vision shared by both author and
audience, of an eye without an “I.” That the anaphor of “she” lacks a correlate antecedent and the
poem begins with the coordinating conjunction “so” additionally gives the sense that the poem’s
context is tacitly shared by speaker and listener—the audience is offered, as it were, a fragment of the
terminal stage of a story begun long before “The Flowering Corpse” itself begins, a story with whose
general arc and central figure the poem seems to presume its audience has already been acquainted.
The insistent present tense compounds this sense of intimacy with immediacy: instead of being
directed to recall an occurrence from beginning to end by an external authority who imposes a
specific narrative arc on the memory of the audience, the audience here seems to be actively
participating in the spectacle of the poem in real time, forming a precise counterpoint to the
estrangement, subjection, and enforced narrative induced in the audience of “A Carcass.”
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This sense of intimacy and immediacy is gradually intensified through the first stanza. The
decomposing woman is first “seen” from a distance, and the invocation of her “feet grown fragile” is
similarly visual, situating the central figure of the poem in her “closed place apart.” The next line,
however, introduces the “striking” of “her pulse,” which evokes a directly haptic experience of the
corpse, as if the speaker/listener has approached the body and grasped her wrist to check if she is, in
fact, dead. The next line brings the speaker/listener yet closer, as knowing that the “echo” of her
pulse no longer “wander[s] through her heart” would necessitate one to press one’s ear to the
woman’s chest. A faint whisper of the sensual runs through this progression through the senses of
vision, touch, and hearing as the speaker/listener is lead gradually closer to the flowering corpse until
her head rests, like a lover’s, on the chest of the decomposing woman. While the speaker of “A
Carcass” attempts (if ultimately ineffectively) to keep the titular carrion at arm’s length via an
insistence on its status as a poetic fabulation, the speaker of “The Flowering Corpse” dives directly
into the direct physical propinquity of the paradigmatic object of disgust. Disgust and desire no
longer orbit one another as they so often do in nineteenth-century figurations of the literary cadaver:
the one has definitively given over to the other and the reader is invited to meditate on an immediate,
even loving embrace with what precedes, traverses, and succeeds the human in the figure of the
titular flowering corpse.
Of course, there is little of the bluntly sexualized imagery of “A Carcass,” in which the
carrion is presented as a kind of grotesque fetish; in the same measure, however, there is also little of
the alienating, visual fetishization of the decomposing body that is described in “A Carcass” which,
though intensely sensual, at least is kept at arm’s length throughout the poem. The fetishization of
“A Carcass,” effected through the sexualization and alienation of the speaker’s male gaze, indeed
betokens a deeper, structural fetishizing of the carcass both as a “femme lubrique” specifically and an
objectified, gestalt mass generally. That is, apart from cursory reference to its “jambes,” “ventre,” and
“vivants haillons,” Baudelaire’s charogne is held together in the singular, as a fetish-object without
105

constitutive parts. Even in the process of its disintegration, it is “cette pourriture,” “la carcasse
superbe,” “le corps,” “ce monde,” “le morceau,” “cette ordure,” and “cette horrible infection,” an
atomic this-ness, a body without organs. I traced how “A Carcass” falls apart, so to speak, through its
own perverse, dialectical momentum—however, this occurs despite the speaker’s efforts to hold the
charogne in his and his captive listener’s mind as an “essence divine,” a preserved, idealized form
rendered stable through rigorous versification. Barnes’s flowering corpse, by contrast, is referred to
as “she” and “her” but even these singular pronouns appear conspicuously severed from their
attendant proper noun, while her “feet,” “wrist,” “heart,” “body,” “quiet head,” “hairs,” and
“armpits” appear in staccato succession, seemingly as separate from one another as if they had been
cut apart and spread out for inspection. She lies in “a closed place apart,” as well as in parts,
disassembled and molecularized as if falling prey to the ecological cycle before the eyes of the reader.
Even that very word, “apart,” like the unresolved anaphors “she” and “her,” similarly begs the
question of reference: apart from where, or what? Appropriately, the word appears just before the
caesura ending the first line of a poem that provides no clear answers. So, drawn ever closer to a
quasi-beloved object, the audience is at the same time given to understand that object as dispersed,
lacking unity and coherence in the same sense that it lacks even the echo of a vivifying pulse.
“The Flowering Corpse” presents an early case of Barnes’s obsession with shattered objects. Walter
Benjamin has read such figures of dispersed bodies as both thematic and structural representations of
the derangement of signification itself: in The Origin of German Tragic Drama, he writes that “death digs
most deeply the jagged line of demarcation between physical nature and significance,” and so the
fragmented corpse becomes the locus of a simultaneous objective lack of meaning on the part of
“physical nature” and the frustration of the subjective, human desire to bestow meaning.195 In
contrast to symbol, which represents a unity of reality and meaning through “the image of organic
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totality,”196 the allegorical sensibility embodied in the image of the corpse expresses a fundamental
lack. “In the field of allegorical intuition,” writes Benjamin, “the image is a fragment, a rune … the
false appearance of totality is extinguished. For the eidos disappears, the simile ceases to exist, and the
cosmos it contains shrivels up.”197 Here Benjamin is specifically referring to Beschreibung des Torso des
Hercules in Belvedere zu Rom by Johann Joachim Winckelmann, a work that dwells on the Belvedere
Torso sculpture “part by part and limb by limb”198 and thus effects textually a markedly similar
operation of fragmentation to that effected in “The Flowering Corpse.” For Barnes, the
fragmentation of the literary corpse precipitates a continuous deferment of meaning and the terminal
frustration of the human consciousness dependent on such stability for its own sense of coherence as
a self, indexing the vagrant quality of matter that is ultimately unconstructable and irreducible to
anthropic control.
Kate Armond has recently encouraged Barnes scholars to bring Benjamin’s analysis to bear
on Barnes’s works.199 Armond writes that Barnes, similar to the Baroque allegorists Benjamin
analyzes, shows how “forms that had been beautiful and vital under the symbolist’s gaze were
betrayed as registers of human pride and delusion. Without their divine significance, these images
could only confirm mortality without grace.”200 Ultimately, Barnes’s preoccupation with
fragmentation generally and the fragmented corpse specifically expresses the inability of any
supposedly transcendent symbology to redeem the base immanence of dead matter, as for the
allegorist such dead matter fundamentally “fail[s] to deliver a pre-Edenic truth”201 and denies the
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reader “access to conventional identities and meanings and to the flawless symbolic form.”202 While
Armond is exclusively concerned with these themes as they arise in Nightwood, A Book shows how
this operation functions in Barnes’s early work as well. For here the exquisitely formalized corpse, to
paraphrase Benjamin, negatively attests to its fundamental formlessness: the body, once the
privileged site of human meaning, becomes the site of the failure and breakdown of meaning as such.
It is necessary to insist on how semiotic and bodily breakdown are consistently paired with
nonhuman emergence in Barnes’s work. That the decomposing body becomes, perversely, the site of
organic growth indicates the degree to which Barnes’s preoccupations were both linguistic and
ecological. Barnes fundamentally agrees with Benjamin in that, “seen from the point of view of
death, the product of the corpse is life.”203 This life, of course, is precisely what the living person
denies and must deny in order to maintain the formal trappings of human dignity—the strange,
tendril-like hairs that grow seemingly erect, “like stately ferns,” “around the body and the quiet head”
are a figuration of the return of this repressed, strangely lively dead matter. It is significant that hair
and ferns are allegorically united in this way, for not only was it commonly believed until recently that
hair literally continues to grow after death, but because hair is chief among the marginal matter that
“traverses the boundary of the body,” as Douglas has written, and therefore prefigures bodily
breakdown and the repulsive intertwinement of the human body with the natural world. Benjamin
similarly notes that “in the processes of elimination and purification that everything corpse-like falls
away from the body piece by piece. It is no accident that precisely nails and hair, which are cut away
as dead matter from the living body, continue to grow on the corpse. There is in the physis, in the
memory itself, a memento mori.”204 The excremental character of the corpse and the “corpse-like”
facets of the living body around which our rituals of “elimination and purification” center, in “The
Flowering Corpse,” become the very representation of the abject returning, attesting via the
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evocation of the deathliness in life to the perverse liveliness of death itself. Barnes hereby mobilizes
this intertwinement to gesture beyond the human capacity for representation, figuring semiotic
breakdown as a function of organic decay.
The fragmented, decomposing corpse appears is a decompositional agent in the corpus of A
Book that not only thematically depicts but structurally enacts the fragmentation at the core of
Barnes’s aesthetics. As textual matter-out-of-place—interleaved, with several other poems on similar
themes, between the distinctly modernistic prose that makes up the majority of A Book—as well as a
text out-of-time—being a throwback of sorts to the rhythms and themes of the decadent 1890s and
Graveyard Poetry—“The Flowering Corpse” and the several poems that are similar to it effect
fragmentation from the margins, disrupting readerly expectations and figuring the destabilization
both of the textual and corporeal body before that which fundamentally resists inscription. The
decomposing body, here, exemplifies the thrust of this project as a whole: it is both an image
represented in the text and a process by which the text fragments and breaks down. In the space of this
degeneration, frightful, inhuman entities proliferate. As I have hinted, this breakdown for Barnes
represents a radicalization of the decompositional impulse present in Baudelaire, inviting the reader
wholeheartedly into an intimate engagement with that which precedes and succeeds the human and
the symbolic faculty by which humanity as such is articulated and expressed. Fragmentation is a
thematic and textual strategy Barnes employs to present the impulse toward disintegration, a modality
of her aesthetic of the “shattered object” that is itself bound up in her own preoccupation with
decadence. In the next section, I will build on Barnes’s critique of language through an analysis of
decadent themes and operations of her writing that further articulate her modalities of posthumanist
modernism

Decadence
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Just as “The Flowering Corpse” does not simply narrate the fragmented perception of a
fragmented body, but itself represents the fragmentation of the textual body and disrupts the reader’s
engagement with the text in which it is included, Barnes’s work in general is not just figurally but
indeed structurally decadent. Len Gutkin points out that, in fact, “all of Barnes’s work and especially
Nightwood would remain signally indebted to the textures and themes of decadence, as the critical
consensus of the last ten years or so has come to reflect.”205 What many studies in this vein fail to
draw out, however, is how Barnes’s decadent preoccupations are bound up in her deeper interest in
the material afterlives of the body and her overarching posthumanist aesthetic. For Barnes,
decadence is both a textual and organic operation, and the two are never far afield from one another,
making decadence on the whole not just an indexing of human impotence before the ravages of time
but a recognition and even celebration of that which transects and surpasses the human as such.
Barnes’s decadence is therefore not merely pessimistic, but in fact gestures toward an eco-erotic
intimacy between the human and the flora and fauna from which it cannot, in the end, be separated.
I will first historically situate decadence and articulate Barnes’s relation to the concept and its
attendant aesthetic, drawing out how her use of decadent themes is related to her obsession with the
nonhuman interactions that take place in the space of bodily decay via an analysis of her parodic
detournement of traditional representations of passion flowers. Then, moving to her illustrations, I will
explore how Barnes renders the human down to humus and explores the strange blooms that crop up
in the space of the aesthetic dissolution of the human.
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In broad strokes, “decadence” arose as a social, historical, biological, and aesthetic category
during the 1880s and 1890s, propelled by such works as Max Nordau’s Degeneration206 and Paul
Bourget’s serial Essais de psychologie contemporaine207 (particularly the latter’s 1833 study of Baudelaire).
While the concept somewhat counterintuitively became popular during Europe’s most industrially
and culturally dominant period, decadence took hold as what Mary Gluck calls a “cultural myth” of
immanent demise, serving as an “elaborate historical metaphor that challenged the dominant
narrative of science, rationality, autonomy and enlightenment, used to explain the achievements of
modernity. … [Destablizing] the Enlightenment vision of the self and the world,” Gluck writes,
decadence “was about the experience of change, instability, permeability and contingency. The
phenomenon signaled a profound transformation and reorientation within contemporary life which
could no longer be accounted for, or represented by, official narratives of progress and historical
evolution.”208 Thus in his essay on Baudelaire, Bourget offers his “theory of decadence,” which has
been taken to this day as a particularly foundational statement on the subject: “A society,” Bourget
writes,
is comparable to a living organism: like an organism, it consists of a collection of lesser
organisms, which in turn consist of a collection of cells. The individual is the social cell. For
the whole organism to function energetically, the lesser organisms must function
energetically, but with a lesser energy; and, for these lesser organisms to function
energetically, their component cells must function energetically, but with a lesser energy. If
the cells’ energy becomes independent, the organisms that make up the total organism
similarly cease subordinating their energy to the total energy, and the subsequent anarchy
leads to the decadence of the whole. The social organism does not escape this law: it
succumbs to decadence as soon as the individual has begun to thrive under the influence of
acquired well-being and heredity.209
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In the literary sphere—where it can be argued decadence achieved its most influential expression in
fin de siècle Europe—this “change, instability, permeability and contingency” signified in the process
of the breakdown of the social whole into its constituent parts was filtered into the very stylistics of
belles-lettres, becoming what Arthur Symonds wrote of in 1897 as “that learned corruption of language
by which style ceases to be organic, and becomes, in the pursuit of some new expressiveness or
beauty, deliberately abnormal.”210 Mobilizing this profoundly influential, if somewhat short-lived
cultural myth, artists explored themes of decay and dissolution, ranging from the gradual erosion of
entire social structures to the personal experience of altered states of consciousness and drug- and/or
alcohol-induced dissolution.
Barnes’s persistent, overlapping artistic preoccupations with organic, architectural, and
historical decay, as well as her frequent depictions of grotesquerie, non-normative sex and sexuality,
drunkenness, and states of psychological delirium and frenzy are only a few examples of her
obsession with decadent themes. Daniella Caselli writes that that Barnes is the mouthpiece of “a dead
French decadence” which loads her work with the “burden of a corpsed legacy.”211 This terminology
does not merely describe an indulgence in decadent themes, but harks to the centrality of the literary
corpse in the decadent movement and its function in Barnes’s own writing. In the 1890s, the corpse
is primarily used as a reflection of a thoroughgoing pessimism with regard to the future of the human
subject and specifically the western enterprise; Barnes shares in this pessimism, but adds to it a sense
of the interactions of the human with that which exceeds it that take place at the nexus of the dead
body. For Barnes, organic decay is always the site of growth—the human, as such, is not merely
written out of existence but written into a more distributed ecology. Barnesian decadence, therefore,
adopts the sense of the increasing disaggregation of the human subject as an avenue for considering
new, more capacious ontologies.
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Underlying Barnes’s directly thematic invocations of decadent subjects, of which the literary
corpse is paradigmatic, a particular operation of language undergirds decadent writing, which
Symonds indicates in his specification of the “learned corruption of language” pursued by decadent
writers. Reginia Gagnier, following Bourget’s seminal theorization, has summarized that, formally,
decadence usually denotes “a decomposition or deformation of the relation between the part and the
whole.”212 Ian Fleishman has more specifically defined decadence as “the decomposition of the
artwork into ever briefer compositional elements.”213 This basic idea returns again and again in the
thinking of decadence, which David Weir describes as a “theoretical paradigm of decadent style
describ[ing] a manner of writing that places the greatest degree of artistic emphasis on the smallest
unit of a literary composition.”214 Bourget himself prominently marshals language as a primary
example of the function and effects of decadence:
The same law [as governs biological and social organisms] governs the development and
decadence of that other organism, language. The style of decadence is one where the unity of
the book decomposes to give way to the independence of the page, where the page
decomposes to give way to the independence of the sentence, and where the sentence
decomposes to give way to the independence of the word.215
I will show in the next chapter’s reading of Nightwood how this operation functions at the level of the
sentence in Barnes’s works, but in the current reading of “The Flowering Corpse” it is apparent how
how this operation functions at the level of the book. Drawing attention as it does to the constitutive
elements of A Book’s textual composition, the reader’s attention is drawn to the independent textual
organisms, so to speak, that make up the text. Indeed, the very title begins to take on new meaning as
a designation of the work’s artifice: a rather haphazard collection of stories, one-act plays, lurid
poetry, and disturbing portrait-sketches, A Book provocatively begs the question of its reader as to
exactly what it is. A commercial bomb upon publication in 1923, A Book was resurrected in 1929 as
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the more coherent and digestible A Night Among the Horses, with the poems and sketches excised. A
Book itself, therefore, does not seem able to hold itself together as a book, and it in fact survived only
as an artifact of the very fragmentation and rearrangement at the core of the textual operation of
decadence itself. Further, as I have also shown, the poem is subject to a form of internal
fragmentation, with the increasing focus on the body’s separate parts mirroring the organic process
of the titular body becoming increasingly molecularized in the process of decomposition.
Barnes also displays a decompositional approach to literary convention, evident in her
scandalously materialist approach to the traditionally sacred symbol of the passionflower. European
missionaries to South America first named this flower passiflora incarnata because of its perceived
symbolic expression of the Passion of Christ: “They discovered a resemblance,” says the author of of
the “Passion Flowers” entry in the Ladies’ Floral Cabinet of 1887, “to the crown of thorns in the
fringes of the flower. They compared the styles, with their capitate stigmas, to nails, the stamens to
hammers with which to drive them, and the tendrils of the plant to chords.”216 As a natural
expression of the central event of Christian history, passion flowers quickly became a mainstay of
European and particularly English poetry after their discovery. The poet who adopts the pseudonym
“Faith” in Women’s Exponent of June 1886, for example, extends the legend of the passion flower to
Genesis itself:
When from Eden’s garden banished
By a just, offended God,
Those two exiles,—angels followed,
Sprinkling with their tears the sod.
Where those jewels fell, bright flowers
Sprang to life in dale and wood,
One, amidst the thorns and briers,
Grew in mystic similitude.217
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The “mystic similitude” described here can be understood under the rubric of the symbol as
described by Benjamin: while the flower arises out of the very moment of the banishment of human
beings from the earthly Paradise, it becomes the sign of the organic totality of Christian history, a
symbol uniting Adam’s original sin and Christ’s redemption in one. Thus, the passion flower
symbolically unites the whole of ecclesiastical history, and indeed the whole of redemption itself, in
the circumference of its sacredly charged blossom. The poem goes on to describe how the flower
indeed waits throughout history for the fulfillment of its meaning, until “that terror-stricken morn”
of the crucifixion, when “Brightly gleamed this mystic symbol, / Where of anguish Love was born.”
On the very day of the Passion of Christ, the speaker of the poem declares that passion flowers were
woven among the crown of thorns, marrying its “sweetest fragrance” with the “anguish” of the dying
Christ. “Ah, revealed!” the poem concludes,
at last its mission,
Fulfilled its destiny.
Emblem of the Crucifixion,
Passion-flowers bloom today.
As a “mystic symbol,” an “Emblem of the Crucifixion,” the passion flower is situated precisely as a
symbol in Benjamin’s sense—that is, as a sign that expresses and unites an organic totality of revealed
meaning, indicating the path toward an Edenic intimacy of nature and significance. “Nature’s witness
to all time,” as announced by J.H. Bright in the Ladies’ Miscellany of November 1, 1830, indeed stands
in the first place for that inscrutable but no less immutable paradisiac unity that the Barnes will deny
in her own adoption of the passionflower as the emblem of what grows in the space of the
dissolution of the human body.
The religious freight of the passiflora incarnata would certainly not be lost on Djuna Barnes,
whose works bear witness to her deep obsession with Christian symbology. Of course, like
Baudelaire’s fleurs maladives, Barnes’s blooms represent a blasphemous détournement of this symbology
and the language of flowers in which it partakes. “The Flowering Corpse” deliberately separates the
passionflower separated from its traditional symbolic value and places under the festering armpits of
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a dead woman’s decaying body. In Benjamin’s sense, this describes the movement from symbol to
allegory—the symbol, separated from any totalizing eidos, bears witness to a semiotic proliferation
that points ever beyond itself, becoming the deferred and deferring sign of a world devoid of
saturable meaning. Perfumed with the aromas of decay, Barnes effects a decomposition of literary
tradition, mirroring the movement of the human body from its status as the locus of significance to
the fragmentation of significance in modernity.
Bound up in this materialist transubstantiation, Barnes’s approach to literary decadence also
sees her use it as a tool to illustrate the relationalities of the human with the nonhuman and the
human being’s place in more general circulations of matter and energy. Direct examples of this
operation can be found in her illustrations. Below, for example, is the drawing that accompanies the
one-act play, “Maggie of the Saints,” published in the New York Morning Telegraph in 1917:218
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Illustration 4. Barnes, “Maggie of the Saints,” New York Morning Telegraph Sunday Magazine, October 28,
1917.

Paired with the laconic description of the character Mary, “She was an erect old woman,” this
illustration reveals much about Mary’s character itself. She is certainly erect, but her posture seems
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more than anything to betoken the beginnings of complete physical breakdown, like those flowers
that in Bataille’s description “die ridiculously on stems that seemed to carry them to the clouds.”219
Her torso appears thin, her fingers and face lined and pockmarked with age, her hair sparse and
balding, her eyes beady, her lips drawn. To Mary’s back, dead leaves or blossoms fall from the sky,
evoking the character’s own gradual decline. In this connection it is no surprise that Mary’s corpselike head emerges from a high-collared ruff that bears a distinct resemblance to a flower, nor that her
remaining tufts of hair seem to cling to her scalp rather like a moss or lichen clings to a stone ruin.
Behind her, firework-like bursts seem to represent life’s joys, now firmly in the past as Maggie sets
her gaze on the both literal and figurative emptiness before her. In the story that the illustration
accompanies, Mary is a woman waiting patiently for the arrival of the day of judgment, at which her
piety will, she thinks, be redeemed and her life retroactively endowed with a meaning that it does not
seem to have. But Mary, of course, finds nothing but the slow creep of increasing decrepitude. The
decadent imagery of decaying flowers mirrors her physical decay as well as the withering of her
spiritual hopes, while it also seems to imply that, instead of a religious resurrection, Mary is in the
midst of a more material transubstantiation. She is becoming flower herself, that is. Typical of
Barnes, this representation mobilizes decadent imagery in a way that simultaneously insists on the
impotence of human constructions in the face of the ravages of time while also evoking a sense of
intimacy with the natural world that underlies such constructions.
In this visualization of the dialectical movement of human decline and posthuman
efflorescence, the reader can recognize something of Barnes’s understanding of the interplay of
vitality and rot, generation and decay. Mary’s lower half is almost entirely blank, a faint crosshatching marking the transition from her torso to her legs, as if she is seeping out of defined
existence itself. A liminal figure both passing beyond the boundary separating presence and oblivion,
life and death, this seepage evokes simultaneously in figure, arrangement, and technique what Caselli
Georges Bataille, “The Language of Flowers,” in Visions of Excess: Selected Writings 1927-1939, trans. Allan Stoekl with
Carl R. Lovitt and Donald M. Leslie Jr., ed. Allan Stoekl (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985): 12.
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defines as characteristic of Barnes’s illustrations, which “present the human form … on the verge of
dissolution.”220 Radia similarly but more explicitly characterizes Barnes’s drawings as “decomposition
illustrated,” describing her process of seemingly “transforming the body into a ‘vacant space’” and
thereby “transform[ing] the corporeality of the subject into a poetic dance of intensities.”221 A finer
point might be put on these speculations by gathering them under the general rubric of decadence,
which I have already explored as a formal operation of textual (or here, visual) decomposition
whereby articulated structures break apart into porous assemblages where the distinction between
form and formlessness itself enacts its own breakdown. The moleculatization of the human subject,
its decadence into increasingly simple and disaggregated elements, is tokened the transformation of
Mary from a solid, discrete and self-posessed subject into an assemblage of inhuman intensities. The
illustration and the aesthetic for which it stands as a figuration indexes Barnes’s approach to art’s
capacity to generate a posthuman aesthetic, which will become increasingly central to Barnes’s work
throughout her career.
The themes and techniques present in the illustration accompanying “Maggie and the Saints”
are recapitulated and intensified in Barnes’s illustration accompanying her experimental article
entitled “There’s Something Besides the Cocktail in the Bronx,”222:
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Illustration 5. Barnes, “There’s Something Besides the Cocktail in the Bronx,” New York Tribune, February 14,
1919.

Like Mary, this unnamed figure’s lower half seems to be melting into the blank space of the page—
the checkered pantaloons in particular lack any distinct border, making the legs appear ready to fall
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apart at any moment. Though Mary I. Unger writes explicitly about Barnes’s early collection of
poems and drawings, The Book of Repulsive Women, her analysis of the “incompleteness, fragmentation,
or beastly excess” of Barnes’s illustrations in that chapbook could just as easily be applied to this
figure:
Negative space highlights the Repulsive Women’s inability to control their bodies, seemingly
leaving them to the forces of their surroundings and the whims of their readers. Because
there are missing shapes and spaces, readers become participants in reading and constructing
the women, filling in what has not been drawn: The women are always in the process of
being created. Their construction is perpetually relegated to the moment when we, as
readers, open the chapbook. Indeed, we are an active part of that deferral. Our participation
in reading these images at once temporarily completes the women yet also disassembles
them when we turn the page.223
The reciprocal movement of composition and decomposition—the reader’s participation in
“constructing the women” of Barnes’s drawings even as they seem to fall apart before our eyes—
allows one, further, to recognize the “symbiotic relationship between subject and environment,”224 a
relationship clearly at play in this figure who seems to emerge out of (and itself serve as the
substratum for) a bed of floral growths. Problematizing the classically decadent, pessimistic vision of
unidirectional decay into emptiness and oblivion, the breakdown of this 1919 figure seems to
betoken not only decrepitude but efflorescence: a corolla not unlike that of a passion flower emerges
out of the figure’s hunched back. In this way, this corpse-like being functions similarly to the corpse
of “The Flowering Corpse,” namely, as a site where human forms give over first into the formless,
becoming a space for the proliferation of inhuman entities and forces. In both of these early
illustrations, there is a clear visual instantiation of the decadent process: similarly to how in decadent
writing, “the unity of the book decomposes to give way to the independence of the page,” 225 the
organic unity of Barnes’s drawings tend to decompose into the space of drawing itself, becoming, in
Symonds terms, “deliberately abnormal,” “corrupted” as their figures are with the slow creep of
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dissolution betokening an absence of distinction between subject and the broader environment from
which it only temporarily excepts itself. Barnes thus presents the decadence of the human subject as
a way to explore how the human is involved in, and indeed necessary to, broader cycles of life and
experience that surpass anthropocentric representation. She situates the decaying body as part of the
exchange of matter and energy in general, displacing the centrality of the human and allowing its
dissolution to become a space where growth occurs. Modernist posthumanism, for Barnes, is where
disarticulation can be articulated. In the following section, I will push this thesis to its furthest extent
via an exploration of Barnes’s engagement with animality.

Animality
Barnes figures decomposition along the axis of fauna in addition to flora: animals and other
nonhuman creatures often rear up in Barnes’s work as figurations of bodily and textual degeneration.
For example, the figure from “There’s Something Beside the Cocktail in the Bronx” certainly looks
like a grotesque human-flower hybrid, but on second viewing, the growth protruding from its back
might well be a ragged wing. This reading is strengthened by the fact that the figure reaches toward a
bee and that both the figure and the bee are represented in similar postures. Barnes’s early work of
poetry and illustrations, The Book of Repulsive Women, contains similarly undecideable, composite
figures, which Caselli points out “present the human form either on the verge of dissolution or
already part of a hybrid between human and beast.”226 Of particular note is the illustration
accompanying the poem “Twilight of the Illicit”227:
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Illustration 6. Barnes, “Twilight of the Illicit,” in The Book of Repulsive Women: 8 Rhythms and 5
Drawings (Los Angeles: Sun & Moon Press, 1994 [1915]), 26.

This figure’s tall rabbit-ears and raised tail, in addition to her vaguely serpentine posture, place her
squarely within Barnes’s iconographic tradition of half-beast, half-human beings. The figure seems to
slither along a barrier where bricks fade into negative space while nonetheless clutching at flowers
rooted in the earth beneath, both defining and transgressing the limit between the concrete and the
evanescent, stasis and movement, the constructed and the vegetal, and “higher” and “lower” orders
of nature. Illustrations like this one have led such Barnes scholars such as Bonnie Kime Scott to write
that it is in Barnes’s visual art in particular where “the animal and the human merge most
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memorably,”228 as it is here that she clearly “constructs a blurred middle ground between the bestial
and the human, disrupting these categories, and the very practice of categorization.”229
While she destabilizes the neat separation of the human from the animal, however, Barnes
also refuses to identify her hybrids as representing a new form of defined, discrete subjectivity that
synthesizes and transcends the terms of the binary it subverts. The poem accompanying the
illustration above clearly resists any impulse toward clear definition:
Your dying hair hand-beaten
‘Round your head.
Lips, long lengthened by wise words
Unsaid.
And in your living all grimaces
Of the dead.230
Refusing discourse, leaving “wise words / unsaid,” the central figure of poem occupies its hybrid
space without articulating itself as a coherent subject—indeed without articulating anything at all.
The perverse conjunction of animal and human being thus juxtaposed to the conjunction of the
“living” and the “grimaces of the dead” effectively places the repulsive woman at the core of
“Twilight of the Illicit” along the semiotic axis of the decomposing body, with the addition of a more
radical critique of language and “the practice of categorization itself” than this project has
encountered yet. That is, just as Barnes’s half-beasts always seem to be on the verge of dissolving out
of existence, so too do these figures appear in her fiction and poetry as maddeningly silent. Thus,
Caselli writes that Barnes’s “early poems disable the notion of opposition not by replacing it with a
third (more acceptable or more valuable) alternative”231 but by deranging the very possibility of
coherent subjectivity through refusing any coherent language with which to articulate it. It is in this
way that, as Rohman points out, Barnes comes to “specifically resis[t] the power of language to name
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and produce a differentiated subjectivity” by “engag[ing] the discourse of animality to trouble the
very terms of human subjectivity and think identity outside of the conditions set by its symbolic
economies.”232 “Twilight of the Illicit” prefigures Nightwood’s near-mute main character Robin Vote,
on whom Rohman centers her analysis of how “the nonlinguistic, the undecideable, and the animal
serve to revise what counts as human” via a “scathing critique of language, of that which forces the
unknowable into the realm of the known.”233 This semiotic nexus of animal-human hybridity, bodily
decomposition, and the impotence of language before inhuman entities and forces forms the basis
for the current section as well as the next chapter, where I will bring Barnes’s poetics of the animal to
bear on the infamous “scene with the dog” at the end of Nightwood. For now, a reading of the central
story from A Book, “A Night Among the Horses,” serves to introduce the theme and operation of
animality in Barnes’s work as it relates to her critique of language and her gesture toward a form of
pre- and/or post-subjective immanence that destabilizes anthropocentric representation. For Barnes,
in brief, flora and fauna do not speak in languages we can understand, and rendering their resistance
to human symbolic economies through writing therefore requires a decompositional approach to
writing itself, a writing that bears witness to its own breakdown and thereby stages the breakdown of
the human subject.
The chronological progression of the narrative of “A Night Among the Horses” follows a
reluctant protagonist named John Buckler. Buckler is a hostler who is somewhat inexplicably married
to an inveterate social climber named Freda, and Freda has taken it upon herself to “make a
gentleman” out of her horse-groom husband. “I’ll step you up from being a ‘thing,’” she tells John,
“You will see, you will enjoy it!”234 Of course, John does not enjoy it—Freda and John Buckler,
described as “debased lady, debased ostler [sic]” respectively, “wrin[g] each other this way and that,
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hunter and hunted,” with Freda insisting that “there is nothing so enjoyable as climbing”235 while
John begs that she stop “torment[ing] him with her objects of ‘culture’” and leave him to his horses
and land.236 “I like being common,”237 John insists. But torn between his low, “common,” even
beastly nature and Freda’s insistent desire for cultural elevation, John begins to worry that “he’d be
neither what he was nor what he had been; he’d be a thing, half standing, half crouching, like those
figures under the roofs of historic buildings, the halt position of the damned.”238 The repetition of
John being a “thing” is significant—where for Freda, her husband is not fully human insofar as he is
lowly, of a piece with his animals and the earth, John sees himself as losing his own sense of self
insofar as he is caught between categories, not quite true to (his) “nature” and not quite able to
become properly “cultured” either. Defined by his lack of particular definition, stuck in “the halt
position of the damned,” John is reduced to thing-ness, a lack of agency typified in the climax of the
story when Freda demands he attend a masked ball held on the top floor of their estate, where John
promptly gets drunk and falls out the window.
The narrative itself actually begins with John awakening on the ground, drunk, injured, and
undoubtedly fed up with the torments of culture:
Toward dusk, in the summer of the year, a man in evening dress, carrying a top hat and a
cane, crept on hands and knees through the underbrush bordering the pastures of the
Buckler estate. His wrists hurt him from holding his weight and he sat down. Sticky groundvines fanned out all about him; they climbed the trees, the posts of the fence, they were
everywhere. He peered through the thickly tangled branches and saw, standing against the
darkness, a grove of white birch shimmering like teeth in a skull.239
The story introduces a play of stark contrasts, of things not being where, acting as, or looking like
they should. A man, walking like an animal, in a tuxedo splattered with dirt and grass stains, is
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crawling away from an aristocratic estate that, for all its implied civilization, cannot hold back the
tendrils of a virulent natural environment that crawl into its cracks and around its defenses.
Appropriately, these images of miscategorization, indistinction, and creeping ruination appear
“toward dusk,” when the clear definition of daylight gives over into the frightful formlessness of
night. The very border between the estate and the fenced pasture described in this twilit borderland is
hazy, partaking of natural growth and human artifice simultaneously. To paraphrase Douglas, what
Barnes presents the reader with at the outset of “A Night Among the Horses” is a profoundly dirty
landscape, one which offends against the established categories by which the human is defined over
and against the ebullient flow of nature. This blurring of definition therefore evokes the flux of
material experience and threatens the very faculty by which the human can constitute itself as a
coherent subject. As such, the sign of death hangs in the offing, with “a grove of white birch
shimmering like teeth in a skull,” allegorically placing the threat of bodily disintegration which all
leaky categories represent at the horizon of the narrative.
The posts of the fence being so raveled with vines that John must “[peer] through the thickly
tangled branches” to see through the slats foreshadows a deeper entanglement of the human and the
earthly. In the next paragraph, John’s heart is said to pulse “with the movement of the earth” and
that upon perceiving the ground shaking “with sudden warning … he wondered if it was his
heart.”240 Upon this shudder, seemingly shared between his own pumping blood and the earth
beneath his palms and knees, John opens his mouth to “the smell of crushed grasses intermingling
with the faint reassuring smell of dung.”241 His barely-veiled sexual thrill sends him into a “tremor”
that “lengthened, … ran beneath his body and tumbled away into the earth.”242 The interchange
between his open mouth and the wafting particulates of verdure and manure, between his body’s
convulsions and the turning earth, receives a yet more explicitly erotic formulation in an earlier
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version of the story, where it is said that John’s “heart ached with the nearness of the earth, the faint
murmur of it moving upon itself, like a sleeper who turns to throw an arm about a beloved.”243 The
narrative thus moves from the implied threat of filth and material flux to the ontological coherence
of the human as human into the eco-erotics of base matter. Bataille’s implicit critique of Douglas
comes up here: embodying a literal nostalgia de la boue, John’s sexual thrill at his proximity to the earth,
his interpenetration by its smells and tastes, stages the desire for dissolution that, for Bataille, always
already undergirds human horror and disgust toward the interplay of decay and reproduction that is
evidenced in the cycles of nature. John has literally fallen from the status of human, and his
excremental character opens the possibility of an erotic nostalgia for the pre- and posthuman.
In the very first lines of “A Night Among the Horses,” John Buckler is presented as a
quadrupedal, seemingly semi-animal and semi-human being who is crawling across a weed-raveled
yard. This animalistic posture, signifying John’s degeneration toward a more beastly ontology, is
nonetheless comically offset by his dress, which keeps him divided him from the earth that he
embraces like a “beloved” while also keeping him from his fellow animals, who do not recognize him
in his strange suit and, startled, eventually trample him. Half crouching and half standing, midway
between life and death just as he is midway between human and beast, John is indeed placed in the
“halt position of the damned,” neither able to occupy a purely “cultured” position nor able to return
to his former, supposedly “natural” state. John’s eroticized embrace of the earth betokens a both
literal and figurative entanglement with the land around him: the reader is told that “he searched for
his cane; he found it snared in the fern. A wax Patrick-pipe brushed against his cheek, he ran his
tongue over it, snapping it in two. Move as he would, the grass was always under him, crackling with
twigs and cones.”244 This entanglement may be read as an allegorical figuration of the attempt to reaccess a form of natural immanence figured as animal (un)consciousness. In the wake of his fall from
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the heights of human culture, John begins to move toward overcoming “Man’s ‘no’ to nature,”
incorporating what human beings must abject to remain human beings as he crawls across the
ground, savoring the scent and even the taste of dung and grass.
The positional language of “A Night Among the Horses” also literalizes John’s animality,
prefiguring similar techniques in Nightwood. As Kenneth Burke points out,245 Barnes’s frequent
depictions of “standing,” “bending,” “bowing,” “crouching,” “kneeling,” and “lying” tend to
physicalize her metaphysics of decadence. Lheisa Dustin reasons that scenes in Nightwood that depict
downward motion occur when characters are particularly obsessed with the recovery of something
that has been lost, and this nostalgia “impels them in pursuit of a ‘great past’ that is both embodied
and withheld.”246
Each character descends before this phantasm as though returning to the past could be
accomplished by yielding a little of the vertical stature recently attained by the human
species. Each seeks the time before abandonment, but there is no such time—ironically, the
sense of a time before subsists only in the encoded repetition of the abandonment: the
curiously immobile descent. This descent cites the moment when unity with the beloved,
first apprehended as lost, seemed almost attainable.247
Both Burke and Dustin support the thesis that Barnes’s fiction often features a thematic of anguished
and ultimately impossible return to a state of immersion in and non-distinction from the world that,
for Barnes, are represented both by animals and by dead bodies. In Barnes’s “going down,”
characters metaphorically and literally regress to animalistic quadrupedality and/or cadaverous
prostration in an attempt to access what Dustin calls a “presubjective unity.”248 John Buckler, whose
heart “moved with the movement of the earth” and who hears the “immemoried cry” of the
denizens of the forest, is “nested in astonishment”—clearly, he can be justifiably read as a figuration
of Bataille’s “yearn[ing] for … lost continuity” and the “obsession with a primal continuity linking us
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with everything that is.” Though driven to say “no” to nature, John represents the inevitable
seduction back into its ebullient flow.
Of course, this “return to nature” is not so simple for either Barnes or Bataille. This
excessive movement by which nature can never but be partially reduced to order is figured in the
herd of horses itself, which have somehow escaped the bounds of the corral: head-on, they “roared
by [John], their legs rising and falling like savage needles taking purposeless stitches.”249 Though John
thinks for a moment that “he was with his horses again; he was where he belonged again,”250 it soon
becomes clear that
They did not seem to know him and they swerved past him and away. He stared after them,
almost crying. He did not think of his dress, the white shirt front, the top hat, the waving
stick, his abrupt rising out of the dark, their excitement. Surely they must know him—in a
moment.
Wheeling, manes up, nostrils flaring, blasting out steam as they came on, the passed
him in a whinnying flood, and he damned them in horror, but what he shouted was “Bitch!,”
and found himself swallowing fire from his heart, lying on his face, sobbing, “I can do it,
damn everything, I can get on with it, I can make my mark!”251
Marked by his recent acculturation, the horses no longer recognize him, and at any rate have been
whipped to such a frenzy it is uncertain whether they would have had he not been wearing his
incongruous tuxedo. While it is clear that his separation from his animal companions disturbs him, it
is also clear that the mark of culture is indelible: when the horses turn on him, he retreats back to
Freda’s injunction to “make his mark” as a gentleman.
However, things have gone too far already—he is stuck in the halt position of the damned,
and though he will not re-access a state of pre-subjective unity by becoming animal, he will inevitably
do so through his death and subsequent reincorporation into the earth of which he feels himself such
an intimate part. Hence the frenzy of the second paragraph, which bears one of the traits that would
become central to Barnes’s decompositional prose in Nightwood: namely, the piling up of subordinate
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clauses and overall derangement of the senses preceding a moment of extreme violence. Though of
course, in “A Night Among the Horses,” the moment of violence as such does not actually appear to
the text—the story, in fact, ends as follows:
The upraised hooves of the first horse missed him, the second did not. Presently the horses
drew apart, nibbling and swishing their tails, avoiding a patch of tall grass.252
Though it is clear that John Buckler is trampled into the very verdure and manure that he so
delightedly opened his senses to shortly before, the narrative avoids the actual event. Barnes’s
critique of language entails that the prehuman past and posthuman future can never actually be fully
captured or even represented in human consciousness or the symbolic economies by which it is
articulated and expressed. Barnes’s modernist posthumanism, therefore, is always tragic, representing
a desire that cannot by nature be satisfied except at the expense of the very consciousness of desire
as such.
“A Night Among the Horses” introduces some qualities of Barnes’s peculiar engagement
with animality and its connection to her overall critique of language as well as to her more directly
ecological concerns. John Buckler’s attempt to return to a past state of intimacy with animals and the
earth stages the eco-erotic desire for the dissolution of the human into what Bataille characterizes as
the continuity of nature. However, Barnes also details the tragic destiny of those who attempt to
reach past human consciousness—namely, by dramatizing the impossibility of such a gesture except
through the annihilation of consciousness itself. But by articulating, in narrative, the tragedy of the
beast (to crib a phrase from Nightwood’s Doctor O’Connor), narrative itself becomes the space in
which such a posthuman state can be, if not accessed, then at least gestured toward. Barnes’s
uncompromising view of human destiny and pessimism with regard to the human capacity to clothe
the unknown in the garments of the known (to paraphrase O’Connor again) thus precipitates a
profound consideration of the limits of the human subject. This consideration will achieve its fullest
articulation in Nightwood, to which I will now turn.
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CHAPTER 3

Ungainly Luminous Deteriorations: Nightwood and the Limits of Discourse

In the previous chapter, I explored three predominant modalities of decomposition in the
early writings of Djuna Barnes: fragmentation, decadence, and animality. Via representations of
bodily fragmentation, Barnes insists on the incommensurability of human meaning-making with what
she views as the fundamentally formless nature of material reality, highlighting the frailty of the
symbolic faculty in the face of entities, forces, and phenomena that transect and exceed the human.
Decadence provides a way into Barnes’s relationship to literary tradition and the ecology of decay
equally, a lens through which to focus her vision of how both textual and organic structures move
from molar coherence into increasingly dissolute assemblages. Finally, Barnesian animality dramatizes
a regression to a pre-human, animal state, and thus to a pre-linguistic immanence in the world, to
figure a generalized critique of the human subject and the rational, sequential discourse in and by
which it is articulated. I mapped how, for Barnes, this regression is ultimately tragic, as it requires the
very representative structures it critiques in order to be envisioned in the first place. Therefore,
actually attaining animalistic immanence would annihilate the ability to be conscious of such
immanence. However, the early articulation of Barnes’s posthumanist aesthetic and the
decompositional modalities proper to it still allowed for an articulation the limits of discourse and, by
implication, the limits of a self-possessed, self-contained vision of the human subject as excepted
from broader circulations of matter and energy.
In this chapter, I bring these concepts to bear on Barnes’s fitful masterwork, Nightwood.
What I will show, first, is that they allow the reader to recognize how Barnes’s novel actively
participates in its own decomposition, both representing, and presenting itself as, a decomposing
body. I will show how this process operates on several levels, ranging from the formal structure of
the novel as a decomposed textual body in which the editorial process of its production figures
132

heavily into the form and content of the narrative itself, to the narrative process of both linguistic
and biological decadence of the characters in the novel. Finally, I explore to the terminal
representation of Robin Vote’s becoming-animal in the novel’s final pages and the fundamental
breakdown of the possibility of representation in the face of nonhuman beings and forces that this
process represents. Pushing Barnes’s critique of the possibility of symbolic coherence in a formless
world to its furthest extent, I will show in this chapter how Nightwood stages a dialectic of language
and silence in relation to themes and operations of decomposition in order to radicalize the
implications of her posthuman preoccupations. This dialectic arises most forcefully between the
characters of Doctor Matthew O’Connor and Robin Vote. O’Connor pushes language to its breaking
point, speaking beyond the bounds of sense and presenting increasingly bizarre mutilations of
discourse that both reflect and enact his own fragmented and incoherent being. Robin, on the other
hand, consistently refuses language, and the novel renders her uncategorizable and unsymbolizable
being through performatively anti-discursive interactions with flora and fauna. Both O’Connor and
Robin are intimately bound up in Barnes’s preoccupation with death and the literary cadaver,
presenting two versions of the critique of human subjectivity via visions of bodies falling increasingly
apart—one which ends in ignominy and disaster, and one that opens onto a more capacious sense of
ecological relationality. Ultimately, though Robin’s beastly being never fully releases her from the
symbolic economy of the human, Nightwood nonetheless gestures toward thinking subjectivity beyond
the strictures of the human symbolic and the human itself.
In the first place, Nightwood, like all of Barnes’s works, unfolds under the aegis of a
metaphysically fragmented universe. In the novel, characters (and the reader) seek sense and purpose
only to fall apart before irreducible otherness, figured in the last analysis as the final, radical
incoherence of decay and death. The “Baron” Felix Volkbein is a self-denying Jewish man whose
attempts to shoehorn himself into the “aristocracy, nobility, [and] royalty” of “Old Europe”253 are
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both futile and tragic. Doctor Matthew O’Connor is a fraudulent physician whose voluminous
speeches give the lie to the notion that he can ever assuage his patients’ or his own existential
suffering at the loss of love and, eventually, life. Nora Flood is a woman desperately in love with
someone who will never love her back, and this love takes more and more pieces of her as the
narrative goes on. Finally, Robin Vote is “the empty center around which [the other characters’] lives
and actions spin,”254 the “black hole of images”255 whose signature silence comes to allegorize the
novel’s preoccupation with the insufficiency of language before the world’s fundamental absence of
meaning. In different ways and to varying degrees, each of these characters falls apart by the end of
the novel, shattered by the futility of assimilating into a coherent social, psychological, romantic,
sexual, or even (for Robin) species order.
With regard to Nightwood and decadence, Len Gutkin points out that Nightwood is “signally
indebted to the textures and themes of decadence, as the critical consensus of the last ten years or so
has come to reflect.”256 Decadence provides a formal touchstone for her masterwork’s fraught deand recomposition, describing as it does the process by which both physical and textual bodies break
down into increasingly porous assemblages of elemental parts that in turn give rise to strange new
metastatizations. In Nightwood, Barnes describes how “certain flowers brought to a pitch of florid
ecstasy no sooner attain their specific type than they fall into its decay,”257 simultaneously providing
an example of the ecological overtones of decadence as a fundamentally decompositional process, as
well as a formal blueprint of the decomposition of, and at play in, Nightwood itself.
Finally, Nightwood’s preoccupation with animals and animality hardly needs an introduction.
The “controversial last scene with the dog,” as Jane Marcus glosses it, has been the subject of much
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readerly fascination and frustration since its publication in 1936. Tim Armstrong has recently argued
that it represents the “apotheosis of modernist writing of the animal.”258 I aim to demonstrate how
animal beings and forces irrupt into and corrupt the textual body of Nightwood through a similar
process of bodily-textual breakdown as that effected through the fragmentation and decadence at
play in the novel. I will explore how animality for Barnes represents the simultaneously ecstatic and
anguished attempt to recapture an irrevocably lost original wholeness—a state preceding conscious,
human life and succeeding its death that Bataille describes as an eco-erotic state of “being lost in the
world like water is lost in water.”259 Ultimately, I will unite each of these strands back into Barnes’s
critique of the self-enclosed, self-contained human subject that arrogates to itself the power to
symbolically circumscribe and control material reality. The ecology of decay refracted in
fragmentation, decadence, and animality is for Barnes the paradigmatic image of the failure of
anthropocentrism as well as an avenue that opens onto the consideration of more capacious humannonhuman relationalities.

The Doctor and the Meat-Axe: Mutilating the Articulate Subject
The composition of Nightwood was, itself, a process of decomposition, one that entailed
multiple painful rounds of fragmentation, cutting, and rearrangement. While this could be said of any
novel, I contend that the particularly grueling editorial process Nightwood underwent over the course
of its creation bears much more heavily on interpretations of characters and events in the novel than
has been generally recognized in Barnes criticism. In a word, the novel in general and the character of
Doctor Matthew O’Connor in particular often invite the reader to interrogate the process by which
both the textual and bodily corpus is subject to fragmentation. Nightwood and the characters in it are

258

Tim Armstrong, Modernism: A Cultural History (London: Polity, 2005).

259

Bataille, Theory of Religion, 29.

135

bodies truncated, torn apart, and rearranged, and its decompositional composition constitutes the
material underside of the figurative process that the novel represents and enacts, showing that
Barnes’s critique of the possibility for art to represent life is as much an issue of artistic creation as
artistic product. Refracted through the character of Doctor O’Connor, who himself is preoccupied
with fragmented bodies and the process of both physical and metaphysical decay, Nightwood’s
fragmentation situates the decomposing body at the center of its critique of the power of language to
encompass reality and stages a destabilization of the articulate human subject that stands separate
from what is for Barnes the formless flux of nature.
The somewhat disingenuously titled Nightwood: The Original Draft and Related Versions
(published by Dalkey Archives in 1995) offers a carefully researched introduction by Cheryl J. Plumb,
which delineates the basic timeline of Nightwood’s composition. Plumb writes that Barnes likely began
work on Nightwood under the working title Bow Down in 1927.260 She seems to have finished the first
version of her novel in 1932, whereupon she sent the manuscript to Boni & Liveright, publishers of
both A Book, her first collection, and Ryder, her first novel. Boni & Liveright rejected Nightwood on
December 18, 1932. After this, Barnes appears to have immediately set about work on revision,
producing a new version over the summer of 1933. This second draft was no more successful among
publishers than the first: by 1934, Nightwood had been rejected from Scribner, Simon & Schuster,
Viking, Covici, Ben Huebsch, and (for the second time) Boni & Liveright.
Editors near unanimously called for Barnes to shape a more realistic narrative and,
specifically, to curtail the voluminous disquisitions of Doctor Matthew O’Connor. The rejection
letter sent to Barnes on August 24, 1934 by T.R. Smith of Boni & Liveright summarizes the main
objections Barnes’s early readers raised:
The theme in itself is obvious but it is all very difficult to extricate the story from the mass of
brilliant and somewhat mad writing. The early part of the book is clear enough but it soon
becomes obscured in nothing more than a welter of homosexuality, described and analyzed.
It is obvious to me that you tried to do an honest study of perversion but I am afraid you
260

Cheryl J. Plumb, “Introduction,” in Nightwood: The Original Version and Related Drafts.

136

got lost in your studies. There is so much brilliant writing, so much unusually broad
observation of life and behavior, so much keen philosophy, that it is a pity that the book
succeeds only in being a rambling, obscure, complicated account of what the average reader
will consider “God knows what.” I wonder if it is humanly possible for you to revise this
book again to the point where an ordinarily intelligent person will not have to read things
into your subject but can understand the psychological manifestations as part of your main
theme. And further, I think something should be done about O’Connor. He really is of
course a brilliant commentator on life and manners but like so many brilliant commentators
he frequently becomes a bore.261
In a word, editors tended to find the work in general and the Doctor specifically too difficult, too
long-winded, and too queer to market to a general readership. After this round of rejections, Barnes
set about her final and most substantial revision of Nightwood, producing a text over the course of
1935 that would eventually (with yet more revision, though no more complete re-drafting) become
the Faber & Faber edition of the text published in 1936.
Barnes was not alone in this process of revision, nor was she even her own most strident
editor. Emily Holmes Coleman, the diarist and author of The Shutter of Snow, is rightly considered a
significant shaper of the final version of Nightwood. Coleman became Barnes’s friend and artistic
collaborator while the latter was working on Nightwood over the summer of 1932. As enthusiastic as
Coleman was about the potential of Barnes’s troubled masterpiece, she was also highly critical of it,
going so far as to say that “most of the book is sentimental shit of the worst kind.”262 While she
admired the work for its “wonderful truths” and the “intense excitement”263 of its more scintillating
turns of phrase, she could not forgive its overinvestment in passion and emotion rather than
intellectual consistency and narrative clarity.264 The duality of her attitude toward the novel was
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particularly strinkingly embodied in O’Connor, who Coleman often claims to admire but on whom
she nonetheless focuses much of her editorial wrath.
By April 1935, Barnes and Coleman seem to have jointly committed to a complete teardown and reconstruction of the entire book. This included deleting some entire sections, combining
others, and rewriting and cutting each chapter. Surviving fragments indicate that the pre-1935
Nightwood was much longer than the final version, with the second draft’s final chapter going up to
page 319 before breaking off. The Faber & Faber version of the novel is, by contrast, some 110
pages, while the Dalkey Archives “Original Version”265 is 140 pages. The remaining fragments
appended in the Dalkey Archives text bear out that nearly all the excised sections are either
exclusively or substantially dedicated to O’Connor’s ramblings. On August 27, 1935—that is, after
most of the more substantial revisions had already been completed—Coleman wrote to Barnes that
there was still “much too much too much here of the Doctor’s stories. Still needs cutting! It makes
no difference how fascinating they are. It doesn’t belong in this book. Holds up the action & feeling,
is irritating.”266
Barnes resisted as much as she could. “I have made all the alterations you suggested,” she
writes on 23 September 1935, “except cutting out any more of the doctors [sic] stories, that can be
done, if it must be done, when and if the book comes to print.”267 Still, however, Barnes was slowly
more willing to accept cuts and overhauls, which is attested more and more over the course of this
round of revision. Monika Faltejskova goes so far as to argue that Barnes’s editorial process began to
resemble “collage,” and was “achieved by shifting scenes from one chapter to another while cutting
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out others.”268 Barnes’s “‘cut and paste technique,” she writes, was “an important part of the revision
process:
the figure of Altamonte that she cut out of Nora’s salon was re-insterted into the first
chapter, “Bow Down” where Felix meets him together with Doctor O’Connor, Nora and
the circus figures a party. Altamonte’s entrance to the book is thus moved from America to
Germany and a few years back in time. The “children and lovers” of Nora’s salon that
Barnes mentions were cut out completely for they do not appear in the published version.269
Of course, this “collage” and “cut and paste” technique was used on Doctor O’Connor as well:
fragments of the pre-1935 Nightwood show that sections of his discourse from “Go Down Matthew”
were transplanted into a chapter entitled “Largo,” while sections of “Largo” appear to have been
moved into the final version of “Go Down Matthew.”
Barnes, though obviously pained by Coleman’s insistent demands for cuts, begins to appear
to come around, describing an engagement with the editorial process in intensely corporeal terms:
“Now it’s rather fun,” Barnes writes in June 1935, “to cut the book up and hurl chapter after chapter
into the fireplace, like a puzzle, all of the rest of it all over the floor, and me crawling after lines like a
fly after honey.”270 This echoes Barnes’s May 5 letter, where she writes, “The whole damned floor is
a mess of it, no table big enough to spread it all out on, so I crawl about on the floor”; “It lies here
on the floor,” she repeats in the same missive, “and I circle around it like a murderess about the
body.”271 Here, Barnes explicitly joins the decompositional process of Nightwood’s (de-/re)composition with the image of the corpse, identifying the textual body and the human body that
would feature in Nightwood’s own representations of simultaneously corporeal and linguistic
mutilation. It is not a far stretch, as I will show, to read the painful and protracted editorial cutting
process in the Doctor’s own preoccupation with the finer points of bodily dismemberment, as well as
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his concern over being constantly interrupted and not heeded by those to whom he is speaking
(being “cut off” and “cut out,” so to speak).
In the end, Coleman simply removed pages from the typescript before sending the final
version to T.S. Eliot, whom she had finally succeeded in getting interested in the novel in the fall of
1935. “I took out pages 29-30, 33-34, 135-6, 139-40-41,” she writes to Barnes on 5 November 1935.
“These seem to be stories of the Doctor. However good they may be in themselves I know they will
irritate Eliot; hold up the book, and, in their place, are boring (however charming they may be to one
who is a devotee of the Doctor).”272 During the final revisions of the novel over the course of 1936,
at which time Coleman had suggested eliminating two entire chapters, Barnes complained to Eliot
that “that girl would take anything out with a meat-axe.”273
While Barnes is only quoted by Coleman, the use of the vicious term “meat-axe” is striking.
Not only did it reportedly cause an intense fight between the two collaborators, but the specific term
exactly mirrors something Doctor O’Connor says during his conversation with Nora and shortly
before his own psychic unraveling in the chapter “Go Down, Matthew.” Despairing of Nora’s ever
being able to truly come to terms with Robin’s endless and meaningless wanderings, O’Connor sighs
and says,
“I might have known better, nothing is what everybody wants, the world runs on that law.
Personally, if I could, I would instigate Meat-Axe Day, and out of the goodness of my heart I
would whack your head off along with a couple of others. Every man should be allowed one
day and a hatchet just to ease his heart.”274
I cannot help but read a connection between Barnes’s specific use of this idiosyncratic term to
describe her friend’s insistent mutilation of her text’s body and Doctor O’Connor’s own use of it to
describe cutting the head off of his most intransigent patient. Referring in some fashion not only to
alleviating Nora’s suffering (however brutally) but to her continuous complaining and refusal to
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listen, the Doctor telling Nora—who is likely a fictional stand-in for Barnes, as many readers and
Barnes herself have insisted—to effectively shut up via beheading with a “meat-axe” both
appropriates and mirrors Coleman’s own editorial decapitation of the Doctor himself, the silencing
of the interminable voice that insistently erodes the already fitful coherence of the narrative.
In fact, O’Connor’s obsession with decapitation suffuses the novel. So does his preoccupation with
the interruption of his own dispersed, incoherent narratives. His first and last speeches center on
decapitation, and notably, each occurs in the context of an interruption and can be read as a
performative display of editorial “cutting” when understood in the context of Nightwood’s de- and recomposition process. The first instance occurs at the table of Count Altamonte, where the Doctor
brings up the “matter of the guillotine.”275 He describes a time when he nearly fell into a swoon (out
of either horror or ecstasy—it is not clear) when a headsman told O’Connor about conducting
executions with a carnation clutched in his teeth. The headsman then seductively, or threateningly,
draws his finger across the Doctor’s neck. Just as O’Connor describes his flight from the scene (“I
didn’t stop until I found myself spank in the middle of the Musée de Cluny, clutching the rack”276), the
Count himself bursts into the room:
The Count was standing in the doorway, rocking on his heels, either hand on the sides of the
door; a torrent of Italian, which was merely the culmination of some theme he had begun in
the entrance hall, was abruptly halved as he slapped his leg, standing tall and bent and
peering. …
“Get out!” he said softly, laying his hand on the girl’s shoulder. “Get out, get out!”
It was obvious he meant it; he bowed slightly.277
After being turned out, Felix, standing in for the reader, inquires, “What was that about? And
why?”278 While there is no clear narrative answer within the published version of Nightwood, from
what first- and second-hand information is available about the earlier versions of the novel, the part
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initially played by Count Altamonte had been much more substantial before it was moved,
reconfigured, and significantly pared down in the second and third drafts. Altamonte was originally a
member of Nora’s salon, who had a conversation with Robin when the two met at one of Nora’s
gatherings. After the first draft, Altamonte was transplanted Austria and made the host of a party
where Felix, Nora, and the Doctor meet, while his own role is cut out almost entirely. His enigmatic
entrance in the published version—having been conspicuously absent for the entirety of the
dinner—is in fact quite unaccountable within the context of the narrative. However, his “torrent” of
speech, begun before he appears on the scene and “abruptly halved” on his arrival, may be justifiably
read as a performative representation of the ragged remnants of one of the “original” Nightwood’s
many severed members. The proximity of his interruption to the Doctor’s favored theme of
decapitation, the image of the cut carnation, and the fact that his arrival both cuts off the Doctor’s
speech and cuts off his own gives weight to the notion that the Count, like the Doctor himself, can
be said to ironically comment on his own editorial “cutting.”
Similarly, the Doctor’s final speech sees him pontificating on bodily mutilation once more, as
he drunkenly picks his way among fragments of images reflecting the shattered and meaningless end
of Nightwood’s cast of characters as a whole. “Once upon a time,” he declares,
I was standing listening to a quack hanky-panky of a medicine man saying: “Now, ladies and
gentlemen, before I behead the small boy, I will endeavor to entertain you with a few parlour
tricks.” He had a turban cocked over his eye and a moaning in his left ventricle which was
meant to be the whine of Tophet, and a loin-cloth as big as a tent and protecting about as
much. Well, he began doing his tricks. He made a tree grow out of his left shoulder and
dashed two rabbits out of his cuffs and balanced three eggs on his nose. A priest, standing in
the crowd, began to laugh, and a priest laughing always makes me wring my hands with
doubt. The other time was when Catherine the Great sent for me to bleed her. She took to
the leech with rowdy Saxon abandon, saying: “Let him drink; I’ve always wanted to be in
two places at once!”279
As the bar crowd tries to cut him off, the Doctor pushes on: “See here … don’t interrupt me,” he
demands. Finally, upon someone insisting he be taken home, O’Connor shouts to the entire bar,
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“Get out! Get out!”280 Clearly mirroring Count Altamonte’s abrupt curtailing of the dinner party in
which the Doctor himself is first introduced, O’Connor both begins with a simultaneously bodily and
discursive decapitation and ends with one.
This passage not only demonstrates the Doctor’s preoccupation with the theme of
decapitation and its proximity to the narrative “cut”—that is, with how bodily and textual mutilation
occurs from without: by an interrupting host, an ex-priest, or an editor, say—but also his more
internal fragmentation, the violently mutilated and spliced-together sentences and phrases that make
up every one of his tortuous monologues. That Nightwood in general and the Doctor’s language in
particular are characterized by fragmentation has been a common theme in the critical literature since
the novel’s first began to receive scholarly attention, though few have written on the confluence of
the novel’s formal construction (up to and including the very corporeal process by which its parts
were physically separated, laid out, and recomposed) and the novel’s pairing of physical incoherence
with narrative decadence. The Doctor’s association with interruption and bodily mutilation, as well as
his own cut-up and mismatched way of speaking, mirrors both the material fact of his editorial
mutilation and the novel’s general concern with how both structures of meaning and physical bodies
break down into increasingly smaller, increasingly disarticulated assemblages of constituent elements.
The process of semiotic disassembly Nightwood both presents and of which it is itself a
product gives rise to a form of discursive production that pushes discourse past meaning. The
fragmentation and decadence evidenced both in the Doctor’s being and his discourse is a function of
the disruption of symbolic coherence as such, generating fissures both in being and the symbolic by
which being is articulated and expressed. The rapid free-association that meanders from a quack
medicine man, to a child sacrifice, to some by turns monstrous and trite parlor tricks, and finally to
Catherine the Great’s demand for a transgression of the law of identity recalls Teresa de Lauretis’s
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point about the “terror of uncertain signs” at the core of Nightwood. Upon first reading the novel, de
Lauretis writes,
The narrative anchorage eluded me, it was too weak or too dispersed; the chain of signifiers
would not halt, would not find a resting point where meaning could temporarily congeal.
And it was not until I read de Man that I could let myself sustain the traumatic process of
misreading—not looking for the plot, that is, for narrative or referential meaning, but going
instead with the figural movement of the text and acquiescing to the otherness in it, the
“inhuman” element in language.281
De Lauretis’s reference to the unstoppable unfolding of loosely related signifiers and its ensuing
troubling of the possibility of meaning as an embodiment of what Paul de Man refers to as the
“inhuman” element in language reinforces the Doctor’s evasion and refusal of self-enclosed and selfassured identity. His insistent metaphorical fragmentations present a molecularization of any
possibility of organic coherence, evoking, for de Lauretis, de Man’s exploration of “what in language
does not pertain to the human, … is totally indifferent in relation to the human”: for de Man, this
indifference “can disrupt the ostensibly stable meaning of a sentence and introduce in it a slippage by
means of which that meaning disappears, evanesces, and by means of which all control over that
meaning is lost.”282 O’Connor performatively enacts the loss of control over meaning and thus brings
forth a non-human quality of language, a symbolic decomposition that Nightwood’s editors (and, on
first reading, de Lauretis) found impossible to stomach. De Lauretis later explicitly links the
“implacability of figuration” signaled by de Man’s conception of the inhuman in and of language to
the “resist[ance to] the self-assurance of subjecthood,”283 linking the terror of uncertain signs such as
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that precipitated by O’Connor with the threat of subjective dissolution. For, of course, this is what
underlies the Doctor’s impossible monologues: that the threat to the economy of symbolic exchange
tokens the destabilization of the human subject as such.
Stepping back, what is clear here is that there is a confluence between the painful process of
Nightwood’s perpetual de- and re-composition, the characterization of Doctor O’Connor as a figure
who is both obsessed with and himself an embodiment of discursive, physical, and metaphysical
fragmentation, and Barnes’s overall aesthetic of the shattered object wherein the human impulse to
make meaning in a meaningless world inevitably gives over into nonsense when pushed to its
breaking point. Spreading shards of Nightwood out on the floor, so to speak, it is additionally evident
that they are all bound up in Barnes’s attempt to think beyond the terms of human subjectivity by
way of exploring the limits of the symbolic exchanges by which it is established. The body in pieces
figures as an instantiation of her critique of discrete, coherent subjecthood. It is in this sense
appropriate that she describes the typescript of Nightwood as a cadaver, staging as it does the thematic
preoccupation with physical, metaphysical, and semiotic decomposition. In this vein, Doctor
O’Connor, the fraudulent healer of the body, himself embodies the function of the literary corpse as
a site of semiotic volatility and irreducible inhumanity. His insistently incoherent linguistic
productions corrupt language and grow beyond his or his listeners’ control, threatening the
traditional representative function of narrative and, as de Lauretis and de Man imply, the human
subjectivity articulated in and through the symbolic.
In what follows, I will zero in on how O’Connor figures the porosity of human subjectivity
and probes the limits of the means of its expression, bringing his own meat-axe to the very core of
the articulate subject. As a figure of both bodily and discursive decomposition, the Doctor
dramatizes the irruption of the inhuman into language as well as the corruption of language from
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within, staging how meaning can move beyond its own bounds of its own momentum, eventually
terminating in the tragic silence with which his time in Nightwood ends.
The chapter “Watchman, What of the Night?” is a particularly salient case study of these
aspects of O’Connor’s character and his place in the dialectic of language and silence that structures
Nightwood’s critique of anthropocentric representation. This chapter centers on an extensive
conversation between Nora and Doctor O’Connor. From the outset, O’Connor’s explicit figuration
as a cadaverous being takes center stage. Ascending six flights of stairs to the Doctor’s impoverished
garret at three in the morning, Nora is met with “a room so small that it was just possible to walk
sideways up to the bed; it was as if being condemned to the grave the doctor had decided to occupy
it with the utmost abandon.”284 This tomb-like enclosure is filled with the disarticulated odds and
ends:
A pile of medical books, and volumes of a miscellaneous order, reached almost to the
ceiling, water-stained and covered with dust. Just above them was a very small barred
window, the only ventilation. On a maple dresser, certainly not of European make, lay a
rusty pair of forceps, a broken scalpel, half a dozen odd instruments that she could not
place, a catheter, some twenty perfume bottles, almost empty, pomades, creams, rouges,
powder boxes and puffs. From the half-open drawers of this chiffonier hung laces, ribands,
stockings, ladies’ underclothing and an abominable brace, which gave the impression that the
feminine finery had suffered venery. A swill-pail stood at the head of the bed, brimming with
abominations.285
Here, the Doctor’s corpse-like nature is figured both in the directly grave-like aspect of his abode and
the quality of his possessions, which all orbit around the manipulation of the body. O’Connor, who
as a fraudulent doctor arrogates to himself power over the body up to and including the passage of
bodies into life and death, thereby also lays claim to the liminal state of one who transgresses the
boundaries of propriety and even good sense. Catherine Whitley reads Barnes’s concern with
excrement and excrementality, such as is evidenced in the filthiness of O’Connor’s room and
especially its open “swill-pail,” as “a way to explore states of liminality and indicate ways in which
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identity can be based on the inclusion rather than exclusion of what is different and therefore seems
dangerous.”286 But while she reads O’Connor as representative of the rejection of binarity and the
articulation of a new form of hybrid identity, it is clear that for Barnes excrement—and whoever is
associated with it—is fundamentally abject, and as such necessarily cannot form the basis for an
articulate subject. The doctor, to paraphrase Kristeva, represents that state of the body turned
“completely turned into dejection, blurred between the inanimate and the inorganic, a transitional
swarming, inseparable lining of a human nature whose life is undistinguishable from the symbolic”;
laying there in his tomb-garret, the corpse-body of O’Connor “represents fundamental pollution …
the opposite of the spiritual, of the symbolic, and of divine law.”287 The blasphemous quality of
O’Connor’s fundamental pollution is figured in the swill-pail, “brimming with abominations,” which
is a reference to the cup held by the beast-whore of Babylon in Revelation, and therefore an emblem
of the Doctor’s both beguiling and apocalyptic excrementality. O’Connor arrives in “Watchman,
What of the Night?” as an agent of Biblical-scale abjection.
The Doctor’s incurable logorrhea—where his true transgressions of the symbolic come to
the fore—proves this point. When Nora asks the Doctor “to tell me everything you know about the
night,”288 O’Connor’s brimming abominations spill forth. It would be impossible to recount the
twists and turns of his discourse in full, and even the Doctor begins by admitting the impossibility of
the task, saying, “Every day is thought upon and calculated, but the night is not premeditated.”289 As
the conversation proceeds, the insistent mutilations of sense and language come to embody what
Armond calls an “ontological doubt that is the antithesis of all rational thought.”290 To the
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“functionalist-scientific discourse” undergirding “the reader’s belief in the power of naming through
singular, exclusive analytic concepts,” as Monika Kaup calls it, the Doctor poses a “dynamic, restless
discourse which proliferates indefinitely the process of naming things … predicated on lack, or the
absence of stable meaning.”291 This signification in excess of possible meaning points nowhere and
ultimately comes to no identifiable, symbolically unified point. Introduced as a kind of living corpse,
laying amid a mausoleum of objects bearing no meaningful systematicity, the Doctor hereby comes
to not only represent but pour forth, like a mephitic infection, metaphysical doubt and symbolic
fragmentation. The porosity of his own subjectivity becomes a kind of funereal miasma that
overtakes his captive listener, opening fissures in the coherence of her (and, by implication, the
reading audience’s) metaphysical coherence.
O’Connor proceeds to meander between shards of poetic, ironic, philosophical, and even
ethnographic quasi- and pseudo-exegeses of the night. He muses, for example, on the difference
between how the French and the Americans apprehend the night; the nights of antiquity, such as
those of Sodom, Gomorrah, and Rome; the relation of sleep and sex, which belong to the domain of
the night; the wonders and horrors of dreams; the promiscuity of those who, like the Robin and the
Doctor himself, wander the night in search of furtive sex in bars, back alleys, and pissoirs. The effect
of O’Connor’s deferral of stable meaning is brought to a fever pitch in his repeated insistence that he
will indeed eventually come to some identifiable point—that underlying his verbal excess is some
final truth that will eventually be arrived at. Repeatedly enjoining Nora to “wait!” and “listen,”292 and
that he is just on the verge of “coming to something,”293 he insists in response to her repeated
interruptions to not “get restless—I’m coming to the point”294 and that he is “coming by degrees to
the narrative of the one particular night that makes all other nights seem like something quite decent
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enough.”295 He is “coming by degrees,” that is, to death, the final and interminable night that makes
all other nights pale in comparison. Once again, by performing the preoccupation with the possibility
of his discourse’s interruption, the Doctor here draws attention to just how shattered an object it
really is, bringing to the fore yet again his own simultaneously discursive and corporeal
molecularization. And by repeatedly declaring his proximity to “the one particular night” and yet
never fully reaching it, he attests to the “crisis of the word and of meaning” embodied in the facticity
of death that is “wholly resistant to reason, to metaphor, to revelatory representation.”296
Nora feebly attempts to arrest this process of increasing semiotic breakdown. Upon
O’Connor declaring that “You beat the liver out of a goose to get a pâté, you pound the muscles of a
man’s cardia to get a philosopher,” Nora exasperatedly asks, “Is that what I am to learn?”297 But the
Doctor merely looks at her and continues in another direction entirely. Later still, after implying that
Robin might be visiting the pissoirs that serve as sites for the anonymous liaisons of nocturnal Paris
(“where you will find [girls] kneeling in that great secret confessional”), Nora begs him to stop, but
the Doctor continues: “If you think that is all of the night, you’re crazy!”298 Throughout, the Doctor
is unwilling or even unable to give a totalizing, distinct idea of his subject—though he promises a
narrative and a “point,” he never articulates either, deferring the desire for a definite symbolic eidos to
soothe Nora’s (and the reader’s) suffering. “Watchman, What of the Night?” hereby radicalizes
Barnes’s overall critique of the symbolic faculty as a means for organizing and making sense of either
the world in general or even subjective experience. Underlying this philosophical point is the
materiality of the ecology of decay, embodied in the Doctor’s deathly being and his insistence on
reflecting the flux of formless reality by way of discourse that never synthesizes anything, that never
leads anywhere. Brimming with abominations, O’Connor, like his swill-pail, unveils the horror of the
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porosity of all seemingly discrete beings and tokens the body-become-waste. His language renders, in
Kristeva’s terms, the “polyvalent signified,” the “blasting of selfhood,” and the “indefinite catharsis”
whereby the individual subject opens onto a world that precedes and succeeds static, self-enclosed
being.
Toward the end of his seemingly endless ramblings, the Doctor turns his meditations on
night and death to himself. “What an autopsy I’ll make,” he tells Nora, “with everything all which
ways in my bowels!”
“A kidney and a shoe cast of the Roman races; a liver and a long spent whisper, a gall and a
wrack of scolds from Milano, and my heart that will be weeping still when they find my eyes
cold, not to mention a thought of Cellini in my crib of bones, thinking how he must have
suffered when he knew he could not tell it forever—(beauty’s name spreads too thick.) And
the lining of my belly, flocked with the locks cut off love in odd places that I’ve come on, a
bird’s nest of public hairs to lay my lost eggs in, and my people as good as they come, as
long as they have been coming, down the grim path of ‘We know not’ to ‘We can’t guess
why.’”299
In both flesh and word, Doctor O’Connor is an agent and exemplum of the decomposing body.
Taken apart by his own discursive meat-axe, he opens his bowels to find not word become flesh, but
word and flesh mixed in an unaccountable welter. Liver and whisper, gall and scolds, thought and
bones form a mix of discursive-corporeal odds and ends that deny any systematicity or totalization,
any redeeming eidos or symbolic revelation. The metonymic stringing of barely-articulated signifiers
that typifies the “terror of uncertain signs” and precipitates the introduction of the inhuman into
language is particularly evident in O’Connor’s auto-autopsy. The lining of the Doctor’s belly is
“flocked” with lovelocks (appropriately mutilated into locks “cut off” love), and the “flock”
immediately becomes the basis for a free-associative movement to birds in the reference to the
metaphorical bird’s nest of pubic hair, which in turn becomes literalized as a repository for the
Doctor’s “lost eggs.” (But then, how can “lost eggs” be lain in a nest? We, like O’Connor’s
mysterious “people,” go “down the grim path of ‘We know not’ to ‘We can’t guess why’” without
meaningfully answering either.) This passage, though it does not terminate the chapter, exemplifies
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the exploration of the limits of discourse via the decomposition of the body that forms the core of
Barnes’s posthumanist aesthetic. It stages the simultaneously semiotic and organic breakdown that
threatens the stability of the human symbolic order and the self-enclosed, self-assured subjectivity
articulated in and through that order.
Overall, the Doctor’s strident disarticulation of subjectivity will follow in the vein he opens
here, with language pushed to its breaking point, up to the lip of death, that final “Crisis of the
Word,” as Kristeva puts it, into which the human symbolic faculty cannot penetrate without breaking
down. O’Connor’s “dynamic, restless discourse which proliferates indefinitely the process of naming
things” presents human subjectivity as a tragic construct that terminates in meaninglessness, in
“nothing but wrath and weeping” as he himself puts it in his final words in Nightwood.300 However, the
Doctor’s symbolic mutilations are only one half of the dialectic through which Barnes presents her
overall critique of human subjectivity, as I stated at the outset of this chapter. And as such, the
Doctor’s metaphysical fragmentation and symbolic-corporeal decadence only present part of
Nightwood’s posthumanist aesthetic. The other pole of this dialectic comprises Robin Vote and her
engagement with animality, which, while also engaging in decompositional techniques to infuse the
inhuman into the literary, validates a more capacious ontological relationality that goes beyond the
futility and disaster avowed by the Doctor as human beings’ inevitable fate.

Robin’s Silence: Animality and the Eco-Erotic Impulse
If the Doctor, as Armond writes, “presides over the birth of fragmented and mutilated
corpses, and the creation of dead and fractured figurative language,”301 it is nonetheless true that the
most fascinating figure whose birth he claims to have presided over is Robin Vote. As another
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character who is represented as a perverse admixture of dead and alive throughout Nightwood, it is in
fact around Robin that the Doctor’s baroque disquisitions inevitably orbit. For O’Connor, the
paradigmatic embodiment of physical-metaphysical fragmentation and semiotic-organic decadence
that is tokened in “the incomparable fascination of maturation and rot”302 is not his own self, but
Robin. Attempting to describe her during a conversation with her husband, Felix Volkbein,
O’Connor says,
“In the acceptance of depravity the sense of the past is most fully captured. What is a ruin
but Time easing itself of endurance? Corruption is the Age of Time. It is the body and the
blood of ecstasy, religion and love. Ah, yes,” the doctor added, “we do not ‘climb’ to heights,
we are eaten away to them, and then conformity, neatness, ceases to entertain us. Man is
born as he dies, rebuking cleanliness; and there is its middle condition, the slovenliness that
is usually an accompaniment of the ‘attractive’ body, a sort of earth on which love feeds.”
“That is true,” Felix said with eagerness. “The Baronin had an undefinable disorder,
a sort of ‘odour of memory,’ like a person who has come from some place that we have
forgotten and would give our life to recall.”
“The doctor reached out for the bread. “So the reason for our cleanliness becomes
apparent; cleanliness is a form of apprehension; our faulty racial memory is fathered by fear.
Destiny and history are untidy; we fear memory of that disorder. Robin did not.”
While recognizably decadent in its evocation of corruption, ruination, and the confluence of life and
death, what the Doctor and Felix spiral toward in their conversation is the connection between
Robin’s decadent character and her evocation of an inhuman past, her “odour of memory” that
makes her seem to “come from some place that we have forgotten and would give our life to recall.”
That the Doctor associates this characterization with “untidiness” is clear given Robin’s nature as
abject, dirty, and heterogeneous—she is one who seeps between categories, and as I will explore
further below, she moves specifically between the categories of the human, the vegetal, and the
animal. That “destiny and history are untidy” refers to the fact that the animals-we-are-no-longer and
the dead-we-are-not-yet resist the categorizations upon which human language and thought depend.
The implication here and throughout Nightwood is that inhuman entities and forces arise in and
through the process of both textual and biological decadence, that properly human physical and
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textual bodies are corrupted by the “untidy” animal past and cadaverous future that precede, traverse,
and exceed them.
Robin’s continuous refusal of language throughout Nightwood—her spoken dialogue would
account for less than a page of the novel—becomes emblematic of this point. Her silence forms the
counterpart and supplement to O’Connor’s endless explorations of the limits of discourse. It marks
Robin’s embodiment of a profoundly relational rather than purely tragic ontology, and describes the
possibility of the imbrication of the human within broader economies of experience. Ultimately,
Robin’s anti-symbolic, intensely corporeal openness to flora and fauna and the insistent eco-erotic
pull she both engenders in others and herself typifies presents a modality of being and meaning that
exceeds the pure futility presented in Doctor O’Connor’s vision of human ontology and human
destiny.
To begin exploring this aspect of Nightwood’s destabilization of the human, it is necessary to
pause over the term “racial memory” as used above. Specifically, the term appears once before in the
text, during the introduction of Robin in the chapter “La Somnambule”:
Sometimes one meets a woman who is beast turning human. Such a person’s every
movement will reduce to an image of a forgotten experience; a mirage of an eternal wedding
cast on the racial memory. … Such a woman is the infected carrier of the past: before her
the structure of our head and jaws ache—we feel that we could eat her, she who is eaten
death returning, for only then do we put our face close to the blood on the lips of our
forefathers.303
Robin is here cast as the distillation of a prehuman past, a kind of regurgitation of what has died and
been consumed by the present. In confronting her, one re-consumes “eaten death returning,”
assimilating what is rejected and unassimilable. Through this transgression, an unspeakable, nonsymbolizable return of the repressed confronts the characters of Nightwood, “infecting” each with a
cannibalistic, necrophagic desire that is as physical as it is symbolic: “Before her the structure of the
head and jaws ache,” the narrative claims, and through eating her “we put our face close to the blood
on the lips of our forefathers.” Robin’s natural “untidiness” as a figuration of the modernist literary
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corpse, her infectious overflowing of traditional ontological boundaries, situates hers as “a surplus
existence that cannot be caught up … in the positivity of the social,” as Cole puts it.304 She is the
image of an “eternal wedding”: Juliana Schiesari writes that Robin “confronts us with the beasts we
once were and, somewhere deep down within us, still are,”305 while Lheisa Dustin writes that she
engenders a desire for a “return to ‘a forgotten expierence of presubjective unity.”306 Robin’s
decadence is intimately tied to a sense of the pre- and inhuman, a transgressive nature that denies
specific or clear categorization.
In this vein, De Lauretis writes that Robin, more and less than a character per se, is “an
excess of affect or unbound psychic energy … an undomesticated, unsymbolizable force.”307 This is
yet clearer in the first passage in which Robin is introduced, a few pages before the passage about the
“racial [read: species] memory” that she embodies:
The perfume that her body exhaled was of the quality of that earth-flesh, fungi, which smells
of captured dampness and yet is so dry, overcast with the odour of oil of amber, which is an
inner malady of the sea, making her seem as if she had invaded a sleep incautious and entire.
Her flesh was the texture of plant life, and beneath it one sensed a frame, broad, porous and
sleep-worn, as if sleep were a decay fishing her beneath the visible surface. About her head
there was an effulgence as of phosphorus glowing about the circumference of a body of
water—as if her life lay through her in ungainly luminous deteriorations—the troubling
structure of the born somnambule, who lives in two worlds—meet of child and
desperado.308
Robin’s perfume—surely the “odour of memory” to which Felix later refers—situates Robin’s as a
quasi-fungoid existence, a body disturbingly halfway between earth and flesh, simultaneously damp
and dry. The specific reference to fungi plays on the fact that Robin, like a fungus, seems to exist in a
liminal state between life and death: “The intertwining of life and death has long been a mark of
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fungal existence,” Ben Woodard writes in Slime Dynamics: “fungal bodies stretch the conceptual limits
of their own bodies as well as destroy and decay the purported solidity for other bodies.”309 In the
same way, Robin’s very existence and the language used to describe her functions as a kind of
degenerative force, breaking down and breaking others down with her/it while also precipitating
strange new growths. As a fungus, she straddles the production and destruction of life and, in the
narrative, of distinct meaning. Here and elsewhere, Robin’s character never can really settle
anywhere, either in the narrative (as she moves between various lovers, unable to be kept long by
any) or in language (in her descriptions, “the language of the novel works to slip the acculturated
binary assumptions of signifier and signified, and the nature of narrative itself is destabilized as
traditional categories are emptied of meaning.”310) More specifically, Nightwood’s language operates
around Robin in a decadent way, breaking into smaller and smaller elements and becoming a porous
assemblage whereby inhuman forces infiltrate and corrupt the text.
Take, for example, the “oil of amber.” Playing off the folk-etymological definition of
ambergris as amber grease (though its proper meaning was originally “gray amber,” referring to its
color), “oil of amber” represents a linguistic degeneration that signals the movement of meaning
from the referent into the writing itself: ambergris is degraded and fractured into amber grease which in
turn degenerates to oil of amber. Words themselves are presented as products of biological and
semiotic decadence. Their meaning has been divorced from their poetic movement: amber, for
example, is a hard, fossilized substance, and though it is produced from tree sap, it does not produce
liquid in the first place, nor is any sort of oil artificially extracted from it. Oil of amber is therefore a
contradiction in terms—a signifier with no signified, and thus an instantiation of language that is in
excess of itself.
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Additionally, identifying this simultaneously fossilized and fluid substance as an “inner
malady of the sea” not only further complicates the identity of “oil of amber,” but also further
complicates the specific character of Robin’s body, which is described in the same sentence in
pungently earthy terms as “earth-flesh.” Coupling the earthly with the mineralogical with the oceanic,
Robin’s deathly-lively, sleeping-wakeful, and now solid-fluid body becomes the locus of a subversion
of distinct categories upon which the production of clear meaning depends. Commentators have
addressed the “metonymic succession” that “layers conceit over conceit, without ever reaching a
conclusion,”311 the “images which Barnes uses to portray [Robin that] never quite add up, but seem
instead to be pointing beyond themselves to an unknown and unknowable referent,”312—this
“allegorical layering of images that are not strictly cumulative in the sense or values they confer”313
precisely mirrors the textual enactment of decadence as described in the section dedicated to the
concept in the previous chapter. Crucially, however, Robin’s corruption does not give the effect of a
slipping toward a yawning void, as the Doctor’s does. Rather, hers generates a perverse liveliness in
death, and decay becomes the locus for strange fungal emergences. Her body becomes the space
where semiotic and organic growths germinate.
The opening description of Robin also reflects a movement of attraction that verges on the
erotic: the intense focus on the sensuous qualities of the skin bring the reader closer and closer to
Robin’s unaccountable body in the same fashion as “The Flowering Corpse.” Robin becomes not so
much an object of observation, but an corporealized experience that plays on the perversely
seductive quality of liminal bodies. In this way, Robin’s elemental, metonymic proliferation is made
the subject of bodily interaction in the description of her flesh as simultaneously earthly—“the
texture of plant life”—and fluid—“as if sleep were a decay fishing her beneath the visible surface.”
Similarly to the first sentence of her description, this sentence bears its fair share of internal
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contradiction: as Whitley writes, “‘the water imagery re-emerges, although it is not clear in what way
‘sleep’ is like ‘decay’ or how ‘decay’ can pull someone beneath the surface: this sentence is richly
connotative, but problematically denotative, since some of the images make little literal sense.”314 The
language seems to move of its own aesthetic momentum, strictly divorced from “literal sense” or
metaphoric coherence; this lack of concern with maintaining strict ties between language and the
reality it is normatively supposed to represent is part and parcel of Barnes’s shattered aesthetic itself,
an allegorical mode of writing that inaugurates the movement whereby text and discourse are
corrupted by the inhuman. That Robin’s life is given as “lay[ing] through her in ungainly luminous
deteriorations” situates her corruption as the site of a mysterious effulgence, a fluidity that gestures
toward nonhuman workings beneath the surface. The insistence on “texture” and “fishing …
beneath the surface” emphasizes that seductive quality of Robin’s mysterious being, making her
undecidability the site of a perverse and ultimately dangerous seduction. In this sense, the separation
between literal sense and the sensuous sound of the language reflects the movement from the
linguistic to the bodily that Robin will come to typify in Nightwood.
The language used to describe her earthly-fluid, dead-alive corporeality is not all that renders
Robin’s capacious, not-quite-fully-human status legible. It is her peculiar relationship with animals
and the refusal of human discourse associated with this relationship throughout Nightwood that most
compellingly conveys Robin’s ontological multiplicity and openness. This relationship is established
at the moment Nora first meets Robin at the circus:
The great cage for the lions had been set up, and the lions were walking up and out of their
small strong boxes into the arena. Ponderous and furred they came, their tails laid down
across the floor, dragging and heavy, making the air seem full of withheld strength. Then as
one powerful lioness came to the turn of the bars, exactly opposite the girl, she turned her
furious great head with its yellow eyes afire and went down, her paws thrust through the bars
and, as she regarded the girl, as if a river were falling behind impassable heat, her eyes flowed
in tears that never reached the surface. At that the girl rose straight up. Nora took her hand.
“Let’s get out of here!” the girl said, and still holding her hand Nora took her out.
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In the lobby Nora said, “My name is Nora Flood,” and she waited. After a pause the
girl said, “I’m Robin Vote.” She looked about her distractedly. “I don’t want to be here.” But
it was all she said; she did not explain where she wished to be.315
Robin locks eyes with a lion, and for a moment seems held in the circuit of some mysterious kind of
communication. Carrie Rohman writes that “while there is an uncanny element of desire in the
lioness’s stance, it remains unclear whether that desire be for acknowledgment, release, or
communion.”316 The undecidability of the interaction is precisely the point: this exchange happens
outside the categories of symbolic representation, and signifies a possibility of communication
beyond categorical syntaxes. The caged condition of the lion and Robin’s declaration, “I don’t want
to be here” (Robin most often only speaks to express a desire to be elsewhere, to be otherwise, or to
enjoin others to silence), each mark the fraught condition of the beastly when placed within the
ambit of the human. Thus, the exchange between Robin and the circus lion “links the animal’s and
Robin’s stultification by humanist power structures that repress animality,”317 establishing the
connection between Robin and the animal world as one of both entanglement and alienation. Robin,
like John Buckler in “A Night Among the Horses,” seems caught in the “halt position of the
damned,” both tied to the sovereign immanence of animality and struggling with the trappings of
culture. That Robin so consistently wishes to “not be here,” almost as a condition of her being,
attests to a recognition of the limitations of her condition even as it emphatically gestures beyond
those limitations, like paws reaching between the bars of a cage. De Lauretis points out that, between
Robin and the animals she interacts with throughout Nightwood,
There is between them a sort of communication that is highly charged with affect but is not
verbal or otherwise symbolically coded, a kind of exchange that takes place on the sensory
register alone, without recognizable meaning—which is to say, outside representation.
Consisting of inarticulate sounds, bodily movements, looks or gestures expressive less of
conscious emotions than of intensities of affect, the “exchange,” if so it can be called, is
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entirely outside the symbolic and imaginary registers, as if it were carried out through the
primary process alone.318
Throughout, Robin refuses clear subjectivity, coming through her silence, her vegetal being, and her
animality to represent a kind of pre- and/or post-subjective unity, and just as her few words
throughout the novel so often emphasize escape and silence, her representation requires a writing
that refuses and undoes itself. She represents what Bataille describes as a nostalgia for a lost
continuity, becoming both the subject and object of an eco-erotic desire for the dissolution of the
self in the “devilish cycle” of natural processes. As such, her silence indexes her unwillingness or
inability to fully conform to the syntaxes of human being and meaning.
This refusal and the overall critique of self-enclosed, self-assured human subjectivity that it
reflects reaches its apex in the final chapter, “The Possessed.” This infamously frustrating four pages
was initially situated somewhere in the middle of Nightwood and only moved to its end over the
course of editing the third version. Like Count Altamonte’s conspicuously truncated speech, “The
Possessed” bears the ragged remnants of its editorial excision. Specifically, it is strangely out of place
at the end of Nightwood. The chapter begins by describing Jenny and Robin coming to New York,
implying that the two are still together, though in the narrative they broke up before the beginning of
the preceding chapter; Nora is additionally described as still living on her land in upstate New York,
which in the preceding narrative she had left for Paris long before. In addition to being obviously out
of phase with Nightwood’s timeline (which is, until “The Possessed,” one of the few things that isn’t
confusing about the novel), it is also seemingly tacked-on in terms of story. Eliot, for example,
fought against including “The Possessed” at all, given that “Go Down, Matthew” effectively
concludes the respective narrative arcs of the Doctor and of the relationship between Nora and
Robin. In “Go Down, Matthew,” Nora describes Robin getting further and further away, concluding
her reflections on their love with the immanently decompositional image of the pair fusing together:
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At that moment I stood in the centre of eroticism and death, death that makes the dead
smaller, as a lover we are beginning to forget dwindles and wastes; for love and life are a
bulk of which the body and heart can be drained, and I knew in that bed Robin should have
put me down. In that bed we would have forgotten our lives in the extremity of memory,
moulted our parts, as figures in the waxworks are moulted down to their story, so we would
have broken down to our love.319
This terminal image of rot and molecular mingling both offers a pat summation of the central
conflict of the novel while also reflecting its underlying decompositional preoccupations. It unites the
posthumanist obsession with the perverse seduction of subjective dissolution with an overtly
eroticized image of the ecology of decay. Additionally, it is the one image that seems capable of
stopping Doctor O’Connor’s language: upon hearing Nora describe her vision of rot and fusion, he
is finally left without anything to say. The Doctor “stood in confused and unhappy silence” in front
of Nora, then leaves her without a word.
This image of corporeal molecularization and mingling, in fact, prefigures the Doctor’s own
end, as he dissolves into drink upon drink at the bar of the Café de la Mairie du VIème. Here, he
addresses the bar at large, whose patrons (representing the novel’s own audience) are amused and
confounded at the Doctor’s rambling. Getting fed up, the Doctor snaps,
“Now that you have all heard what you wanted to hear, can’t you let me loose now, let me
go? I’ve not only lived my life for nothing, but I’ve told it for nothing—abominable among
the filthy people—I know, it’s all over, everything’s over, and nobody knows it but me—
drunk as a fiddler’s bitch—lasted too long—” He tried to get to his feet, gave it up. “Now,”
he said, “the end—mark my words—now nothing, but wrath and weeping!”
Here O’Connor finally passes over into the other term of the dialectic between language and silence
that has played out between him and Robin throughout Nightwood. Rohman writes that in this
moment O’Connor “seeks release from the lure of a language that promises meaning through stable
identifiers but does not deliver, and he notes in the end that his words, like Nora’s before him, have
all been spoken in vain.”320 Where before O’Connor insisted that meaning and semiotic stability was
only deferred—that he was “coming to” what he meant and all would be revealed if only his
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intransigent patients would listen to his words—here he seems to enact the fundamental breakdown
of any possibility for language to give the alchemy of a thing in place of a mere word. To Eliot, this
terminal ejaculation by the tortured and dissolute Doctor seemed the fitting end to a book centered
around the fragmentation and ultimate breakdown of relationships, people, and language. He thought
it difficult to find a more powerful final image than O’Connor, hunched over the bar, screaming
through his tears to a chuckling horde of barflies that this, indeed, is “the end.”
But, like an amputated limb sewn back onto a part of the body where it doesn’t belong, “The
Possessed” appears out of place after the neat conclusion of “Go Down, Matthew.” Commentators
have argued for widely divergent readings of this enigmatic ending, with some contending that it
represents a sexual encounter between Robin and Nora’s dog, a kind of blasphemous religious
“transcendence downward”321 whereby Robin sheds the last vestiges of her humanity, and that it
recapitulates in miniature the lineaments of the relationship between Nora and Robin and gestures
toward their ultimate reconciliation. Most agree, however, that the scene is fundamentally
undecidable: “Nightwood’s ending,” Ho writes, “withholds the closure of comprehension, and
diversity of readings it has sparked testifies to its resistance of singularity. Like the Surrealist collage,
it challenges every attempt to dress its unknowable substance in the garments of the known.”322
In “The Possessed,” Robin, having returned to New York with Jenny, takes to wandering
the woods and hinterlands: “Robin walked the open country, pulling at the flowers, speaking in a low
voice to the animals. Those that came near, she grasped, straining their fur back until their eyes were
narrowed and their teeth bare, her own teeth showing as if her hand were upon her own neck.”323
Like in the scene with the lioness, Robin is presented in a curious form of oppositional communion
with animal life. Rohman writes that “she grasps the animals as if she grasps herself. The boundaries of
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her subjectivity lapse out toward animals and a kind of animal consciousness that rejects strictly
humanist identifications.”324 The pulling of the flowers additionally seems to recall the image of the
half-human, half-animal figure from The Book of Repulsive Women analyzed in the previous chapter.
Thus plants, animals, and the human merge in a kind of fraught, simultaneously ecstatic and
anguished entanglement—indeed, “because Robin’s engagements were with something unseen,
because in her speech and in her gestures there was a desperate anonymity, Jenny became hysterical.
She accused Robin of a ‘sensuous communion with unclean spirits.’”325 The chapter presents Robin’s
immersion into the inhuman world of plants and animals as itself a kind of damnation, an exit from
the properly human world, and once Jenny speaks these words, she then “struck herself down,” and
took to walking “up and down in her darkened hotel room, crying and stumbling.”326
Upon Jenny’s psychological breakdown, Robin
headed up to Nora’s part of the country. She circled closer and closer. Sometimes she slept
in the woods; the silence that she had caused by her coming was broken again by insect and
bird flowing back over her intrusion, which was forgotten in her fixed stillness, obliterating
her as a drop of water is made anonymous by the pond into which it has fallen.327
The language of the passage seems to mirror the movement from pre-subjective non-differentiation,
to differentiation, and back: when the silence surrounding her is “broken again by insect and bird,”
those same creatures are then seen “flowing back over her intrusion,” which is in turn “forgotten.”
Curiously, the verb “obliterating” does not have a clear subject—is it Robin, the insects and birds, or
the “fixed stillness” which does the obliterating? Muddying where action originates and terminates,
human and nonhuman seem to flow into each other in a kind of glutinous ecological continuum that
admits of no discrete identity. The very description of Robin thus becomes the “infected carrier” of
the pre-subjective and non-human. Further, this deranging of discrete identity recalls the passage
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above, where Robin is simultaneously something “we” desire to eat and herself “eaten death
returning”—simultaneously digested and digesting, dead and undead, the description here seems to
fold language back on itself in a gesture toward what surpasses or precedes language and the very
differentiation on which it is predicated. The passage precipitates the immanence, nondifferentiation, and immediacy at the core of the eco-erotic impulse. Its excessive, unstable, and
polysemous qualities indicate how Barnes’s approach to the animal entails a certain breakdown of the
order of discourse and the articulation of a truly posthuman emergence.
“Circl[ing] closer and closer” to the unspeakable, “The Possessed” then abruptly shifts to
Nora’s perspective, describing how, one night, Nora suddenly hears the hysterical barking of her dog.
Following the dog into the night, she walks through the briars and tall grass, braving the pitch dark
and the ominous rustlings of creatures unseen. Climbing a hill to a decaying chapel where, seemingly
unbeknownst to Nora, Robin has been spending her nights, Nora comes upon her former lover
standing in front of a contrived altar bearing an image of the Madonna before which lay flowers and
toys.
Robin’s pose, startled and broken, was caught at the point where her hand had reached
almost to the shoulder, and at the moment Nora’s body struck the wood, Robin began going
down, down, her hair swinging, her arms out. The dog stood rearing back, his forelegs
slanting, his paws trembling under the trembling of his rump, his hackle standing, his mouth
open, his tongue slung sideways over his sharp bright teeth, whining and waiting. And down
she went, until her head swung against his, on all fours now, dragging her knees, the veins
stood out in her neck, under her ears, swelled in her arms, and, wide and throbbing, rose up
on her hands as she moved forward.328
The scene goes on to describe Robin by turns disturbing the dog, fighting it, then dancing with it, all
the while mimicking its behavior, barking, grinning, and crawling across the floor. The dog
ran this way and that, low down in his throat crying, and she grinning and crying with him;
crying in shorter and shorter spaces, moving head to head, until she gave up, lying out, her
hands beside her, her face turned and weeping; and the dog too gave up then, and lay down,
his eyes bloodshot, his head flat along her knees.329
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Critics tend to agree on what Tyrus Miller calls a fundamental “undecideability” in this scene, where
the line between “abject breakdown” and “divine communication” is disturbingly unclear.330 Rohman
contends that this undecidability “echoes the larger tenets of the novel, which declare the
impossibility of choosing between rigid binaries.”331 A paradigmatic representation of modernist
decomposition, Robin, literally “going down,” effectively breaks down, in rhythm with the staccato
succession of subordinate clauses that offer the reader fragments of images rather than a cohesive
narrative. The physical body of Robin mirrors the textual body, becoming an agent of degeneration
that literalizes and so “inhumanizes” the metaphor of decline itself. In Barnes, Dustin points out,
“descending, going down, is going back in time to reinstate a time prior to the losses inflicted by life.
… [It] seeks to recapture the only time before loss and shame: the time before subjectivity.”332 There
is the distinct hint of a renunciation of specifically Freudian humanity, where the human is in large
part first defined through its upright gait and the subsequent striation of “higher” and “lower” senses
and faculties: Robin, transgressing the distinction of high and low, reverses the equation given in her
introduction as a “beast turning human” by becoming a human turning beast. And as such, this
desire for a return to the untidy, non-categorizable, non-symbolizable, inhuman past necessarily must
partake of a decomposition of the very language making up the symbolic economy of and therefore
the being of the human itself. Approximating the “impenetrable howling of a dog,” Robin manages
to be both “obscene and touching,” this “trans-species mating dance [is] as unspeakable in its
outcome as its implications.”333
The struggle between Robin and the dog parallels the struggle for a language that is not
“deceptive, unstable, temporary, and grotesquely and humorously duplicitous” (Caselli 14).
In the end, neither struggle is decisively won or lost; as Caselli demonstrates, “human and
inhuman are questions, searched rather than known,” and the tragedy of the novel is one of
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“legibility and interpretability” (157). The direct language of this final scene exposes another
facet of this same problem, never offering a solution or an escape.334
Embracing the breakdown of logic itself through the elaboration of a polysemous literary language
that leads from the known to the unknown, Nightwood moves from discursive sense to the linguistic
expression of nonlinguistic immediacy. Her posthumanist aesthetic thus proceeds from and thrives
on the death of discourse. She here renders what exceeds language through language that bears
witness to its own breakdown. For Barnes, allowing a fundamentally unsymbolizable reality to infect
and corrupt the process of its symbolization makes language itself animal. In Nightwood, the animal
becomes an operation of posthumanist modernist writing, a passage through which discourse and the
specifically human consciousness with which it is imbricated can be sacrificed to the end of
transgressing the limits of human expression. The text thereby embodies the process by which
discourse is elaborated unto absurdity and fractures of its own momentum, leaving space for a
gesture toward excessive, immediate, beastly expression. That is, Nightwood pursues the double bind
of animality to the point where O’Connor gives into a despair of accessing the world beyond
language, but then it goes further—it goes “down, down” with Robin, descending into that “animal
darkness” and the sovereign immediacy it betokens via the climactic ebb and flow of bodies and
immediate language that insistently refuse neat interpretation. This writhing dance of intensities laid
out before the “altar to the unspeakable” need not be dismissed as hopelessly incoherent nor as an
ultimately soluble enigma waiting to be unlocked by the proper metaphor, but rather as part and
parcel of a posthumanist aiesthetic that both articulates and deranges the limits of discourse and of
the human.
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CHAPTER 4

One Day This Living World Will Pullulate in My Dead Mouth:
Georges Bataille’s Ungrounding of the Anthropos
For Barnes, human communion with the nonhuman can only be gestured toward, orbited
and not fully accessed, given the limitations of the very symbolic faculty by which such communion
could be articulated. Actually attaining a pre- or posthuman state of immanence would annihilate the
ability to be conscious of such immanence; thus, in the space of this impossibility, language can only
bear witness to its own breakdown. This enactment of discursive decomposition becomes the site of
a posthumanist aesthetic that acknowledges and avows the limitations of the human before that
which precedes, traverses, and exceeds it. It equally precipitates an ecological awareness of the
openness of supposedly discrete subjectivity to entities and forces that transect and sunder it,
revealing the porosity of the human, our imbrication in a more general economy of experience that is
not reducible to anthropic inscription or control.
In what follows, I will explore how Bataille systematizes, radicalizes, and dramatizes the
implications of Barnes’s exploration of the limits of discourse via modernist decomposition. A
similar recognition of the simultaneous impossibility and seductiveness of subjective dissolution as
figured in the literary corpse animates the fictions of both writers. Analogous forms of
decompositional writing proper to the modernist representation of death and the dead are
additionally present in the works of both Barnes and Bataille. However, for Bataille, what he
variously calls immanence, communion, intimacy, and continuity—by which he means the state of
eco-erotic openness to the nonhuman that both Baudelaire and Barnes before him have recognized
in the decomposing body and the natural entities and forces for which it is a lively nexus—is not just
impossible but, counterintuitively, also inevitable. The shattering of structures of meaning on which
properly human consciousness depends to define itself as human in the first place, which for all three
authors occurs in the confrontation with the dead body, is for Bataille the effect of an ineluctable
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movement of being toward its own self-destruction, embodied in its most capacious form in the
“devilish cycle” of nature. Drawing together how transgressing the syntaxes of the symbolic order are
part and parcel of this movement will entail first understanding the place of transgressive literature in
the generation of what Bataille calls “extreme states,” wherein one’s sense of defined subjectivity is
called into question. Such texts dramatize and even precipitate a state of what Bataille claims is antianthropocentric “ungroundedness,” describing, via a deep engagement with death—and the
abjection and filth attendant to it—a radical openness to the circulations of matter and energy that he
associates with the concept of general economy. Approaching what he calls “dead language,” defined
as the residue of a deliberate movement from articulation to formlessness in both language and
being, Bataille invites meditations on the postmortem as a way of engendering an intimate experience
of the self as a locus for more-than-human relationalities. The quotation from the posthumous work,
The History of Eroticism, which I analyzed in detail in the introduction to this project, is a salient
epigraph in this regard. What Bataille’s theory and fiction encourages the human individual to
recognize is that, in the end, “I will rejoin abject nature and the purulence of anonumous, infinite life,
which stretches forth like the night, which is death. One day this living world will pullulate in my
dead mouth.”335

Extreme States, Dead Language, and the Role of Literature
According to Bataille, as properly religious experience was gradually eroded throughout
modernity, the reading and writing of literature came to replace sacrificial experiences of collective
effervescence and specifically the kenotic sense of rupture that religious ritual was supposed to elicit
among its participants. Today, he claims, “extreme states fall under the domain of the arts, which
doesn’t come without its inconveniences. Literature (fiction) substitutes itself for that which had
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before been spiritual life, poetry (disorder of words) for real states of trance.”336 In the course of his
writings, Bataille includes writers such as Rousseau, Baudelaire, Hölderlin, Poe, Dostoevsky, and
Hofmannsthal as among those who managed to portray “states of ecstasy that escape the classic data
of religion.”337 To this list it would be justifiable to add Baudelaire, Kafka, Emily Brontë, and Jean
Genet, all of whom Bataille writes about in his final work, Literature and Evil. In a preface to what is
both his first and his final fiction (more on that below), Bataille additionally counts The Red and the
Black, Eugenie de Franval, and Sarrazine among the works of those whom he admires for expressing
“the possibilities of life” through moments of “fury” and “excess.”338
In describing the extreme states that Bataille associates with the “disorder of words,” he
claims that certain authors are able to represent “moments when the walls opened, where everything
is finally without opacity or weight, when the chain of time is sundered.”339 The notion of a lack of
weight, a sudden absence of earthly rootedness, is a commonplace in Bataille’s descriptions of
ecstatic transportation, a hallmark of what he somewhat counterintuitively calls inner experience. The
sense of losing a specifically self-enclosed and self-assured sense of both physical and metaphysical
groundedness is the apex of Blue of Noon, as I will explore in detail below. In order to articulate the
place of this ungroundedness in the overall shape of Bataille’s thought and his posthumanist
aesthetic, however, it is necessary to understand the operations by which, for him, literature can
precipitate such experiences and what they mean in the context of the critique of anthropocentrism
that is evident in his body of work from the early Documents articles to The Accursed Share and beyond.
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For Bataille, the challenge is to present a form of thought and expression that refuses to
reduce the incomprehensible, unconstructable movement of the material flux of nature to the scale
and ratio of human consciousness via the symbolic structures that give rise to such consciousness.
Literature becomes for him the space for what he calls the decomposition of thought; it is
undoubtedly with this in mind that Bataille writes admiringly of Samuel Beckett’s Molloy that the
work presents a “formless character,” an “absence of humanity” achieved via an “incontinent flow of
language … equivalent to ‘negation’” and that it “brings itself, under the weight of a fate to which it
succumbs, to the formless figure of absence.”340 Such a decomposition of language, character, and
humanity effects the performative movement from the impulse to anthropoform the world to a
recognition of what refuses neat inscription within the ambit of the symbolic. Bataille particularly
focuses on the dirtiness of Molloy, his association with abject substances, objects, and states of being.
Such a focus tokens how the physiological, psychological, and semiotic crisis embodied in the
representation of abjection in general and the decomposing body in particular is a privileged site
wherepon Bataille both dramatizes and enacts his conception of the movement from the categorially
defined to the formless and ungrounded that is at the core of those extreme states with which he is
so deeply concerned throughout his career. That “the exclusion of what is rotten is constitutive of
man, and understanding this must be taken as the base for the understanding of man himself”341 is
his basis for an engagement with abjection as a modality of disrupting the self-contained and selfassured human subject. Thus, the failure of words before the filth in general and cadaverous
corporealities in particular become examples of the overall failure of meaning in the face of the
unconstructable, indexing the limit of the human before that which radically exceeds it.
The conscious performance of this failure is a quality he identifies with all true “poetry,” a
generic term he applies to literary language in general, and in which he locates the deliberate
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dramatization of the failure of rational thinking. This staging of what exceeds the symbolic through
the symbolic precipitates what is for Bataille the crucial experience of nonknowledge that forms the
apex of the experience of ungrounding and the entry of the human into a more general economy of
experience. In his view, poetry comes to represent the self-negation of the symbolic, and it is of value
in Bataille’s thought precisely because it renders legible its own impotence in the face of the
unknowable. “The path walked by man,” he writes,
inasmuch as it puts [its] nature in question, is essentially negative. It goes from contradiction
to contradiction, composed of rapid movements [that] quickly break apart, [and] of
excitations and depressions. … The movement of poetry departs from the known and leads
to the unknown. It touches madness at its zenith. … Poetry is in every manner negation of
itself: it denies itself in conserving itself and denies itself in surpassing itself.342
Bataille crucially associates this self-negation with both literal and figural death. In Bataille’s
formulation, “Thought taken to the limit of thought requires the sacrifice, or death, of thought.”343
The cadaver is a central function of the movement undertaken in extreme states; as the final negation
of the self and the entrance of that self back into the continuity of nature, the corpse signifies for
Bataille the poetic object par excellence.
Language consummate with the cadaver is therefore dead language: the locus of a both
intellectual and religious kenosis, the passage into what is for Bataille an extreme state that
transgresses the limits of the properly human. The death of thought attendant to this state takes
shape as bodily, immediate, non-discursive experience—it brings out “what, in man, is irreducible to
project: non-discursive existence, laughter, ecstasy, which link man—in the end—to the negation of
project which he nevertheless is—man ultimately ruins himself in a total effacement—of what he is, of all
human affirmation.”344 The manner of expression here is telling. Bataille punctuates his conclusion
with intermittent dashes, as if each phrase has to be forced out through dying breaths, or between
bouts of laughter. Leslie Anne Boldt writes in her translator’s introduction to Inner Experience that the
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text “is full of lacunae and incomplete passages,” is “interrupted and unfinished,” and “opens the
‘folds’ of words into the radical continuity in which they are lost.”345 His language both dramatizes
and enacts the breakdown of discursive reason, heralding the “total effacement” of “all human
affirmation” in a negative downward spiral that seems to descend into nonsense and is punctured by
silence. Thus, Bataille writes in Erotism that, “as far as I am concerned—it seems to me—as I have
been speaking—that I have paid a kind of homage—a rather clumsy one—to silence. […] [A]t this
point I should like to counsel my hearers the most extreme caution. I am really speaking a dead
language.”346 Here as elsewhere, Bataille’s tendency to puncture his language with dashes and ellipses
or otherwise enact a sort of performative stuttering is one of his most telling ways of marking the
insufficiency of language in the face of the excessive movement his thought strives to account for.
This movement dramatizes the movement of the discontinuous toward the continuous, the irruption
of general economy/-ology into the restricted economy of the human symbolic. For Bataille, Susann
Cokal writes that “the only possible cure for what ails [him] (which, again and again, seems to be his
own discontinuity—and perhaps L’Érotisme and other works written in order to purge him of that
sense) is death—death of the text, death of the authorial self.”347 This performative way of bearing
witness to the decomposition of discourse into increasingly smaller and increasingly incoherent
elements doubles as a testament to the porosity and non-enclosure of the self when put in
confrontation with symbolic and real death. Situating the literary as a space where the human can
intimately engage with that which it traditionally rejects as a condition of its own humanity, Bataille
pulls the human subject beyond its self-containment and into dirty, material engagements with
entities and forces that transect the human, creating dead language and abject literature.
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Blue of Noon as Abject Literature
In this section I will map the ways in which Blue of Noon explores the porosity of the
articulate subject and writes the human into more capacious, eco-erotic relationalities. Specifically, I
aim to show how the restricted economy of anthropocentric subjectivity and the symbolic order by
which it is defined is broken down by the force of abjection embodied in the character of Dirty and
her associations with the maternal body, with corpses, and finally, with the soil of the earth itself. As
with this project’s other central texts, Blue of Noon both dramatizes and structurally enacts the
decomposition of the body via the text and the text via the body. In fact, there is no text in Bataille’s
œuvre that more insistently encourages the reader to interrogate the impermeable and seamlessly
articulated human subject than Blue of Noon. It is a work that questions and transgresses borders
(including, as I will show, its own), and that engages with margins of the corpus with all its attendant
power and danger in a way that situates it at the apex of what Kristeva calls “twentieth century
‘abject’ literature.”348
The “Introduction” to the novel—initially released as a stand-alone piece in 1945 under the
title of Dirty—could be taken in particular as the typification of this genre. Opening “in the most
messy [hétéroclite] of sordid places,” Henri Troppmann and Dorothea (tellingly nicknamed “Dirty”),
are sick, destitute, drunk, and debauched, frittering away their lives “in pursuit of some sinister
response to the most sinister of obsessions.”349 Barely spanning ten pages, the chapter follows the
pair’s booze-fueled bender as it moves from a basement dive bar to a wrecked room at the luxurious
Savoy hotel. Along the way, Troppmann and Dirty bleed, cry, vomit, belch, make out, urinate, and
defecate in full view of horrified onlookers. Even from this cursory description, Bataille’s gleeful
exploration of the permeability of bodies and the confusion of the border between interior and
exterior is evident. Blue of Noon thus stages from its outset a sort of inexorable eruption of the human
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subject beyond itself, a deliberately obscene showcasing of what he calls the “sewers” of the body
that open out onto the world and reveal the non-enclosure of the self.
The visceral repulsion such silthy openness stirs up in the bellies of those who encounter it
emphasizes the pair’s profoundly dirty, heterogenous, and abject character: while at the hotel, Dirty
calls in the maid, whose reaction to the stench in the room recalls that of Kristeva’s reaction to
abjection cited above. The prim, healthful, English girl “seemed to suffocate from the smell,” which
was
[rare dans un endroit si luxueux : une odeur de bordel de bas étage. […] Je ne sais où elle
s’était couverte, ce jour-là, de parfums à bon marché, mais, dans l’état indicible où elle s’était
mise, elle dégageait au surplus une odeur surie de fesse et d’aisselle que, mêlée aux parfums,
rappelait la puanteur pharmaceutique. Elle sentait en même temps le whisky, elle avait des
renvois…
La jeune Anglaise était interloquée.]
highly unusual for such an opulent place: a smell of a lowdown brothel. […] I don’t know at
what point that day she had smothered herself in cheap perfumes, but in addition to the
unspeakable state she had gotten herself into, she gave off a sour smell of armpit and crotch
which, mingling with the perfume, recalled a pharmaceutical stench. She also reeked of
whisky, and she was belching…
The English girl was aghast.350
The pair’s wretchedness is all the more repulsive for being so radically out of place, for disrupting the
symbolic order of their surroundings. The clash of their smell with the Savoy turns the stomach of
the young maid, who is nevertheless enjoined to observe the decorum of her position and wait on
Dirty as if she were any other bourgeois guest at the hotel.
That the horrid smell is a mélange of cheap perfume and sweat from Dirty’s “armpit” and
“crotch” presents her as a literally miasmatic force whose poisonous exhalations traverse her own
body and infect that of another. The reference to the pharmaceutical stench encourages such a
reading, recalling as it does an infirmary or hospital, where sick bodies convalesce and wounds are
treated. The odor thus becomes symbolic of those qualities of cadaverous corporealities that are said
to threaten the integrity of the living; the threat to bodily integrity also recalls the wound on
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Troppmann’s hand, which is mentioned earlier and becomes reopened just prior to the maid’s
entrance. A literalized irruption of the body’s coherence, the “I” of the text is presented as open and
seeping, a fractured subjectivity embodying the non-enclosure of the corpus in and of Blue of Noon
itself. In this connection, it should be noted that while the first ellipsis in the above quote designates
my own excision, the second is in the text itself. Bataille, as mentioned, often uses ellipses, dashes,
and literal breaks in the text to textualize the body’s transgression of its own borders and enact the
failure of discourse in the face of such transgression. Kristeva claims that this technique of syntactic
ellipsis represents the process of text and body mingling in “those intermediate states, those nonstates, being neither subject nor object” and thus abject, unspeakable, “less than nothing, or
more.”351 In the above passage, it appears to designate a sentence that could go on but instead trails
off into silence. Designating an excess that is both indicated and inarticulate, Bataille not only
establishes Blue of Noon and its central characters as both semiotically and physically porous, but
testifies to how that porosity becomes the site where that which cannot be articulated traverses the
physical and textual body.
Soon, Dirty tells the maid to fetch the decrepit elevator operator who has worked at the
Savoy since Dirty’s own mother was a patron. When he arrives, she taunts him with the memory of
her debauched progenitor, asking if he remembers “the tall old lady … The one who fell down
getting out of the elevator and vomited on the floor…”352 Dirty here seeps beyond herself in a
qualitatively different way from how her armpit- and crotch-sweat suffuses the room and the noses
of its inhabitants. Recalling her debauched mother, that is, does more than simply make the bellhop
uncomfortable, but projects her own filthiness into a past that precedes her own person. She thus
offers herself as a recurrence or regurgitation of an undifferentiated flux of abjection that supersedes
her already over-effusive person. The association of the maternal body in this way situates Dirty in a
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kind of genetic line of dirtiness, a continuation of an elemental power that is submerged beyond her
own, or perhaps any, individual existence. In Kristeva’s terms, Dirty is here bringing the unspeakable
maternal body into the domain of the symbolic which relies for its very coherence on the abjection
of that body. Thus confronting the symbolic order with the condition of its impossibility presents an
attack on the integrity of that order’s categories and differentiations, pushing the reader to consider
what Kristeva identifies as the core abjection of birth itself: “the immemorial violence with which a
body becomes separated from another body in order to be.”353
I will return to the theme of the maternal, Dirty’s seemingly elemental dirtiness, and the presubjective past momentarily. At this point in the text, however, Dirty not only precedes her own
person, but literally exceeds it. Giving the maid and bellhop money for a bottle of whiskey along with
a “staggering” tip, Dirty then demands that they stay a moment.
[Muette, Dirty se tenait sur la chaise. Il se passa un long moment : on aurait pu entendre les
cœurs à l’intérieur des corps. Je m’avançai jusqu’à la porte, le visage barbouillé de sang, pâle
et malade, j’avais des hoquets, prêt à vomir. Les domestiques terrifiés virent un filet d’eau
couler le long de la chaise et des jambes de leur belle interlocutrice : l’urine forma un flaque
qui agrandit sur le tapis tandis qu’un bruit d’entrailles relâchées se produisait lourdement
sous la robe de la jeune fille, révulsée, écarlate et tordue sur sa chaise comme un porc sous
un couteau…]
Mute, Dirty held herself on the chair. A long moment passed: you could have heard hearts
inside their bodies. I walked up to the door, my face smeared with blood, pale and sick; I
was hiccupping and ready to vomit. The terrified servants saw a trickle of water flow over
the chair and down the legs of their beautiful interlocutor. The urine formed a puddle that
spread over the carpet while a noise of slackening bowels made itself ponderously evident
beneath the young woman’s dress—repulsed, scarlet and writhing on her chair like a pig
under the knife…354
Troppmann, his face smeared with the blood from his wounded hand, is on the verge of projecting
what is interior to him into the exterior world, while Dirty actually does it, albeit from the other end
of her body. The imagery of hearts, blood, and the “pig under the knife” situates this scene in the
affective ambit of ritual sacrifice, the luxuriant spilling of precious bodily fluids that Bataille identifies
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with the “rupture of personal homogeneity and the projection outside the self of a part of the self.”355
This “power to liberate heterogeneous elements and to break the habitual homogeneity”356 of the
coherent individual and/or symbolic body is associated in Bataille’s thought with practices as wideranging as vomiting, orgies, auto-mutilation, luxuriant expenditures of wealth, intoxication, and ritual
killing—in brief, everything presented to the reader either literally or metaphorically in the first five
pages of Blue of Noon.
What presents itself at the climax of Blue of Noon’s introduction, then, is an auto-sacrificial
corpus, a text-body that negates itself at the very moment of establishing itself. What would one call
such a text? It might, as hinted above, borrow Kristeva’s notion of “‘abject’ literature,” which she
herself associates with Bataille. In fact, one could read her description of this genre as epigrammatic
of Blue of Noon:
[N]ot until the advent of twentieth-century “abject” literature … did one realize that the
narrative web is a thin film constantly threatened with bursting. For, when narrated identity
is unbearable, when the boundary between subject and object is shaken, and when even the
limit between inside and outside becomes uncertain, the narrative is what is challenged first.
If it continues nevertheless, its makeup changes: its linearity is shattered, it proceeds by
flashes, enigmas, short cuts, incompletion, tangles, and cuts.357
Insofar as the corpus of Blue of Noon bubbles forth in kenotic negation of the self-enclosure of the
human body, it also leads to a broader questioning of the stability of the symbolic order of narrative
itself. In Blue of Noon’s introduction, the sequential registration of meaning on which traditional
narrative depends is called radically into question by the constant interchanges of bodily interiors and
exteriors, the blurring of corporeal margins, and the fraying of discrete identity such that any
narrative properly so-called is burst into a myriad of disaggregated moments: “flashes, enigmas, short
cuts, incompletion, tangles, and cuts.” In this connection those insistent ellipses with which Bataille
punctures his text with silence and thus the corpus with the empty space of so many narrative wounds
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arises again; so too do Dirty’s frequent nonsensical exchanges, its breathless run-ons interspersed with
fragmentary sentences dwelling on meaningless detail. The chapter as a whole is divided into seven
vignettes, “short cuts,” that ultimately present the reader with no clear sense of character, plot, or
motivation beyond the insistent downward spiral of expenditure without reserve. Thus Blue of Noon’s
position at the summit of Kristeva’s so-called twentieth-century abject literature: providing an
introduction that does not introduce, but rather explodes the articulate subject is no foundation, but
rather a body already in the midst of self-negation, a discourse that undoes itself as discourse. It is
therefore typical of the form of decompositional writing that paradoxically articulates itself as
disarticulated, that presents what is beyond the bounds of language through language, that gestures
toward the silence foaming forth beyond a terminal ellipsis. Kevin Kennedy argues that it is this selfnegating quality that epitomizes Bataille’s “heterological aesthetics,” the highest value of which “lies
first and foremost in exposing the limit or absence of the epistemological, in indicating a realm of
experience beyond the limits of reason.”358 Bataille himself avows that the central purpose of his
work is to “direct our attention towards a part of the horizon where everything is in flux”359—via its
disaggregated narrative and the effusive, abject force of Dirty, the introduction to Blue of Noon
gestures toward and partakes of this flux beyond the horizon of the restricted economy of traditional
narrative’s symbolic order. Blue of Noon might then be taken as a typification of the kinds of “extreme
states” that Bataille associates with the “disorder of words,” and thus presents a literally posthuman
aesthetic that destabilizes the self-enclosure and self-assurance of the individual human body.
Directing the reader to the “flux” beyond the horizon of inscription, Dirty generates a simultaneously
repulsive and fascinating exploration of the body’s corporeal relationality, its transection by that
which cannot be corralled into a properly human symbolic order.
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Neglecting to provide narrative anchorage, and indeed undermining the very foundations of
the possibility of a discrete and articulated corpus, the introduction to Blue of Noon and the central
figures it presents signify rather an effaced, deferred, or submerged point of origin. The textual
history Blue of Noon, in fact, emphasizes this undermining of defined origins. In the foreword
accompanying Blue of Noon’s 1957 publication, Bataille claims to have written the novel in 1935,
during which time he resided in Spain with his friend and collaborator, the artist André Masson.
Bataille says he had more or less forgotten the book’s very existence by 1936,360 though as I have
mentioned, the introductory chapter was actually circulated as a standalone narrative in 1945.
Interestingly, that publication bore a backdate of 1928; readers of Bataille will recognize this as the
year L’Histoire de l’oeil was first released, which would then place the origins of Blue of Noon among
Bataille’s first gropings with literary fiction. Many in fact associate the work with a mysterious
document entitled “W.-C.,” “a crazy piece of writing,” according to Bataille, that he claims to have
composed, then burned, a year before writing The Story of the Eye.361 Bataille says that the narrator for
“W.-C.” was named Troppman—the same name as Blue of Noon’s narrator—while several additional
clues peppered throughout the author’s description of the incinerated document lead most to
conclude that Blue of Noon is in some way the residue or resurrection of “W.-C.”
Origins are of course always a messy business—especially for Bataille, whose literal origin as
a writer of transgressive fiction begins with a document named after a toilet. The problem is thornier
than simply determining a precise point where and when Blue of Noon comes from, however, since the
text itself frustrates the location and nature of its own beginning, turning what might have just been a
problem of textual provenance into a problem of narrative form. As mentioned, the book starts with
an avant-propos designating its year of composition as 1935, followed by the introduction that was
likely completed, in whole or in part, sometime before 1928. Between these two, the original edition
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published by Jean-Jacques Pauvert includes an undated explanatory insert—essentially another
preface or introduction—that, bafflingly, is not included in any later French edition, the English
translation, or the Œuvres complètes. But even if the reader ignores this strange and singular artifact,
when she finally get to “Part One,” the problem of where and when the text actually begins does not
get any easier. The entirety of this two-page section is in fact a quotation from the “Blue of Noon”
section of Bataille’s Inner Experience, based on the author’s 1930s journals and published in 1942. Part
One is then essentially an exergue or epigram rather than a beginning to the narrative proper—one
which further frustrates Bataille’s pat dating of the novel to 1935. Moreover, the fact that Part One is
set entirely in italics typographically marks it out as an extra- or paratextual artifact, a beginning that
is (yet again) not one. Finally, Chapter 1 of what could properly be called the narrative of Blue of Noon
itself does not actually begin until Part Two, some 30 pages into the text. But even this is not all: the
manuscript of this document jumps abruptly from page 17 to 34, a rather substantial excision that
Bataille explains in a brief handwritten note on the typescript that says, merely, “16 deleted pages are
missing.”362 So in sum, in order to arrive at the first chapter (1935), which is itself substantially
truncated, the reader must first go through the book’s preface (1957), explanatory insert (undated),
introduction (1928), and exergue (1942).
So, where on earth to begin? Indeed, Blue of Noon appears to literalize Kristeva’s central claim
concerning abject literature as that which reveals how the “narrative web is a thin film constantly
threatened with bursting”—here, it has not just burst, but exploded into at least five fragments that
are themselves fragments of fragmentary texts originating in various periods of their author’s body of
work. The text is so constructed as to not help but exceed itself, or recede beyond itself, appearing as
an disaggregated assemblage caught in and gesturing toward a broader flux that precedes, traverses,
and exceeds its own body. I tend to see the original epigram for the 1942 publication of Dirty as
emblematic of this quality: tellingly clipped from Hegel, the quotation in part reads,
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That which is limited to a natural life does not have, for itself, the power to go beyond its
immediate being [être-là (likely Dasein in the original)]; but it is pushed beyond this being
[être-là] by another, and this other, torn from its position, is its death. … [Being] is thus
immediately the act of overcoming the limit, and when the limit is its own, [it is] the act of
overcoming itself.363
Insofar as trying to start the book becomes a (largely futile) attempt at discovery or recovery,
I am inclined to further excavate Bataille’s own attempt to determine how and why he began writing
fiction like “W.-C.” in order to reach back into explorations of bodily and textual decompositions of
Blue of Noon. He provides such a self-analysis in the brief 1943 work, Le Petit, which the author
backdates to 1934—that is, around the time Bataille claims to have composed Blue of Noon. Le Petit is
a psychoanalytically-inflected self-analysis oriented around uncovering the origins of certain themes
and imagery in his fiction. He dwells in particular on the influence of his parents, and specifies three
memories as preponderant over some of his most recognizable preoccupations. The first deals with
his mother “drenched to the belt, pissing creek water” after she evidently attempted to drown herself;
the second memory is of having masturbated next to his mother’s corpse the evening of her funeral;
the third deals with his father—who was paralyzed, mentally ill, and subject to chronic and
excruciating pain throughout most of Bataille’s childhood—relieving himself through the bottom of
the modified chair to which he was confined. Combined, the first and last of these memories are
quite directly embodied in the climactic image of Blue of Noon’s introduction: Dirty writhing on her
chair, pissing and shitting herself with near ecstatic abandon. The second—Bataille masturbating next
to his mother’s casket—will be explored shortly. But for now, approaching Blue of Noon’s
introduction in the light of Le Petit certainly makes clear that bodily excretions—one of the most
repeated themes in Bataille’s work—serve both as the madeleine at the center of the author’s longdeferred psychic journey back to his birth as a writer of extreme experience and a motivic manifold at
the fraught origin Blue of Noon’s own narrative movement.
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It is not coincidental that urination and defecation are, for Bataille, also images of bodily
porosity par excellence, both in Blue of Noon’s introduction and beyond. While pissing and shitting
(not to mention bleeding and vomiting—the passage detailing Dirty’s climactic writhings in the Savoy
hotel room mention all four), a person not only transgresses social decorum but literally leaks. In
relieving or purging oneself one “project[s] outside the self … a part of the self” in an obscene
approximation of the sacrificial impulse, which occupies the gravitational center of Bataille’s galaxy
of thought. Adopting his terms, the excreta appear in a general sense to represent both biologically
and aesthetically that accursed share that is expelled in order to maintain the integrity of distinct,
human identity: the abjection on which the foundation of the self is constructed. Thus in abject
literature, Kristeva writes, “the body’s inside shows up in order to compensate for the collapse of the
border between inside and outside. It is as if the skin, a fragile container, no longer guaranteed the
integrity of one's corps propre.”364 Like all things cast off, this expelled part also bears a certain
fascination and even has the tendency to return and disrupt that integrity, revealing the more general
economy/-ology in which one can never but be partially and temporarily excepted. The W.-C. is
where we go to rid ourselves of bodily filth, that is, but it is also what connects us to the world
beyond the periphery of the skin, to everything that cannot be reduced to the restricted economy of
subject/object and the symbolic order underpinning it. “W.-C.” and, therefore, the introduction to
Blue of Noon, begin with the accursed share: Bataille’s return to his own origins founds itself on (or in)
the latrine, and thus casts itself as necessarily uncontainable and intransigent to neat categorization in
its essence.
In repeatedly undermining its own origin, Blue of Noon reveals—even before the narrative
proper starts—how any corpus must contend with what is both necessary to it and cannot by
contained by it. Whether body or book, corpora are subject to a corruption by which they seep
beyond themselves, and Blue of Noon presents itself as a performance (and even enactment) of this
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corruption of the body and of the text such that both are projected before their own beginnings and
after their own ends. Blue of Noon as the fraught textual artifact it is even itself appears as both a
submerged origin and a terminal waste-product of Bataille’s own literary career. Dirty’s association
with the maternal in this way ties her to a pre-subjective, elemental dirtiness that seeps beyond her
individual existence, while situating Troppmann’s all-consuming desire for her as an eco-erotic desire
for self-annihilation, for re-incorporation in the world from which the human being has separated
itself as a condition of its own subjectivity.
This pre-subjective quality naturally implies a post-subjective quality as well: thus Dirty’s
insistent association with corpses and death. From her “dead lips,” to her skin being “pale as any
corpse,” to Troppmann’s dream of her as a monstrously revenant creature “both insane and dead,”
Dirty is as clearly linked to the dead as to the maternal body. In fact, these two themes are united in
her: when Troppmann is describing how he and Dirty came to be separated at the beginning of Part
Two, he suddenly declares that he is a necrophiliac and describes a scene in which he masturbates
next to the corpse of his mother. (If further proof of the entwinement of Dirty in Bataille’s
preoccupation with his relationship to his parents is needed, it is this scene that most clearly parallels
what Bataille claims is his own experience). Troppmann in turn relates this experience to his sudden
and incurable impotence with Dirty, which he ascribes by turns to his near-worship of her as the
most debauched woman he has ever known and to his seeming incapability of achieving climax
except in the presence of one who is literally dead. These explanations finally resolve into Dirty’s
general exasperation with Troppmann and her desertion of him in Prum some weeks before the
events narrated in Part Two.
The conversation in which the narrator avows his necrophilia takes up the first chapter of
Part Two, and marks where the novel finally adopts what Denis Hollier calls a “classical narrative
form” as opposed to the haphazard and aphoristic style of the introduction and Part One.365 It is
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telling that Troppmann is here talking to Lazare, whose name links her to Lazarus, the corpse Christ
raised from the dead in the gospel according to John. It is also telling that the “classical narrative
form” of the majority of Blue of Noon only takes shape upon the separation of Troppmann from
Dirty, who is linked, as I have shown, to both the maternal and the dead body, and who therefore
demands a decompositional narrative modality. Literalizing the formation of the articulate self
through the abjection of the maternal and the semiotic death of which it is the embodiment,
Troppmann only becomes a true speaking subject in the midst of a recognizable symbolic system of
narrative after he has become separated from Dirty. Ultimately, this way of situating the possibility of
coherent narrative only after the subject’s abjection of that which “disturbs identity, system, order,”
“what does not respect borders, positions, rules.” Blue of Noon can then be read as an allegory, in part,
for the very process of abjection whereby the subject as such is articulated in contradistinction to that
which it must necessarily reject to maintain the self-identity of the corps propre.
So too does it allegorize the inevitable seduction of the continuity of nature, which is evoked
for Bataille in the paradoxical attraction of the ecology of decay. Shane Weller points out that,
according to Bataille,
the corpse is of object of both repulsion and attraction, both disgust and desire. This
fundamental ambiguity characterizes … not only the reaction of those who are sexually
perverse, but the human being as such, caught as that being is between the desire to separate
itself from, and the desire to rejoin, nature in its continuity. This longing for lost continuity
(or absolute formlessness) explains why the decomposing body is not only a threat but also a
promise. The necrophiliac desire that lies at the heart of all erotic experience, as Bataille sees
it, is essentially a form of nostalgia.366
In connecting the simultaneous attraction and repulsion of corpses to Bataille’s notion of the
continuity of pre- and post-subjective nature, Weller in this way brings us back to the central
problematic of the nostalgia for a lost intimacy at the core of much of Bataille’s work that I analyzed
in the introduction to this project and touched on in the previous two chapters in relation to the
concept of animality. The connection between the breakdown of “Man’s “no” to nature,” the
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repulsion/attraction of the corpse, and the a-signifying force of decomposition provides a way into
the climax of the novel, when Dirty and Troppman—finally—have sex in a graveyard atop a hill
overlooking the German city of Trier. As night falls, Troppman first looks at Dirty across their café
table:
[Elle demeurait très belle, pourtant son visage se perdait dans cette lumière, il se perdait dans
le gris du ciel. Pour redescendre, sans difficulté nous avons pris le bon chemin, très court,
tracé en lacets à travers les bois. Il ne neigeait plus, ou presque plus. La neige n’avait pas
laissé sa trace. Nous allions vite, nous glissions ou nous trébuchions de temps à autre et la
nuit tombais. Plus bas, dans la pénombre, apparut la ville de Trèves. Elle s’étendait sur l’autre
rive de la Moselle, dominée par de grands clochers carrés.]
She remained beautiful, though her face kept losing itself in that light, losing itself in the gray
of the sky. On our way down we easily found the good, short path, laid out in twists and
turns through the woods. It had stopped snowing, or almost had. The snow had left no
trace. We went quickly, slipping or stumbling from time to time; night was falling. Father
down, in the half-dark, appeared the city of Trier. It stretched over the far bank of the
Moselle, with great square steeples towering over it.367
The first sentence depicts Dirty’s face as “losing itself [se perdait], losing itself in the gray of the sky [le
gris du ciel],” recalling the general effacement of strict borders and defined identity that has been
characteristic of Dirty since the introductory chapter. The oblique reference to the title of the novel
additionally alerts the reader to the importance of the coming scene and sets up the vision of losing
oneself in the empty sky that will form the crux of the climax some paragraphs later. The passage
then offers some of Bataille’s characteristic semantic confusion, saying that the pair found the “good,
short path,” though this path is laid out in “switchbacks [lacets]” through the woods; of course,
switchbacks necessarily lengthen any path, twisting and turning at abrupt angles and thus defining a
more meandering course than the qualifier “short” might lead the reader to believe. The prose hereby
appears to signal that it is folding back on itself—not unlike a path laid out in switchbacks—which in
turn is emphasized in the next two sentences, where the reader is told that it is no longer snowing,
then on the contrary that it might be snowing, but that also somehow the snow “had left no trace.”
This curious meandering toward the articulation of an absence only renders that absence all the more
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present. The prose itself seems to follow Troppman and Dirty, “slipping or stumbling” through a
description of the scene that seems to deny or at least muddy the possibility of strict definition. What
is sure, however, is there general movement downward, a direction that implies something of a
Barnesian insistence on “going down” as a metaphysical movement from the high to the low that will
in part characterize the coming scene’s paradoxically earthy transcendence.
Before this mystic experience, however, the narrative appears to insist on the impossibility of
any meaningful communication between Troppmann and Dirty. As the clocks of the city disappear
in the darkness and now Troppman and Dirty are limited to their immediate environment:
[Peu à peu, dans la nuit, nous cessâmes de voir les clochers. En passant dans une clairière,
nous avons vu une maison basse, mais vaste, qu’abritaient des jardins en tonnelles. Dorothea
me parla d’acheter cette maison et de l’habiter avec moi. Il n’y avait plus entre nous qu’un
désenchantement hostile. Nous le sentions, nous étions peu de chose l’un pour l’autre, tout
au moins dès l’instant où nous n’étions plus dans l’angoisse. Nous nous hâtions vers une
chambre d’hôtel, dans une ville que la veille nous ne connaissions pas. Dans l’ombre, il
arrivait que nous nous cherchions. Nous nous regardions les yeux dans les yeux : non sans
crainte. Nous étions liés l’un à l’autre, mais nous n’avions plus le moindre espoir.]
Little by little, we ceased to see the clocktowers in the night. As we passed through a clearing
we saw a low but vast house nestled in arbored gardens. Dorothea spoke to me of buying
that house and living in it with me. There was nothing left between us but a hostile
disenchantment. We could sense it—we mattered little for one another, at least from the
moment when we were no longer in anguish. We were hurrying to a hotel room in a city we
didn’t know the day before. In the darkness, we sometimes looked for each other. We
looked in each other’s’ eyes, not without dread. We were bound to each other, but we no
longer had the slightest hope.368
Spotting a house through the forest mantled in luxuriant gardens, Dirty scoffs that they might buy
the place and live there in some fantastic form of fairy-tale, edenic domesticity completely at odds
with their characteristic solitude and the impulse to wander that each demonstrates throughout the
novel. Of course, Troppmann sees right through it: “there was nothing left between us but hostile
disenchantment,” he claims. In fact, what seems to be at play in the remainder of the passage is a
recapitulation of the first chapter of the novel (or, at least, the first chapter of the narrative proper),
where Troppmann tells Lazare about the circumstances leading to his separation from Dirty in Prum.
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Bound together but hopeless of ever actually being together, Troppmann expresses an anxious inertia
and impotence with regard to the ultimate object of his ever-deferred desire for a non-subjective
immersion into undifferentiated immediacy embodied in Dirty. That they “look for one another” “in
the darkness [dans l’ombre]” without being able to see one another takes on a potent metaphorical
weight, coming to stand not just for their objective but their existential condition of discontinuity.
Then, in a moment, everything changes.
[À un tournant du chemin un vide s’ouvrit au-dessous de nous. Étrangement, ce vide n’était
pas moins illimité, à nos pieds, qu’un ciel étoilé sur nos têtes. Une multitude de petites
lumières, agitées par le vent, menaient dans la nuit une fête silencieuse, inintelligible. Ces
étoiles, ces bougies, étaient par centaines en flammes sur le sol : le sol où s’alignait la foule
des tombes illuminées. Je pris Dorothea par le bras. Nous étions fascinés par cet abîme
d’étoiles funèbres. Dorothea se rapprocha de moi. Longuement, elle m’embrassa dans la
bouche. Elle m’enlaça, me serrant violemment : c’était, depuis longtemps, la première fois
qu’elle se déchaînait.]
At a turn in the path an emptiness opened beneath us. Strangely, this void at our feet was no
less infinite than the starry sky over our heads. Myriad little lights, twisting in the wind, held
a silent, unintelligible festival in the night. These stars—these candles—flamed by the
hundreds over the ground: ground lined by hosts of illuminated graves. I took Dorothea in
my arms. We were fascinated by this abyss of funereal stars. Dorothea drew close to me. For
a while, she kissed me on the mouth. She embraced me, holding me violently tight: it was the
first time in a long time she had let herself go.369
Presenting a fissure in the discursive logic of the paragraph, the sudden opening of the ground
beneath their feet allows for a conversion of their bleak experience of separation into a passionate
embrace, a feeling of literally letting themselves go via a bodily entanglement with one another. In
Sovereignty, Bataille recapitulates a common theme in his theory and fiction that identifies vast,
unstructured space with the rupture of rational thought. Specifically, he specifies the condition of
ungroundedness as characteristic of immediate experience and the disarticulation of the symbolic
order at the foundation of human subjectivity: in contrast to rational discourse and traditional
narrative, which “ground” the self in a symbolic order characterized by distinction and self-enclosure,
such immediate experience introduces “moments, like the deeply rhythmed movements of poetry, of
music, of love, of dance, [that] have the power to capture and endlessly recapture the moment that
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counts, the moment of rupture, of fissure … the miraculous moment when anticipation dissolves
into NOTHING, detaching us from the ground.”370 What the above passage introduces in its first
sentence, then, is “the moment that counts,” where the bleak anticipations of Troppman and Dirty
dissolves into “NOTHING” and the ground quite literally opens beneath their feet.
Being “no less infinite than the starry sky over our heads,” this miraculous and sudden
ungroundedness recalls several meditations Bataille wrote in the mid-30s surrounding similar imagery
of the reversal of the sky and the earth. In an article devoted to the paintings of André Masson (to
whom Blue of Noon is dedicated), Bataille writes:
The immobile object, the established ground, the celestial throne are illusions in whose ruins
human pettiness childishly lives on; when daybreak brings the omnipotence of time, of death
and headlong movement toward the great falling cry; for it is true that no ground exists, nor
any high or any low, but a flashing festival of stars spinning forever and ever the “vertigo of
bacchanalia.”371
What Bataille is describing here is the general detachment of perspective from its normal anthropic
grounding—“human pettiness” gives over into the “vertigo of bacchanalia” when the self allows
itself to become detached from its “established ground” and to recognize that the universe radically
transcends the syntax of the human symbolic. Acknowledging the limits of the restricted economy
circumscribed by anthropic perspective leads in this way to a literal letting go of the self in favor of
an ecstatic experience of the world turned upside-down. “We want a world reversed,” Bataille insists,
“we want a world turned upside-down.”372
Patrick ffrench points out that Bataille’s impulse toward disturbing or eliminating the ground
beneath our feet and thus disrupting anthropocentric perspective is necessarily ecological. What
Bataille describes is re-engaging with nature on terms other than those imposed by anthropocentric
perspective: according to ffrench, Bataille promotes “an affirmative experience of the fundamental
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contingency and destructive tendency of nature, the foundation of which is an absence of ground.”373
By affirming the “contingency” of groundedness itself, ffrench emphasizes the nature of
anthropomorphism and the categories by which it organizes its environment as a form of restricted
economy. Recognizing one’s place in the broader economy/-ology of experience—in Bataille’s case,
through a vision of the planet hurtling through space among among a “flashing festival of stars”—
the human gains a semblance of access to the pre- and post-subjective experience of continuity. Of
course, this experience necessitates an intimacy with one’s own death as an articulate subject: hence
the character of the stars as “funereal.” It is the moldering dead that invite Troppmann and Dirty to
step beyond themselves: Bataille’s vision of the “silent, unintelligible festival” of stars writhing over
the black earth therefore “begins a movement under the surface” where, ffrench writes, “decomposition
… suggests a return to the soil … as a kind of immersion in nature’s incessant process of loss and
expenditure”374 that liberate the “contingency and inherent mobility” of earthly being when
confronted with the interplanetary bacchanalia. Ungrounding in this way catalyzes a new relationship
with the ground: a kind of entry into the earth as simultaneously mother, lover, and tomb:
[Hâtivement, nous fîmes, hors du chemin, dans la terre labourée, les dix pas que font les
amants. Nous étions toujours au-dessus des tombes. Dorothea s’ouvrit, je la dénudai
jusqu’au sexe. Elle-même, elle me dénuda. Nous sommes tombés sur le sol meuble et je
m’enfonçai dans son corps humide comme une charrue bien manœuvrée s’enfonce dans la
terre. La terre, sous ce corps, était ouverte comme une tombe, son ventre nu s’ouvrit à moi
comme une tombe fraîche. Nous étions frappés de stupeur, faisant l’amour au-dessus d’un
cimetière étoilé. Chacune des lumières annonçait un squelette dans une tombe, elles
formaient ainsi un ciel vacillant, aussi trouble que les mouvements de nos corps mêlés. Il
faisait froid, mes mains s’enfonçaient dans la terre : je dégrafai Dorothea, je souillais son
linge et sa poitrine de la terre fraîche qui s’était collée à mes doigts.]
Straying from the path, we hurriedly took the lover’s ten steps across the furrowed earth. We
were above the graves the whole time. Dorothea opened herself—I bared her to her sex. She
bared me herself. We fell onto the shifting earth and I sank into her humid body like a wellguided plow sinks into earth. The earth, under this body, was open like a grave, her naked
cleft opened to me like a fresh grave. We were struck dumb, making love above a starry
graveyard. Each of the lights proclaimed a skeleton in a grave, they formed in this way a
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wavering sky, as unsteady as the movements of our mingled bodies. It was cold; my hands
sank into earth; I unbuttoned Dorothea; I soiled my clothes and her chest with fresh earth
that was glued to my fingers.
Thus Blue of Noon arrives at Dirty’s final, elemental association: namely, with the very stuff of her
obscene nickname. It is in the furrowed field that Troppmann and Dirty finally break through the
wall dividing them since the orgiastic introductory chapter. Appropriately, the apotheosis of this final
blurring of the boundaries between discrete corps propres is signified as a wallowing in the corpsefecundated, excrementitious earth.
Throughout his career, Bataille returns to the theme of soil as the site where bodily
annihilation meets and mingles with the general ferment of life—where all matter breaks down and
melds with everything else to give rise to new matter that will in turn grow and die and feed still
further structures of matter. From his early declaration of allegiance to Marx’s principle that “decay is
the laboratory of life,” to The History of Eroticism’s declaration that “life is a product of putrefaction,
and it depends on both death and the dungheap,”375 the linkage of decay and reproduction is always,
for Bataille, bound up in an ambiguous and ultimately reversible complex of attraction and repulsion
that characterizes the erotic in general. Sexual organs themselves being linked to “those unstable,
fetid and lukewarm substances where life ferments ignobly,”376 the immanent reversibility of the
repulsive and the attractive finds its highest expression in the very stuff of the ground, where dead
things rot and evil flowers grow. This ontological ambivalence is appropriately staged in a world
turned upside down—where graves become stars and the fetid earth trades places with the limitless
sky. Those curiously effulgent corpses betoken Bataille’s notion that death itself is a function of
excess, and that it is not an end except to the restricted economy of the human subject. Being finally
“the most luxurious form of life,” according to Bataille death presents life in the modality of that
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“tumultuous movement that bursts forth and consumes itself,”377 not unlike the celestial bodies that
endlessly give off their warmth and light in return for nothing.
The world turned upside-down is therefore also the world turned inside-out. Troppmann
and Dirty here throw themselves out of themselves, opening to the formerly unassimilable other and
the more profound alterity of dirt itself in an elemental pursuit of abjection past the limit of the
human. The language of the passage stages the play of fragmentation and fusion: the earth covering
the graves becomes itself a kind of grave, while Dirty’s corpse-like body, atop the grave-like soil, is
described by turns as the plowed earth and as a grave itself. The confusion between the body, earth,
grave, and corpse reflects a both material and ecological mingling of various elements otherwise held
as heterogeneous to one another, an irruption of the abject into the human symbolic economy that
would otherwise hold these elements separate in order to maintain symbolic sense.
The very atmosphere seems to blow through Troppmann and Dirty during their tryst in the
graveyard:
[Le vent fit dans les arbres un bruit sauvage. Je dis en bégayant Dorothea, je bégayais,
je parlais sauvagement :
— …mon squellette… tu trembles de froid… tu claques tes dents…]
The wind made a wild noise through the trees. I say stammering to Dorothea, I stammered,
I said wildly:
“…my bones… you’re shaking with cold… your teeth are chattering…”378
Here again is the recurrence of Bataille’s characteristic ellipses, enacting the stutter described as well
as marking the stutter introduced into discursive logic itself via the ungrounding experience of an
extreme state. This stutter being both indicated and performed becomes yet another puncture in the
progression of language, marking that which exceeds articulation. Language is here dirtied up,
wounded, and blown apart, while also made to speak, thus making the passage one spoken from the
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literal place of death into a figuration of the kind of dead language to which Bataille consrates his
life’s work in Erotism.
And, appropriately, what follows at this point is the “little death,” the final paroxysm of the
lovers in the graveyard:
[Je m’étais arrêté, je pesais sur elle sans bouger, je soufflais comme un chien. Soudain
j’enlaçai ses reins nus. Je me laissai tomber de tout mon poids. Elle poussa un terrible cri. Je
serrai les dents de toutes mes forces. À ce moment, nous avons glissé sur un sol en pente.
Il y avait plus bas un partie de rocher en surplomb. Si je n’avais, d’un coup de pied,
arreté ce glissement, nous serions tombé dans la nuit, et j’aurais pu croire, émerveillé, que
nous tombions dans la vide du ciel.]
I stopped, I weighed on her without moving, I panted like a dog. Suddenly I gripped her
naked buttocks. I let myself fall with all my weight. She burst forth in a terrible scream. I
clenched my teeth with all my might. At that moment, we slipped down the sloping ground.
Below there was an overhanging bit of rock. If I hadn’t struck out my foot, stopping
our slide, we would have fallen into the night, and I might have believed, amazed, that we
would have fallen into the emptiness of the sky.
In this meticulously constructed image, the pair’s orgasm is followed immediately by another sort of
“ungrounding” that parallels that which introduced the scene as a whole. The ground seems to give
way beneath them, leading them to slip down the muddy embankment toward some sort of
precipice. It seems only by chance that Troppman and Dirty keep from falling into space—a curious
“fall upwards” that mirrors the “transcendence downwards” that the scene as a whole takes as its
metaphysical basis—and the “emptiness of the sky [la vide du ciel]” that greets them echoes the
ungrounding experience of the deterioration of articulate subjectivity in the midst of an extreme
state. On the whole, this spectacular termination seems to dramatize Bataille’s preoccupation with the
contingency of self-enclosed, self-assured human subjectivity. The stable foundation of the
grounded, anthropic perspective having been taken away, Bataille insists that the self can only be
articulated as that which hurtles toward its own destruction and eventual mingling in a directionless
and purposeless expenditure. The reversibility of gravity betokens a loss of stable, anthropocentric
perspective as much as a loss of a stable position from which to articulate perspective.
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This dirty entanglement is given a somewhat comedic cast in the following paragraph, where
Troppmnn and Dirty have difficulty separating themselves from one another and from the earth that
clings to both their bodies and draws them in like a grave unwilling to give up its dead:
[Je dus, comme je pouvais, tirer mon pantalon. Je m’étais mis debout. Dirty restait le derrière
nu, à même le sol. Elle se leva péniblement, elle attrapa une de mes mains. Elle embrassa
mon ventre nu : la terre s’était collée à mes jambes velues : elle la gratta pour m’en
débarrasser. Elle s’accrochait à moi. Elle jouait avec des mouvements sournois, avec des
mouvements d’une folle indécence. Elle me fit d’abord tomber. Je me relevai difficilement, je
l’aidais à remettre ses vêtements, mais c’était difficile, nos corps et nos vêtements devenus
terreux. Nous n’étions pas moins excités par la terre que par la nudité́ de la chair.]
I had to pull up my pants as best as I could. I stood myself up. Dirty was still on the ground,
on her naked backside. She got up with difficulty, grasping one of my hands. She kissed my
naked stomach: the earth was glued to my hairy legs: she scratched at it to get rid of it. She
clung to me. She played around in sly movements, in movements of mad indecency. At first
she made me fall back down. I got up again with difficulty, I helped her to put her clothes
back on, but it was difficult, our bodies and our clothes having become so earthy. We were
not less excited by earth than by the nakedness of flesh.
“Devenu terreux” here signifies both becoming literally dirty and entering into a liminal ontological
state associated with dirt itself. Such becoming-dirt sees the pair take on a terrestrial corporeality,
their flesh mingling with the stuff of the earth in a directly cadaverous fashion. They cannot separate
either from the earth or from each other; neither can the pair stand on their own two feet anymore.
The whirling perspective and ungrounded sense of gravity and direction tokens a reversal of the high
and the low, cosmos and earth, inside and out, self and other at play within the scene, figuring a state
of immanence that is simultaneously inevitable and inarticulate, yet still subject to expression.
For Bataille, what I have termed eco-eroticism entails “a breaking down of established
patterns, the patterns … of the regulated social order basic to our discontinuous mode of existence
defined as separate individuals.”379 Bataille is here addressing what I have examined throughout this
chapter as the fracturing of articulate subjectivity and its opening to alterity in the form of immediate,
non-discursive experience. Such a “state of communication [reveals] a quest for a possible
continuance of being beyond the confines of the self,” and is in the first place recognized in that
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threatening porosity of self, in the “secret channels” by which “bodies open out to a state of
continuity” and the “obscenity” associated with this openness.380 “Obscenity,” he pursues, “is our
name for the uneasiness which upsets the physical state associated with self-possession, with the
possession of a recognized and stable individuality. Through the activity of organs in a flow of
coalescence and renewal, like the ebb and flow of waves surging into one another, the self is
dispossessed” and breaks down in the flux of a general economy/-ology that precedes and succeeds
the properly human.381 Bataille hereby articulates the extreme threat to stable, individual selfhood as
represented by death, death being for Bataille nothing other than that state of continuity, of
“coalescence and renewal,” “ebb and flow” which characterizes what is beyond the horizon of
articulate selfhood where everything is in flux.
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CONCLUSION

The Postmodern Postmortem

On December 26th, 2021, Desmond Tutu died in Cape Town. The death of the celebrated
Anglican bishop, theologian, and anti-apartheid activist, strangely, occasioned a groundswell of
popular interest in alternatives to the traditional forms of corpse-disposal that have pervaded most of
the world since the modern revolution in western deathways. For Bishop Tutu did not want his body
embalmed and buried in a hermetically sealed casket, nor did he wish to be cremated. He stipulated
rather that his remains should be subject to alkaline hydrolysis. This process, popularly called
“resomation” or “aquamation,” breaks down the body by immersing it in a metal cylinder filled with
a mixture of water and strong alkali, which is then heated to 150 degrees centigrade and often either
pressurized or agitated. At the end of the process, only bone fragments and a harmless liquid effluent
remain. According to the Cremation Association of North America, “The decomposition that occurs
in alkaline hydrolysis is the same as that which occurs during burial, just sped up dramatically by the
chemicals.”382
Bishop Tutu was undoubtedly attracted to aquamation because of his deep concern over
planetary ecological crisis and climate change. This method of corpse-disposal uses exponentially less
energy than cremation, produces fewer carbon emissions, and involves no harmful chemicals like
those used in embalming. Far from being detrimental to the earth, in fact, the resulting effluent is
rich in amino acids, peptides, and sugars. The tellingly named “Be a Tree Cremation” organization,
which promotes aquamation, notes that the solution makes a “wonderful fertilizer.”383
Articles abounded in the wake of Bishop Tutu’s death that not only reflected on the
celebrated clergyman’s life, but on his peculiar material afterlife. Such interest in green burial has
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grown over the past decades, reflecting, in my view, the beginnings of a general destabilization of the
episteme of modern death culture. States are increasingly legalizing eco-friendly forms of corpsedisposal in response to more and more people seeking out ways of giving their bodies back to the
earth rather than keeping separate from it. Such efforts are often hamstrung by, in the first place, the
funeral industry, the livelihood of which is obviously threatened by evolving funerary conventions.
Religious organizations often object as well. While the Roman Catholic Church eventually came to
accept cremation in a limited capacity, it explicitly does not approve of alkaline hydrolysis. Legislation
that would have allowed alkaline hydrolysis in the state of Indiana was defeated with the help of the
Indiana Catholic Conference, whose executive director, Glen Tebbe, testified in the Indiana House
Public Health Committee that it “does not provide, in our opinion, the dignity due the person” and
that it is “unnecessarily disrespectful.”384 Such sentiments, and the fact that the matter of green
corpse-disposal is being treated as a potential danger to public health in the first place, are reflective
of broader cultural hesitancies left over from the post-Enlightenment development of the cult of the
dead body and the fear of the potential danger of corpses to the living. The vehement reaction
against idea that the human body could be as much a part of the cycle of nature as any other form of
decomposing organic life is, as I have shown throughout this project, at the core of the modern
definition of the human as such.
“The exclusion of what is rotten is constitutive of man,” says Bataille, “and understanding
this must be taken as the base for understanding man himself.”385 Engaging with the rotten, with the
self-as-rotten, requires a radical redefinition of the self as a profoundly ecological phenomenon. It is
this redefinition, or perhaps sublation, of the human self in the context of broader circulations of
matter and energy that has occupied the center of my project. And it is my contention that we may
still learn much today by engaging with the ways in which posthumanist modernism navigated the
Quoted in Brigid Curtis Ayer, “Bill to dissolve human remains defeated in Indiana House,” The Criterion Online Edition,
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renegotiation of the human vis-à-vis a more general economy that stretches from the immediately
environmental to planetary and even cosmic scales. Conceiving of oneself as manure, admittedly, is
not a terribly comfortable experience. Baudelaire, Barnes, and Bataille each knew this, and
deliberately engaged emotional and visceral registers of disgust in order to probe the boundaries of
the self with regard to those entities and phenomena that human beings traditionally reject in order
to define themselves as human in the first place. But each author also limns the points at which
disgust seems to turn into attraction, pulling the reader into a space where a radically new conception
of the self as immanently imbricated in a more general economy of experience can be born. This
movement may help contextualize and broaden current debates on green burial and the current move
away from hegemonic, post-Enlightenment deathways. Baudelaire, Barnes, and Bataille each
abrogated the traditional Christian eschatological anchoring of the decaying corpse as a sign of future
resurrection while also resisting new retrenchments of human exceptionality that evolved via the
modern cult of the dead body and the public health revolution’s distancing of the dead from
everyday life. Now that we seem to be moving beyond the simultaneous sacralization/obscenification
of the corpse that is characteristic of the modern relationship to the dead and into, perhaps, a more
ecologically conscious conception of material human involvement in the biosphere, the various
explorations of organic breakdown that form the aesthetic core of posthumanist modernism appear
more salient than ever.
What surprised me about the direction this project has ultimately taken, however, is not the
departure from religious sensibilities, but the return to them. Each of the texts I have analyzed has
engaged with traditionally religious treatments of and attitudes toward the dead. Baudelaire draws
forth Ronsardian death-poetics, and while he largely shears them of their spiritual content (indeed, I
argued in part that his modernizing of Baroque poetics resided in this departure), his treatment of the
decomposition of organic matter nonetheless only truly makes sense in reference to premodern
deathways. Barnes situates Robin Vote’s final and most radical transgression of the division between
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the human and the nonhuman in a dilapidated church. The language of Robin’s becoming-dog,
according to Tyrus Miller, renders the line dividing “abject breakdown” and “divine
communication”386 undecidable, reflecting, perhaps, a more thoroughgoing blurring of the material
and something approaching the spiritual in Barnes’s overall rendering of the passage beyond the
human. Finally, the climax of Blue of Noon is set in the Trier graveyard, where memorial candles burn
over the moldering bodies of the dead and the novel’s main characters seem just on the verge of a
heavenly assumption (however perversely reversed.) The language of this passage, as I showed in the
preceding chapter, engages Bataille’s quasi-mystical approach to the literary precipitation of an
“extreme state,” which approximates what would have formerly been a religious experience of
ecstasy that blurs the lines of the individual subjectivity. While each author I have studied directly and
often brutally blasphemes Christian senses of propriety surrounding death and the dead, setting his
or her work in opposition to the traditional values embedded therein, each nonetheless evidences a
deep engagement with the religious and with pre-Enlightenment death culture in order to render
their representations of materialist transcendence legible.
It is for this reason that the death of Bishop Tutu took on a kind of talismanic significance
for me, occurring as it did at the end of writing this dissertation. For his death and the manner of
disposing of his mortal remains brought out just how fraught the interplay truly is between the
ecological and the religious that is, however counterintuitively, at play in the works of Baudelaire,
Barnes, and Bataille. My three authors appeared to prefigure this moment, where material and
spiritual relationships to the dead body and the broader cycles in which it is embedded collide.
Bataille, of course, makes no secret of the connection between mysticism and the
apprehension of, and entry into, what he calls general economy in The Accursed Share and what he calls
continuity in Erotism. One of his final works is dedicated to articulating a theory of religion that is
geared toward further clarifying this movement. Christian mysticism offers Bataille the most salient
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guide, the clearest method of meditation, whereby the transgression of the individual self and its
entry into more general movements of matter and energy can be conceived and even effected. This
persistent fascination with premodern methods of attaining states of ecstasy may have something to
do with what Michèle Richman has called Bataille’s “classical modernism”—that is, his tendency to
introduce archaic modalities of expression or stylistic techniques into experimental, modernist
texts.387 Richman singles out Blue of Noon, in which “Bataille inserted the imperfect tense of the
subjunctive and the plus-que-parfait, despite the fact that they were considered totally anachronistic in
the literary language of the 1950’s.”388 This tendency is nowhere more evident than during the climax,
where archaic tenses increasingly intersperse the language of the narrative, and the overall scene takes
on the character of a meticulously constructed, Baroque tableau. The effect of this shift in language
and imagery introduces “a more jerky rhythm, a more percussive tempo” to the text.389 Richman
associates this deliberate stylistic disjunction with Bataille’s overall project of precipitating “poetic
disruptions of contemporary modernism” via “methods and techniques capable of introducing a
sovereign moment into contemporary experience.”390 In this sense, Bataille not only uses the avantgarde techniques of modernist writing to irrupt into and corrupt then-contemporary senses of stable
and self-enclosed human-being, but even goes so far as to reverse this order of operations,
transgressing modernist prose via the established forms of the past in order to unleash further
interruptions of the course of ordinary life and the reader’s sense of what it means to be an individual
subject. “We are not only prey to our own feelings,” Bataille writes, “but of those of the past, whose
modes of expression continue in us all an agonizing agitation.”391
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This strange vibration of the past within the present resonates with the fascinating
movement I have unaccountably and unintentionally charted away from the language of religion and
back to it. The postmodern postmortem, increasingly, is characterized by the sense of one’s
embeddedness in a past and future that radically exceeds the human individual—but, today, this
sense of involvement in something vastly broader than one’s own self turns to the terran compost
pile, as Haraway puts it, rather than to the heavenly host. We have traded God for Gaia, perhaps.
The lapidary image of this shift may be that of Desmond Tutu’s body in the corpse resomator, slowly
disintegrating, and eventually coming to feed the soil of some Cape Town garden. Or it may be that
of Troppmann and Dirty in the Trier graveyard, covered in teeming soil, falling into the sky.
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